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Scotland, my auld, respected mitherl 
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Plate 1 The Highland Whisky Still by Sir Edward Landseer. United Distillers Pic. 
Although the reality was probably less chimerical than in Landseer's portrayal, the prevalence of illicit distilling throughout 18th century Scotland prompted the 
government to intervene, in so doing facilitating the development of one of the United Kingdom's most efficacious industries. It is contended herein that a 
similarly proactive stance on behalf of the industry may be required of the current government, if the success of Scotch whisky is to continue. 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation analyses imminent innovations in public policy 
that will impact upon the whisky industry, and, through linkage 
adjustments, the regional Scottish economy. An analysis of the 
interconnectedness between the whisky industry and the wider 
Scottish economy reveals that such linkages are substantial. 
A holistic conspectus of the whisky industry in the first part of the 
dissertation reveals that the predominant form of structural change 
in the past has been merger & acquisition. Such consolidation has 
permi tted economies in marketing & distribution, but it is contended 
that in this arena at least there is scope for further performance 
improvement in the industry. Nevertheless, with taxation forming 
such a significant proportion of the final price of the product, 
realising a sustained increase in demand is deemed to be largely 
outwith the capability of the industry. 
It is advanced, therefore, that two tax-related developments in 
public policy in the next few years will impact not merely upon the 
whisky industry, but materially upon the regional Scottish economy 
as well. The first of these imminent innovations examined is the 
proposed abolition of the intra-EU duty free concession in 1999. 
Whilst it is concluded that such a move is inevitable (and 
economically logical), it is nonetheless determined that this will 
have a meaningful detrimental impact upon the whisky industry and 
Scottish economy. 
Secondly, the current proposals of the European Commission for the 
harmonisation of alcohol excises across the European Union are 
critically appraised, and are shown to be grounded on no logical 
economic principles, but instead, enshr1ne protection for European 
vinicultures. The rationale for alcohol taxation is considered de 
novo, concluding that wi thin the Uni ted Kingdom & across the European 
Union, at a minimum all alcoholic beverages should be taxed on an 
equal basis according to alcoholic content, at a level sufficient to 
cover an estimate of the negative externalities associated with 
alcohol consumption. 
Mindful of the importance of the whisky industry to the Scottish 
economy, it is revealed that in times past, the public authorities 
have been proactive in intervening to secure the continuing 
prosperity of the whisky industry, and it is contended that such a 
stance may be required of the present government. The dissertation 
concludes by advocating a set of reforms to the structure of alcohol 
excises in the United Kingdom. 
An approximate halving of the excise applied to spirits, such that 
all alcoholic beverages are taxed equally according to alcoholic 
content, would ensure that the whisky industry & government could 
lobby with credibility for comparable structures to be adopted 
overseas, particularly in any revised proposals for European excise 
harmonisation. In addition, it is suggested that the fillip such a 
reform would give to domestic sales of whisky would mitigate the 
negative effects upon the whisky industry & regional Scottish 
economy of losing the intra-EU duty free concession in 1999. 
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Plate 2 The Glenturret Distillery, Crieff. The Glenturret Distillery Ltd. 
Although a rustic distillery is one of the images that most readily comes to mind when 
considering Scotch whisky, the industry supports many thousands of jobs right across 
rural and urban Scotland, the Highlands and Islands. In addition, exports of whisky 
earned almost £2.9 billion in 1997, whilst nearly £1 billion was contributed to 
HM Treasury in the form of excise duties and VAT. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Scotch Whisky Industry & The Scottish Economy 
Having regard to our difficulties about export it would be most improvident not 
to preserve this characteristic British element of our ascendancy. 
Winston Churchill on the whisky industry April 1945 
The manufacture of spiri tous liquor is a major industry in the United 
Kingdom, deriving its success from both natural and acquired 
advantages. The natural advantages are epi tomised by Scotch whisky, 
which can only be produced in one region, Scotland. Examined from 
whatever perspective - corporate, trade, employment, or revenue 
accruing to the exchequer - the salience of the whisky industry to the 
economy of the United Kingdom is made manifest. 
The United Kingdom is the largest spirits producer in Europe and the 
third largest in the world. Two of the three largest multinational 
drinks companies in the world originate in~the United Kingdom -
Allied Domecq and Diageo (formerly Grand Metropolitan and Guinness) 
- and, for each of these, spirits are a core business. In total, 
spirits producers in the United Kingdom account for one-third of 
world sales of branded spirits products. 1 
In a White Paper (Cm2867) concerned with competitiveness, the 
previous government stated that spirit distillation, of which Scotch 
whisky accounts for 60%, is the "League leader by a considerable 
margin", when all manufacturing industries in the United Kingdom are 
1 
ranked by a ratio of sales to domestic demand, and notes the 
importance to the United Kingdom of the comparative advantage 
enjoyed by the whisky industry, based on traditions and a highly 
developed network of suppliers. 2 
A comprehensive measure of an industry's contribution to the 
economy, as recorded in the Scottish Production Database, is the 
amount of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which it generates. The 
industry-level equivalent of GDP is gross value added (GVA), the net 
output from an industry less the cost of non-industrial services 
received, rates and licensing of motor vehicles. 
Net output is in turn calculated by taking the industry's gross 
output, (which for most manufacturing industries approximates to the 
industry's sales in any period), and deducting the value of material 
inputs, fuels and industrial services used up in production, with an 
adjustment made for changes in stocks in materials. Alternatively, 
GVA can be thought of as the income accruing to the factors of 
production - land, labour, capital and enterprise - employed in an 
industry. The total payment for these services must make up the 
difference between an industry's gross output and the value of 
material inputs. 
For the whisky industry, the inputs into the industry in anyone year 
will not match the gross output from the industry in that year, due to 
the lag between production and sales. However, an adjustment is made 
to account for changes in stocks of materials, stores and fuels, and 
changes in work-in-progress and goods on hand for sales. The 
Scottish Production Database, therefore, gives a reasonable 
2 
estimate of the value added by the whisky industry in anyone 
year. 3 
As illustrated in Table 1.1, Scottish Production Database figures 
for 1994, the latest year avai lable, indicate that GVA in the whi sky 
industry amounted to £700 million. This represents 35% of the total 
gross output in the industry of £1,995 million, above the 
manufacturing average of 31%. Moreover, value-added per employee 
averaged approximately £50,000 in 1994, almost 60% above the average 
for Scottish manufacturing. 
Table 1.1: Gross Value Added in Scottish Manufacturing 
Industries 1994 
Industry 
Food, Drink & Tobacco 
Whisky (Subset of Above) 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Leather 
Wood 
Pulp & Paper 
Printing & Publishing 
Chemicals & Man-made Fibres 
Rubber & Plastics 
Basic Metals 
Metal Products 
Mechanical Engineering 
Office Machinery 
Electrical Equipment 
Radio & TV Equipment 
Medical, Precision, Optical etc 
Motor Vehicles 
Other Transport Equipment 
Other Manufacturing & Recycling 
Total Scottish Manufacturing 
Gross Valued Added 
£ million £ per capita 
1975.6 
700.0 
379.5 
362.0 
25.6 
220.9 
500.4 
614.4 
623.0 
413.4 
232.6 
605.7 
769.3 
872.0 
236.3 
994.7 
341.2 
107.2 
513.1 
229.7 
10449.7 
30,731 
50,000 
17,495 
20,263 
16,437 
26,649 
38,751 
31,389 
41,131 
30,101 
41,984 
24,409 
29,131 
58,106 
21,832 
56,489 
31,478 
29,100 
26,799 
21,780 
Average 31,571 
Source: Scottish Economic Bulletin No 54 March 1997 
According to the Scottish Input-Output Tables for 1994, 8% of final 
3 
demand for whisky was accounted for by consumers in Scotland. This is 
roughly equivalent to the manufacturing average of 9%. Exports to 
the rest of the United Kingdom and overseas accounted for 92% of final 
demand. This shows a higher reliance by the industry upon exports 
compared to Scottish manufacturing as a whole, which sells 84% 
outwith Scotland. 
In 1992, whisky exports accounted for 21% of manufacturing exports. 
Since 1992, total manufacturing exports have grown more strongly 
than exports from the whisky industry with the result that, by 1995, 
the industry accounted for only 13% of total Scottish manufacturing 
exports. The decline in the whisky share of manufacturing exports is 
partly due to the rapid increase in electronics exports which grew by 
around 90% over the same period. 4 Scotch whisky is still nevertheless 
Scotland's third largest manufacturing export, and ranks fifth in 
the United Kingdom as a whole. The relative contribution of the 
whisky industry to Scotland's export performance is detailed in 
Table 1.2: 
4 
Table 1.2: Scottish Manufactured Exports in 1995 
Industry (Standard Industrial Classification 1992) £ million Rank 
15 
17 
18 
19 
~o 
~1 
~2 
~3 
~4 
~5 
~6 
~7 
~8 
~9 
~O 
~1 
~2 
~3 
~4 
~5 
~6 
~7 
Whisky 
Other food products and beverages 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
Tanning and dressing of leather; luggage, 
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
Wood and wood products 
Pulp, paper and board products 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 
Coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel 
Chemicals and chemical products 
Rubber and plastic products 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Basic Metals 
Fabricated metal products 
(except machinery and equipment) 
Machinery and equipment 
Office machinery 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 
Radio, television, and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
Medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Other transport equipment 
Furniture; Other manufacturing 
Recycling 
All manufacturing industries 
2,277 
499 
342 
134 
52 
22 
395 
30 
196 
1,563 
333 
111 
179 
299 
677 
5,973 
260 
3,241 
77 
161 
421 
69 
5 
17,315 
Source: Scottish Council Development & Industry 
3 
6 
9 
16 
20 
22 
8 
21 
13 
4 
10 
17 
14 
11 
5 
1 
12 
2 
18 
15 
7 
19 
23 
In net terms, Scotch whisky is actually the largest Scottish 
exporting industry because its inputs are predominantly sourced 
domestically, whereas the inputs of the electronics industry are in 
the main acquired from overseas. 5 The 1994 Input-Output Tables 
reveal that 82% of materials, fuels and service inputs purchased by 
the spirits & wines industries were garnered within Scotland. A 
further 12% were procured from elsewhere in the United Kingdom and 6% 
were sourced from the rest of the world. But for the Scottish economy 
as a whole, only 57% of inputs are obtained within Scotland, with 27% 
5 
and 17% acquired from elsewhere in the United Kingdom and overseas 
respectively. 6 
Whisky is the Uni ted Kingdom's leading export to Japan, earning over 
5% of the total value of exports to that country. In 1991, Scotch 
export earnings per employee averaged £120 ,000. By 1994, the figure 
for Scotch had reached £160, 000, and in 1996, £170, 000. This figure 
is almost twice the level of the next best performer 
(electrical/computer and communication products), and is seven 
times the average for all manufacturing industries in the United 
Kingdom. 7 
In sum, at the close of 1997 the total value of Scotch exports for 
that year approached nearly £2.9 billion, shipped to no less than 216 
countries around the world. No other industry in the United Kingdom 
achieves such geographical penetration. By way of contrast, as 
depicted in Figure 1.1, £1379 million was spent importing wine alone 
in 1996, and there is an incremental trade deficit in beer.8 
6 
Figure 1.1: United Kingdom Imports &: Exports of Alcoholic Drink 
£m 1996 
3000 
WhIskY 
2000 
1000 
o 
Other 
SpIrits 
Wine 
1000 r------------------------------------
+2259 +56 -1379 
Beer 
Imports 
Source: Pieda PIc The Abolition of Intra-EU Duty Free Shopping 
Direct Employment in Scotch Whisky production accounted for some 
13,345 jobs in 1996. The illdustry sources approximately £620 million 
, 
worth of inputs from suppliers based in Scotland, so employment 
ranging from barley production to warehousing, bottling &: packing, 
office employment, advertising &: marketing, engineering, road 
transport, shipping and distribution is indirectly generated by the 
whisky industry. In Chapter 3 an estimate is presented of the number 
of such jobs indirectly dependent upon the whisky industry (19,617). 
Expenditure by those both directly and indirectly employed in the 
supply chain results in increased consumption expenditure and 
additional induced employment, estimated at 8,408 in Chapter 3. 
In contrast with electronics and other 'sunrise' industries, which 
~rovide employment largely in central belt new town areas, whisky 
provides longer-term high value-added employment in a much wider 
range of Scottish communi ties. 9 Moreover, many of the jobs dependent 
upon Scotch whisky production are in areas with few alternative 
7 
upon Scotch whisky production are in areas with few alternative 
employment opportunities - in distilling in the Highlands & Islands 
of Scotland, or in bottling plants in urban areas with high 
unemployment. 1 0 Over 90% of Scotch whisky production occurs in areas 
which have been designated for Regional Fund Assistance by the 
European Union. 1 1 
Finally, Sutherlands Ltd have estimated that excise duty levied upon 
Scotch whisky accounted for £653 million in the year to 31st March 
1996. Value Added Tax (VAT) is payable on the total selling price of 
a bottle of whisky (including duty), which adds a further £180 
million of revenue, making a total Scotch whisky contribution to Her 
Majesty's Customs & Excise in excess of £830 million. 1 2 In addition, 
an estimated £182 million is paid in taxes by those dependent upon the 
whisky industry for employment, as well as approximately £480 
million in corporation tax from the principal companies in the 
industry (1996 estimate). 
8 
1.2 Survey of the Literature 
Let schoolmasters puzzle their brain, 
With grammar, and nonsense, and learning, 
Good liquor, I stoutly maintain, 
Gives genius a better discerning. 
Oliver Goldsmith She Stoops to Conquer 
Considering the importance of the whisky industry to the Scottish 
economy, it is some~hat surprising that to date few academic studies 
have been published specifically on this genre. There have been some 
theses written in the natural sciences on the chemical processes 
associated with whisky distillation, but within the social sciences 
such dissertations that are known about have as their topic the 
dynamics of change in the whisky industry in the pre-1939 era. There 
are, however, two exceptions; a PhD thesis from the University of 
Connecticut in 1994, and an Economics PhD from Strathclyde 
University in 1988. 
The American thesis, by Peter de Haven Caldwell of the Uni versi ty of 
Connecticut, proffered an unorthodox, if somewhat monocausal 
explanation of Scotland I s economic transformation in the 18th 
century. This is ascribed to the by-products of distillation, used 
as animal feed, freeing farmers from the problems of victualing 
livestock during the winter, thus enabling the soil to be manured 
year-round and producing greater yields. 
was then distilled into whisky as a 
wealth. 1 3 
9 
This agricultural surplus 
non-perishable store of 
The one Economics thesis was submitted in 1988 by James Love, a member 
of Strathclyde University's Fraser of Allander Institute. This 
perspicuous tract focused upon three external acquisitions of 
indigenous Scotch whisky companies in the 1970s, and attempted to 
quantify, utilising input-output analysis, the effects on the 
Scottish economy of linkage adjustments in the aftermath of the 
takeover. 14 
Naturally there is a body of literature on the history of Scotch 
whisky distillation & production, and tasting notes on the 
subtleties & nuances of the multitudinous whiskies on the market. 
Not surprisingly, considering the significance of the whisky 
industry in Scotland, the Scottish business press features articles 
on individual firms fairly frequently, as do various periodicals 
such as Accountancy, Admap, Marketing Today, The Scottish Business 
Insider, The Economist and International Business Week. 
A number of publications have examined the linkages between sectors 
within the Scottish economy, and attempted to model the effects of 
exogenous shocks upon the region. Several publications of those 
attached to Strathclyde University's Fraser of Allander Institute, 
such as Ashcroft & Love's Takeovers, Mergers & The Regional Scottish 
Economy, ISmay be ascribed to this group, and of especial utility in 
the context of this thesis, James Love's work on the impact on the 
regional economy of altered linkages associated with external 
takeover of Scotch whisky companies. 1 6 An underlying theme in many of 
these sources is a scepticism as to the overall benefits of 
acquisition of indigenous Scottish firms by concerns from outwith 
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Scotland, identifying as one outcome significant negative linkage 
adjustments within the Scottish economy. 
Much of the Fraser of Allander Institute's work takes the form of 
applying data from the Scottish Input-Output Tables,17 a project 
upon which the Institute and The Scottish Office work closely 
together. Developments in the Input-Output project are chronicled 
intermi ttently in the Scottish Office's Scottish Economic 
Bulletin. 
The Input-Output Tables also contain within estimates of income, 
output and employment multipliers for Scotland, which are clearly of 
relevance in any study of the effects upon the regional economy of a 
change in final demand in such an important sector as the whisky 
industry. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the controversial 
issue of bulk exports of whisky generated much acrimonious 
discussion, several publications utilised multipliers to lend 
credence to arguments in favour of restricting the export of Scotch 
whisky in bulk. The work of J K Thomson was prominent in this 
category. 1 8 
Another pertinent category of literature is that contained in the 
learned Economics journals, which periodically feature therein 
analyses of own-price, cross-price and income elasticities of 
demand. In particular, Tony McGuinness's has written quite 
extensively on estimates for the Irish Republic, and the Institute 
For Fiscal Studies (IFS) is occasionally commissioned to quantify 
variables for Her Majesty's Customs & Excise. These estimates have 
been utilised by, inter alia, National Economic Research Associates 
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and Pieda PIc, who have written on the effects of the abolition of 
intra-EU duty free sales in 1999. 19 
The IFS have also used demand elasticities, as well as information 
gleaned from the Family Expenditure Surveys, to create their own 
econometric model of a demand function for alcoholic drinks, and the 
effects upon consumption, distribution and exchequer receipts from 
altering alcohol excises. Several studies have been published by 
both the IFS and the Adam Smith Institute in this area. The IFS 
studies generally advocate a fairly restrictive policy of alcohol 
taxation, ascribing high values to the negative social costs of 
alcohol consumption in the United Kingdom. Quantifying the latter is 
problematic, however, given that all excepting a very few works in 
this field have been in the United States & Canada. 
The planning, economic and development consultants Pieda PIc are 
retained as consultants to the Scotch Whisky Association and a 
propos this role have produced several publications emphasising the 
importance of the whisky industry to the Uni ted Kingdom economy, most 
of which are in the form of pre-budget submissions for the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer and Treasury officials. Despite being overtly 
lobbying documents, in respect of the data contained within, they 
proved invaluable in writing this thesis. 
The Scotch Whisky Association publishes an annual tripartite 
publication, which includes 1) a Review of the year's developments in 
the whisky industry, 2) a Statistical Report, and 3) a supplement 
detailing the many Barriers to Trade Scotch whisky faces around the 
world. 20 Finally, Alan S Gray of the Edinburgh stockbrokers 
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Sutherlands Ltd compiles an Annual Review of the Whisky Industry, 2 1 
which although primarily intended for the use of investment analysts 
(reflected in the asking price of £325 a copy), is undoubtedly the 
single most comprehensive and exhaustive compendium of statistics 
available on the whisky industry. 
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1.3 The Importance of the Present Research 
Breathes there the man, with soul so dead, 
Who never to himself hath said, 
This is my own, my native land! 
Land of brown heath and shaggy wood, 
Land of the mountain and the flood, 
Land of my sires! What mortal hand 
Can e'er untie the filial band 
That knits me to thy rugged strand! 
Sir Walter Scott (1805) The Lay of rhe Lasr Minsrrel VI 
In Section 1.1 an attempt was made to propound an apen;;u of the import 
of the Scotch whisky industry to the economy of the United Kingdom. 
It will be noted from the foregoing review of the literature that few 
academic studies published hitherto have had as their raison d'etre 
an attempted quantification of this significance, the Pieda briefs 
notwithstanding. 
The publications of those attached to the Fraser of A1lander 
Insti tute & The Scottish Office have determined an appropriate 
methodological structure for utilising input-output tables, and in 
particular, the work of James Love on the effects of external 
takeover involved applying this analysis to the whisky industry. 
Journal articles and occasional papers by the likes of the IFS have 
sought to determine the effects of varying indirect taxes, such as 
alcohol excises, upon consumption, distributional considerations, 
and exchequer revenues. 
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But hitherto, these disparate sources have not been systematically 
conjoined in order to model the effects of shifts in public policy, 
not only upon final demand for whisky, but the implications of this 
for other sectors of the Scottish economy. This neglect is somewhat 
surprising, as two innovations in the near future could well have a 
~reater impact upon the whisky industry than any other development 
since the restoration of trade after World War II. 
The proposed abolition of intra-EU duty free sales in 1999 is one such 
development. The European Travel Research Foundation have attempted 
to determine the effects of this upon a whole host of manufacturing, 
retail, transport and distributional sectors, and recently 
commissioned Pieda PIc to produce a report concerned specifically 
with the impact of abolition upon the Scotch whisky industry. But 
~onsidering that the European Union duty free market is estimated to 
be worth approximately £185 million (1995 prices) to the Scotch 
whisky industry, its loss is likely to resul t in significant n~gative 
linkage adjustments with suppliers right across the Scottish 
economy. Even if abolition does not result entirely in a 100% loss, 
wi th some compensating increase in duty paid sales, this is 
undoubtedly an issue of great concern to the industry. 
Secondly, and arguably of even greater concern, are the recurring 
attempts to harmonise indirect taxation across the European Union. 
The European Union, including the United Kingdom, accounted for 
almost half of all whisky sales in 1996, equivalent to £827.94m in 
value, and with tax representing over 40% of the final price even in 
low tax regimes such as Spain and Italy, any harmonisation will have 
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repercussions upon the demand for whisky, which again, will impact 
upon the whole Scottish economy. 
The bulk of the existing studies that have examined the European duty 
free market, advocated stances to be adopted by ministers when 
discussing harmonisation of indirect taxation in Europe, or argued 
for reform of the duty structure in the United Kingdom, have been 
concerned almost exclusively with the consequences upon alcohol 
consumption, distributional considerations, or public sector 
revenues. Few have 'undertaken a rigorous ab initio reappraisal of 
the functioning of the Single Market or the rationale for the special 
taxation of alcohol, much less taken into account the impact of their 
proposed innovations upon the Scotch whisky industry, and the 
effects on the wider Scottish economy from linkage adjustments. 
This thesis aims to redress these omissions, attempting to quantify 
the impact not only upon the whisky industry, but the whole Scottish 
economy, of ending the intra-EU duty free concession in 1999, the 
harmonisation of alcohol duties across the European Union, and 
possible reforms of the structure of excise duties in the United 
Kingdom. The innovations proposed in existing studies are examined 
cri tically with regard to standard economic theory, and in the light 
of their likely impact upon the whisky industry & the Scottish 
economy. Al ternati ve, arguably more appropriate policies are 
advocated. 
This is felt to be important, as implicit in debate on such public 
policy issues as the abolition of intra-EU duty free and the 
harmonisation of excises are assumptions about the operating of the 
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Single Market, the most appropriate role of government in the market 
place and the rationale for the special taxation of alcohol. Reform 
in these areas should not be reduced to seeking a compromise that 
satisfies nobody but does not displease anbody, or political horse-
trading in Europe's Council of Ministers. Any innovations will have 
real and significant effects not only upon a nebulous 'whisky 
industry', but on people's jobs, prosperity and lives right across 
Scotland. No government should be impervious to this when 
deliberating upon these issues and advocating policies. 
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1.4 The Structure of The Dissertation 
Including the introductory Chapter, this thesis is divided into 
eight principal Chapters. Chapter 2 looks at the Scotch Whisky 
industry per se, examining areas which are wi thin the competence of 
the industry to affect. In the first Section, a brief account of the 
history of distillation in Scotland demonstrates that at certain 
times in the past, the public authorities made the decision to 
concern themselves with some aspect of the whisky industry. This is 
of significance in the context of this thesis, a principle contention 
of which is that the potential problems facing the whisky industry in 
the present era are such that a more proactive stance may again be 
required of the government. A Section on the production of whisky is 
included in order to make the point that in such a traditional 
industry, changes in capital ratios are limited, and significant 
increments in productivity are rare. 
A chronological description of the process of industrial 
consolidation is also pertinent as this has been the predominant form 
of structural change in the whisky industry in the past, and seems 
likely to continue to be. The Section on trends in consumption 
depicts the long-term problems facing the industry in mature 
markets, a factor which has been exacerbated by discriminatory 
taxation, referred to in later Chapters. Current marketing 
practices, the continuing controversy over bulk exports, and the 
system of exporting and distribution are examined, with the 
conclusion that in these areas at least the whisky industry has been 
somewhat deficient in the past. 
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Prima facie, such issues may appear somewhat incongruous in a 
dissertation primarily concerned with the impact of public policy, 
but Chapter 2 is intended to demonstrate that the petitioning of the 
whisky industry for a fairer hearing from public authorities is not 
just another case of special pleading for grace & favour by one of the 
United Kingdom's many hard pressed industries. Whilst it is argued 
in Chapter 2 that there is some scope for improvements intra vires the 
whisky industry, particularly in the fields of marketing and 
distribution, the general thrust of this Chapter is that with tax 
accounting for such a significant element of the final price, 
achieving substantial increments in sales is outwi th the control of 
the industry. 
Utilising the Scottish Office Input-Output Tables, an estimate is 
made in Chapter 3 of the employment associated with the whisky 
industry across Scotland. Direct employment by whisky companies is 
detailed, followed by the application of input-output analysis to 
determine indirect and mul tiplier induced employment. Applying this 
methodology in Chapter 4 facilitates an attempted quantification of 
the impact upon the whisky industry and Scottish economy of the 
proposed abolition of the intra-European duty free concession in 
1999. 
Chapter 5 examines the history of taxes upon alcohol in the United 
Kingdom, and the present duty structure. The rationale for the 
special taxation of alcohol is considered in respect of the extant 
theoretical arguments for commodity taxation. This is important as 
much of the published literature on reforming the structure of 
alcohol duties has eschewed a rigorous analysis of the proper role of 
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excise duties. 
After an examination of the current structure of alcohol excises in 
the major European countries, Chapter 6 devotes a large Section to 
considering the degree of competition between different categories 
of alcoholic beverages, and in particular whether there is price-
induced substitution between various forms of alcohol. Naturally 
this involves a consideration of variables for cross-price 
elastici ties. A critical analysis is then undertaken of the current 
proposals for excise harmonisation proposed by the European 
Commission. Chapter 6 concludes by considering the various 
al ternati ves to European excise convergence advocated by some 
economists. 
Chapter 7 considers the many problems wi th the present duty structure 
in the United Kingdom and critically appraises proposed reforms in 
the light of their potential effects upon the whisky industry and 
Scottish economy. Most are found to be wanting, and an alternative 
set of proposals is advocated. The anticipated impact of these 
proposals upon the whisky industry, wider Scottish economy and 
public finances is then quantified. Chapter 7 also includes a 
Section on estimates of own-price elasticities. Chapter 8 
concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE SCOTCH WHISKY INDUSTRY 
2.1 Introduction 
What is it gives me the necessary sagacity to outwit the Inspector? Whisky. What 
is it that helps me to know just where to put down the net in Loch Sleeport for 
Waggett's sea-trout? Whisky. What makes me a good shot at grouse or snipe? 
Whisky. What is it makes Maclaren such a hell of a good doctor? Whisky. Love 
makes the world go round? Not at all. Whisky makes it go round twice as 
fast. 
Norman Macleod in Sir Compton Mackenzie (1947) Whisky Galore 
This Chapter adopts a holistic conspectus towards the Scotch whisky 
industry per se, incorporating the history of whisky distilling in 
Scotland and the seemingly inexorable process of consolidation in 
the industry, as well as the production, marketing, and distribution 
of whisky worldwide. No a priori conclusion as to the exigency of 
government sustenance for the industry is possible without 
undertaking such a critical appraisal of the whisky industry IS 
performance in these ambits which are wi thin its competence to 
affect. 
An account of the history of distilling in Scotland in Section 2.2 
details the various government measures and the revolution in 
blending that laid the foundations for the production of whisky on a 
commercial scale. Section 2.2 concludes with a delineation of the 
legal innovations that have protected the character and integrity of 
Scotch whisky in the United Kingdom, and provided a standard for 
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nations overseas to abide by. In Section 2.3, the process of whisky 
distillation is briefly described, including a summary of capacity 
utilisation in the industry in recent years, concluding with an 
examination of recent transformations in productivity. 
The process of industrial consolidation in the industry is described 
in Section 2.4, with reference to the standard theories of industrial 
economics. This includes an explanation for the sizeable shifts in 
ownership in the 1970s, the demise of the Distillers Company Limited 
(DCL), once the dominant firm in the industry, and the debut of 
Guinness on the scene wi th its infamous takeover of DCL in 1986. The 
Section also analyses the motives behind the considerable foreign 
investment in the industry and any untoward effects this may have had 
upon the regional economy. Finally, developments are brought to date 
by an appraisal of the issues surrounding the recent merger between 
two of the largest firms in the industry, Guinness and Grand 
Metropolitan. 
Section 2.5 discusses recent trends in consumption, production and 
marketing. Explanations are tendered for the secular decline in 
whisky consumption in mature markets, and the consequences upon 
production considered. The advertising and marketing of whisky is 
scrutinized, as is the growth in new products such as single malts, 
and the prospects for the industry in overseas markets contemplated. 
Section 2.6 conducts an investigation of the issues surrounding the 
continuing controversy over the export of whisky in bulk, and 
considers appropriate strategies in this arena as well as in the more 
general ambits of distribution and overseas investment. Section 2.7 
concludes Chapter 2. 
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2.2 The History of Distilling in Scotland 
On the grim battlefield of Culloden whisky was used, perhaps for the first time, 
for a sacred purpose, when John Maitland, a Presbyter of the Episcopal Church of 
Scotland, administered the Holy Eucharist to the mortally wounded Lord 
Strathallan with oatcake and whisky, 'the requisite elements not being 
obtainable. ' 
From Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart (1995) Scorch: The Whisky of Scorland in Facr & 
Srory 
Mr Johnson, whom I had not seen taste any fermented liquor before during our 
expedition, had a gill of· whisky brought to him. "Come," said he, "Let me know 
what it is that makes a Scotchman [sic] happy." He drank it all but a drop, which I 
begged leaved to pour into my glass, that I might say we had drank whisky 
together. 
James Boswell (1807) in The Journal of A Tour ro rhe Hebrides 
The process of spirit distillation is mentioned by Aristotle writing 
some 350 years before Christ, and his contemporary Zosemus of 
Alexandria gives an accurate description of the necessary apparatus. 
He does not claim to be its inventor, but to have derived his material 
from wall-paintings in an Ancient Egyptian temple. It is probable 
that distillation was known to the Chinese at an equally early 
date. 1 
During the disasters of the Barbarian invasions, much of the lore of 
the Ancient World was preserved by the Arabs. The Arab chemist Geber, 
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who lived in the 8th century AD, was very familiar with distillation, 
and the Arabic word 'alcohol' is universally applied to its product. 
From the Moors, the secrets filtered through to the abbeys and 
monasteries of Spain and Western Christendom, 2 where devotion to God 
and a supposedly ascetic existence did not seem to preclude the 
production of alcoholic drinks, initially regarded as cordials or 
medicines. It is no accident that so many liqueurs bear monastic 
names. 3 
There is also evidence to suggest that distilling had been practiced 
in Ireland from the beginning of the eleventh century, even perhaps 
by the ancient Celts, who believed its product's power "To revive 
tired bodies and falling spiri ts, to drive out the chill and rekindle 
hope, was a gift from God." 
Though it was not until 1505 that the Guild of Surgeon Barbers in 
Edinburgh were given a monopoly to distill strong waters for 
medicinal purposes, 4 the first indisputable reference to distilling 
in Scotland is an entry of 1494 in the archives of the National 
Exchequer. It records the purchase of "eight bolls of malt by Friar 
John Cor (of Dunfermline, the former capital city) wherewith to make 
acqua vi rae. " 
Acqua vi rae, 'The Water of Life', indicated simply 'spirits'. This 
word, in various spellings, is found today in some Nordic countries, 
and the French eau-de-vie translates in the same way. Rendered in the 
Irish and Scottish-Gaelic, the term becomes uisge bearha or 
usquebaugh, among other spellings. These Gaelic names, sounding to 
the English speaker like 'uishgi', were corrupted to 'whisky.,5 
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For several centuries whisky distilling remained a small cottage 
industry, usually carried out by crofters and farmers, quite often in 
extremely remote and isolated areas of the country. The government 
were nevertheless determined to raise revenue by imposing excise 
duties on the sale of whisky. The still operators and consumers were 
equally determined that they were not going to pay these duties. 
Towards the end of the 18th century there were Ii terally thousands of 
. illicit distilleries scattered throughout Scotland, immortalized in 
Sir Edwin Landseer' s famous painting The Highland Whisky Still (see 
Plate 1). 
In 1823 after a Board of Trade Commission had reported on the facts to 
Parliament, a Distilling Act to eliminate illegal distilling was 
passed wi th the support of the Duke of Gordon. Under the provisions 
of this act, all of Scotland's distilleries were required to be 
licensed, and to make provision for a resident Excise Officer (see 
Plate 6). A flat rate was introduced on all stills of 40 gallons 
upwards and a duty of 2s 3d was levied on each gallon of spirits 
distilled, with the immediate result that wi thin two years the amount 
of tax-paid whisky had increased from 2m to 6m gallons annually. 
Producers operating within the law started to prosper, the 
authori ties clamped down ever harder on the illegal stills, and their 
operators either became honest men or were closed down. Encouraged 
by the Duke of Gordon, one of the first such 'honest men' to take 
advantage of the 1823 act was his tenant George Smith of Glenlivet, 
whose whisky became what is now one of the most famous malts. 6 
It was in this new climate that some of the industry's most astute and 
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imaginative men turned their attention to the matter of their whisky. 
Towards the middle of the 19th century they began to investigate a new 
idea, which was to revolutionize the Scottish whisky industry, and 
facilitate an explosion in demand. The concept which attracted 
attention was that of blending: the combination of different 
whiskies to produce a new and different Scotch. 
Hi therto, much of the whisky produced had been rough and fiery 
because of the vrimitive conditions in which it was created; there 
was little quality control, and as a result the flavour, character 
and strength could vary wildly. The notion of 'brands' or trademarks 
were unknown in any industry. Whisky was sold by the cask to country 
grocers and wine merchants. Johnnie Walker was one such shopkeeper; 
George Ballantine another; the Chivas Brothers were partners in a 
shop. These merchants dealt with the lack of consistency or volume by 
creating their own in-house vattings, and these became brands. John 
Dewar, who went into the business in 1806, was the first person to 
sell branded whiskies in bottles. 7 
The first commercial blend - in the sense that it was offered for sale 
to a wider market, and thus had to be consistent - was made by Andrew 
Usher in 1853. Usher was the Edinburgh agent for Glenlivet, and he 
named his creation Old Vatted Glenlivet. By 1860 it was being 
advertised in London, and in 1864 he was selling overseas, especially 
India. Others followed, spurred on by the fact that increases in tax 
(in 1853 and 1855) caused a slackening of demand for whisky in the 
United Kingdom. 8 
A concatenation of various factors were to assist the whisky 
28 
Plate 3 The Monarch of the Glen by Sir Edwin Landseer 1851. United Distillers PIc. 
Contemporaneous with the writings of Sir Walter Scott, Landseer's romanticized paintings of Highland subjects came to epitomize Victorian infatuation 
with all things Scottish, greatly assisting the expansion of the whisky industry in the latter 19th century. 
distillers in marketing their new creations. In 1827-28, the most 
prominent distiller in Scotland, Robert Stein, took out patents for a 
still which was heated internally by steam, instead of by an external 
furnace, and which distilled whisky in one continuous operation, 
unlike the traditional pot-still which had to be filled, emptied and 
refilled. But it was Aneaus Coffey, Inspector General of the Excise 
in Ireland, who in 1830 was sharp enough to adapt, patent and market 
the concept, and with 'Coffey's Continuous Patent Stills' it became 
possible to produce a light, palatable whisky fast· and 
economically.9 Further encouragement to producing large volumes of 
blends came with Gladstone's Spirit Act of 1860, which permitted 
blending in bonded warehouses before duty had to be paid. 
The growing success of Scotch whisky was aided by the infatuation in 
Victorian Britain, led by Queen Victoria, for all things Scottish, 
epitomized by the writings of Sir Walter Scott and the paintings of 
Sir Edwin Landseer, such as The Monarch of The Glen (see Plate 3), 
the well established rail and sea routes, which made transportation 
far easier than previously, and the existence of the British Empire, 
the largest free market in the world. 
Finally, the role of the Phylloxera Vastatrix bug in heightening the 
demand for Scotch whisky was immense. The bug devastated the 
vineyards of France between the mid-1860s and the late 1880s, with 
the result that the production of Cognac virtually ceased. Hitherto, 
brandy (with soda) had been the drink of the middle classes in the 
United Kingdom. Blended whisky (with soda) was there to replace 
it. laThe change in tastes this phenomenon represented was attested 
to by Sir Winston Churchill in A Roving Commission: "My father could 
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never have drunk whisky except when shooting on a moor or in some very 
dull chilly place. He lived in the age of brandy & soda."l 1 
Legal Protection for Scotch Whisky 
The position of Scotch was finally entrenched in a series of legal 
decisions, the first of which was recorded in the early years of the 
20th century. In 1906 Islington Borough Council took a local 
publican to Court for selling grain whisky, alleging that this was 
"not the nature, substance and quality demanded by the purchaser. " 
The result seemed a resounding triumph for the pot-still malt 
distillers when it was held that "whisky should consist of a spirit 
distilled in a pot-still derived from malted barley ... " 
Al though at first hailing this legal decision as a resounding 
victory, the malt whisky distillers quickly realised that the 
enormously wealthy Lowland distillers would simply distill very 
cheap Lowland malts and use them instead of their Highland malts to 
produce blended whisky. Both sides therefore asked for a Royal 
Commission to decide the issue, and after six months, in 1909, the 
Commission concluded that: "Whiskey (the current spelling of the 
period), is a spirit obtained by the distillation of a mash of cereal 
grains saccharified by the diastase of the malt; that 'Scotch 
Whiskey' is whiskey, as above defined, distilled in Scotland ... " 
This definition of Scotch whisky was finally incorporated in Statute 
Law in 1952.12 
A revised legal definition of Scotch whisky was included in the 
Finance Act of 1969, covering the three major elements of what 
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consti tutes whisky, what constitutes Scotch whisky, and a defini tion 
of blended Scotch whisky. The defini tion had the important effect of 
specifying the broad process of production & distillation, laying 
down a minimum period of maturation of three years in wooden casks, 
and gave the title 'Scotch whisky' a unique geographic meaning, 
implying that the product was distilled and matured in Scotland. 
Blended Scotch whisky may only claim that title if each of the 
individual whiskies in the blend is entitled to be called Scotch 
whisky in its own right. 
In June 1982 the European Commission published proposals to 
establish general definitions wi thin the Community to cover various 
alcoholic beverages. Included in these proposals were the 
acceptance of the unique nature of various national spirit products 
such as Scotch whisky and Cognac, and a definition of Scotch whisky in 
practice similar to that of the United Kingdom was established in 
European law in 1989. 13 
The current UK legislation relating specifically to Scotch whisky is 
the Scotch Whisky Act of 1988, and the orders made under it, which 
came into effect in June 1990 and superseded that part of the Finance 
Act of 1969, as subsequently amended, defining Scotch whisky as 
whisky: 
a) Which has been produced at a distillery in Scotland from water and 
malted barley (to which only whole grains of other cereals may be 
added), all of which have been: 
i) Processed at that distillery into a mash 
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ii) Converted to a fermentable substrate only by endogenous enzyme 
systems; and 
iii) Fermented only by the addition of yeast: 
b) Which has been distilled at an alcoholic strength by volume of less 
than 94.8% so that the distillate has an aroma and taste derived from 
the raw materials used in, and the method of, its production: 
c) Which has been matured in an excise warehouse in Scotland in oak 
casks of capacity not exceeding 700 litres, the period of that 
maturation being not less than 3 years; 
d) Which retains the colour, aroma, and taste derived from raw 
materials used in, and the method of, its production and maturation; 
and ... 
e) To which no substance other than water and spirit caramel has been 
added ... " 
The Scotch Whisky Act of 1988 prohibits, inter alia, the production 
in Scotland of whisky other than Scotch whisky. The Scotch Whisky Act 
of 1988 and European Union legislation both specify a minimum 
alcoholic strength of 40% by volume, which applies to all Scotch 
whisky bottled and/or put up for sale within or exported from the 
EU. 1 4 
Thus, through this legal definition the name and reput'ation of Scotch 
whisky can be enforced within the United Kingdom & European Union, 
and provides the basis for persuading other countries to accept the 
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standards laid down and to incorporate such standards into their own 
national legislation. 1 5 For example, in June 1996 Australia passed 
into Commonwealth law a definition of Scotch whisky matching that of 
the United Kingdom, including a statutory minimum strength of 40% 
alcohol by volume. In addition, in late August 1996, Chinese 
government officials visited the industry and explored the 
possibili ty of incorporating the United Kingdom definition into 
Chinese legislation. 16 
The Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) has been highly active in this 
area of 'protection' by litigation where misappropriation of the 
ti tIe 'Scotch Whisky' can be identified. The domestic whisky 
industry is heavily dependent upon brand images that have been 
nurtured over many decades and this investment can be seriously 
undermined by counterfeiting, which is a particular problem in the 
Far East. 
The International Federation of Spirits Producers (IFSP) has been 
established to assist the local law enforcement agencies in 
detecting counterfeits of IFSP members' products and to handle 
investigations on behalf of its members. 17 The SWA also receives 
considerable support from various government departments in its 
monitoring and protection activities. 
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2.3 The Production of Whisky 
The immortal spirit grows 
Like harmony in music; there is a dark 
Inscrutable workmanship that reconciles 
Discordant elements, makes them cling together 
In one society. 
Anon from Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart (1995) Scotch: The Whisky of Scotland in Fact 
& Story 
Wide was our foresire I lore, but only these, the Northern Branch, were masters of 
the old Dark alchemy that from the barley frees the last elixir, in whose liquid 
gold the essences of the shining summers dwell, the mystery that none may ever 
tell, while still the heather to the hill returns. 
Anon from H Charles Craig (1994) The Scotch Whisky Industry Record 
As detailed in the previous Section, whisky is the distilled spirit 
of cereals, and within the United Kingdom, for this spirit to be 
called 'whisky', it must be matured in oak casks for at least three 
years, and to be called 'Scotch Whisky', it must be distilled in 
Scotland. Within this broad category there are essentially three 
types of Scotch whisky produced: malt whisky, made exclusively from 
mal ted barley, grain whisky, made from mal ted barley and other 
unmal ted cereals such as barley, wheat and principally, 
maize, 1 8 (accounting for around 85% of the ingredients of the 
recipe), and blended whisky, containing both malt and grain 
whiskies. 19 
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Malt Whisky 
Malt whisky is produced in batches by the pot still method, in 
relatively small distilleries scattered throughout Scotland, each 
of which claims to have its own individual flavour. Malt distilling 
can be divided into four main stages: malting, mashing, fermenting 
and distilling. 
i) Malting 
The barley is first steeped in tanks of water for two days or so and 
then allowed to germinate; the starch in the grains turns to sugar 
and rootlets begin. to sprout from the barley. After five or six days 
germination is hal ted by drying the mal ted barley for about 24 hours 
in a kiln fired by oil, gas or coke together wi th peat. In the course 
of this drying the malt absorbs the smoke from the peat and this in 
part gives Scotch whisky its unique flavour. 
Many distilleries now buy all or part of their malt ready made from 
specialist maltsters, although a handful, such as the Springbank 
distillery at Campbeltown, retain traditional floor maltings. 
Springbank is also one of only two distilleries which malt all the 
barley required for distilling, which obviously gives the company 
greater quality control than most other distilleries in Scotland. 
The type of barley used is an important element in the quality of the 
final product. Mal tsters and distillers traditionally favoured the 
local Golden Promise barley, but many have latterly substi tuted into 
higher yielding strains. It is perhaps no coincidence that the 
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customarily regarded 'Rolls-Royce' of malt whiskies, The Macallan, 
is produced exclusively from the costly, low-yielding Golden Promise 
variety. A few years ago, a decidely inferior batch of Macallan 
emerged from the spirit still, occasioning much angst until it was 
discovered that the spirit had been produced with a 50-50 blend of 
Golden Promise and a lesser variety of barley. Even at this ratio, 
the whisky was unsaleable as The Macallan. 2o 
ii) Mashing 
The dried malt is ground in a mill and this 'grist' is mixed wi th hot 
water in a large vessel called a 'mash tun.' The soluble starch is 
thus converted into a sugary liquid known as 'wort'. 
iii) Fermenting 
After cooling, the wort is passed into large vessels, known as 
'washbacks', where it is fermented by the addition of yeast. The 
resul tant liquid, known as 'wash' , contains alcohol of a low strength 
which has been produced by the action of yeast on the sugar in the 
wort, emitting large amounts of carbon dioxide in the process. 
Purists maintain that superior quality whisky emerges from 
traditional pine or larch washbacks, but most parsimonious 
distillers have switched to stainless steel, which as well as being 
cheaper to purchase, are significantly easier to maintain. 
iv) Disti11ing 
Mal t whisky is distilled twice in large copper pot stills, the shape 
36 
of which adds to the individual character of the distillery's whisky. 
The first distillation of the liquid wash is carried out in the wash 
still and separates the alcohol from the fermented liquid, 
eliminating the residue yeast and unfermentable matter. The solids 
remaining after the wort is run off, and the residue after 
distillation, are converted into cattle feed or fertilizer. This may 
be done at the distillery or in one of the number of 'dark grains' 
effluent disposal plants situated throughout Scotland and designed 
specifically for this purpose. 
The distillate ('low wines') is then distilled in the spirit still 
but only part of this second distillate is of an acceptable quality 
and is collected in the spiri t receiver. The first and last runnings 
of the distillation (the 'foreshots' and 'feints'), are run-off and 
redistilled with the next low wines. The pot still process is 
intermi ttent, the still being recharged every time a distillation is 
completed. 21 
Since the 1960s virtually all distillers have converted their stills 
from direct flame heating to internal steam coils. But at the 
Springbank distillery, the wash still continues to be fired from 
below by a live flame. To prevent solids within the wash at the base 
of the still from burning, Spingbank's wash still is fitted with 
rotating copper rummagers. This method of continually scraping 
solids has traditionally been considered an important factor in the 
whisky's eventual character; when distilleries began to convert to 
steam coil heating, many stillmen observed a notable diminishing in 
the quality of the spirit. 
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Plate 4 The Malt Whisky Producing Regions of Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
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The Malt Whisky Producing Regions of Scotland 
As the fruit of the vine differs widely from Bordeaux to the Loire, so 
too do malt whiskies vary considerably in the nuances of body and 
flavour, depending upon the distillery from which they originate. In 
common with viniculture, the malt whisky distilleries of Scotland 
are categorized by geographical areas, summarized in Table 2.1 and 
illustrated in Plate 4. This map also features the one distillery in 
Northern Ireland, Bushmills, licensed by King James VI & I in 1608 and 
now the oldest licensed distillery in the United Kingdom. As 
Bushmills is the only remaining distillery in Ulster, it is usually 
categorized with the Scotch whisky industry. The Lowlands, 
Highlands (alo~g with the subregions of Speyside and the Islands), 
Campbel town and Islay regions have their origins in the regulation of 
licences and duties, but they do al so embrace certain 
characteristics. 22 
Table 2.1: Geographical Distribution of Whisky Distilleries 
Highland 75 
Lowland 2 
Islay incl Jura 7 
Campbel t own 1 
Grain 8 
Total 93 
The Highland distilleries include one each on Arran, Mull 
and Skye, two on Orkney, and the cluster of distilleries 
in the Speyside region of Grampian. 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1995 
Of the total 85 pot still malt distilleries operating in Scotland in 
1995, 75 may be classified as Highland Malts, made north of an 
imaginary 1 ine drawn from Greenock in the west to Dundee in the east. 
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The majority of Highland distilleries are located in the Grampian 
region of Speyside, with a particularly heavy concentration in the 
Moray district; here approximately 30% of manufacturing employment 
is provided by the whisky industry.23 Given the large numbers of 
distilleries in this area, the Speyside mal ts are often regarded as a 
distinct subset of the Highland region, as are the whiskies produced 
on the islands of Mull, Skye & Orkney. In 1995 a distillery also 
opened on the island of Arran at Lochranza, whose first single malt is 
eagerly expected in January 2001. Since quality of water plays such 
an important role in the production of malt whisky the reason for the 
locational concentration of malt distilleries in Speyside & the 
islands is not surprising. 
Lowland mal ts are produced south of the Greenock-Dundee line, and are 
distinguished by a softness untempered by Highland peatiness or 
coastal brine and seaweed. The number of operational Lowland 
distilleries has fallen sharply in recent years from 8 in 1980 to only 
2 in 1995. There is also one distillery, Springbank, currently 
producing at the extremity of the Kintyre peninsula in Campbeltown, 
the whiskies' notably briny characteristics rendering their 
appellation as the product of a distinct region. Malts from the 
Hebridean island of Islay have an infamous iodine-like pungency 
occasioned by the heavy prevalence of peat on the island; most blends 
contain at least one Islay malt. The number of distilleries in 
operation has continued to fall, with only 7 producing in 1995, 
including one on the neighbouring island of Jura. 
The industry should be concerned at the fall in number of Lowland and 
Campbeltown distilleries in operation as an important aspect of 
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Scotch whisky is the wide geographic range of malt distilleries 
within the industry, which has enabled blenders to develop such a 
wide-ranging variety of blends. The Glen Scotia distillery at 
Campbeltown closed in 1995, but is capable of re-opening. 
v) Maturation 
By law, all Scotch whisky has to be matured for a minimum of three 
years in an oak cask, and it is during this maturation period that the 
different whiskies obtain many of their defining characteristics. 
The majority of distillers use ex-Bourbon oak casks from the United 
States, but some 'finish' their products in Spanish sherry casks. 
The long-term supply posi tion of these casks is tenuous, so in recent 
years there has been a developing interest in the use of new wood, and 
internal charring to prolong the life of existing casks. 24 
The Macallan is matured exclusively in Dry Oloroso sherry casks, and 
it is widely held that it is this more than any other factor which is 
responsible for The Macallan regularly being rated the finest of all 
Scotch whiskies. To secure the continuing supply of these casks, the 
directors of Macallan-Glenlivet traditionally made an annual 
sojourn to the bodegas of Jerez, paying as much as £140 a hogshead, 
compared to £82 for a Bourbon and £37 for an ex-Scotch refill 
cask. 25 
After maturation, malt whisky is either sold as a single malt, mixed 
with other malts to make what is known as a 'vatted' malt, or in the 
case of 85% of all malt whisky produced, eventually blended with 
grain whisky (in an average proportion of 30 per cent malt to 70 per 
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cent grain) to produce two thousand and more blended and branded 
whiskies. 26 With little variation in characteristics or quality 
between distilleries, grain whisky lends itself admirably to its 
role as the base for blended whisky, with the mal ts providing most of 
the flavour and character of the blend. 27 
Grain Whisky 
Unlike malt whisky, grain whisky distilling is not so dependent upon 
environmental or geographical factors, and as a result most of the 8 
distilleries currently in operation are situated in the central belt 
of Scotland. Grain whisky is produced under the same definition as 
mal t whisky, in that only mal ted barley, whole grain and yeast may be 
used in its manufacture. Whole grain (maize or wheat) is cooked under 
pressure before being added to previously milled malt in a mash tun, 
where conversion of the starch in both the malt and other cereals 
takes place. The resultant wort-sugar solution is cooled and pumped 
to washbacks, where, by the addition of yeast, ,fermentation takes 
place. 
Grain whisky distillation is a continuous, large scale process using 
the 'Coffey' still, resulting in the typical grain distillery more 
resembling a chemical plant than a whisky distillery. As very large 
volumes are involved, grain distilleries have substantial by-
products plants which recover approximately 30% of the original 
grain as animal feed. The carbon dioxide discharged during 
fermentation is generally recovered and sold as liquid C02.28 The 
average annual capacity of a grain distillery is in the region of 41 
million litres of pure alcohol (LPA) per year, whilst the average 
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capacity of a malt distillery is around 2.5 million LPA. But malt 
whisky distilleries also vary greatly in annual capacity, from 
90,000 LPA (Edradour) to 10 million LPA (Tomatin). 
Capacity utilisation in malt and grain distilleries since 1980 is 
detai led in Table 2.2. It will be noted that even during the 
prosperous late 1980s capacity utilisation rarely exceeded 80%, and 
at the depth of the recession in the early 1980s, fell to less than 
half. 
Table 2.2: Capacity Utilisation 1980-1996, Malt & Grain Distilleries 
(million litres of pure alcohol) 
Year Malt ~apacity ptilisation 9,-0 Grain Capacity ptilisation 9,-0 
put put Output 
1980 177.9 259.2 68.6 238.0 365.9 65.0 
1981 110.1 262.8 41.9 157.9 350.6 45.0 
1982 96.7 264.6 36.5 151. 0 350.6 43.1 
1983 93.4 248.4 37.6 145.7 311.7 46.7 
1984 99.5 242.5 41.0 153.9 311.7 49.4 
1985 104.8 214.7 48.8 155.8 311.7 50.0 
1986 103.8 208.5 49.8 161.1 284.6 56.6 
1987 116.0 208.3 55.7 173.7 287.0 60.5 
1988 138.0 203.0 68.0 191. 9 268.9 71.4 
1989 167.2 214.1 78.1 218.3 275.0 79.4 
1990 193.1 238.5 81. 0 235.9 306.0 77.1 
1991 187.8 238.7 78.6 230.5 310.0 74.4 
1992 167.9 237.3 70.8 217.0 310.0 70.0 
1993 142.8 232.5 61.4 210.2 294.0 71.5 
1994 148.0 230.9 64.1 210.9 300.0 70.3 
1995 159.7 224.6 71.1 239.0 328.0 72.9 
1996 173.1 221. 2 78.2 268.3 333.0 80.6 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
Creating & Sustaining a Blend 
Over 90% of the Scotch whisky consumed in the United Kingdom is 
blended whisky, which can comprise anything from 15 to 40 or more 
whiskies. The objective is to make a blend which draws the best 
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quali ties from all its component whiskies, but has flavour and 
character in its own right. In selecting whiskies, the Master 
Blender will combine malt whiskies of different characteristics from 
some or all of the whisky producing regions, along with grain 
whiskies of suitable character, and must ensure that the blend is 
consistent in flavour and quality at all times. 29 
Having settled the formula for the blend, the blending company must 
secure the necessary quantities of new whisky from the different 
distilleries and allow it to mature. In practice, almost all Scotch 
whisky is earmarked for a particular use at the time of production, 
with orders usually agreed for a calendar year at a time, and filled 
into casks belonging to the purchaser. The distiller normally stores 
the casks while the whisky is maturing, charging the purchaser an 
annual storage rent. 
Distillers do not normally distill and mature any whisky except 
against firm orders, because of the financing costs and risks 
involved. There is, however, a broker's market, which is used 
primarily for balancing stocks of maturing whiskies if, for example, 
actual brand sales prove to be different from original forecasts. 
There is a thus a large degree of interdependence wi thin the industry 
at the manufacturing stage, despite vigorous competition at the 
point of sale. 3o 
The whisky matures in the casks at strengths of 110-120 degrees 
proof, until, in the opinion of the blender, it is ready to be added 
to his blend. Although Scotch whisky can only be so described if it 
has matured for three years, in practice the average age at which mal t 
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whisky is used is between 5-6 years, and between 3-4 years for 
grain. 31 The necessity to mature whiskies for many years before 
blending means that an unusual degree of forward planning is 
required. 
When the whiskies are considered ready to be incorporated into the 
blend they are brought from the maturation warehouse to the blending 
establishment, where they are mixed together in a blending vat. They 
may then, after reduction in strength by the addition of soft water, 
be returned to cask and left to 'marry' for a period, which may be 
from weeks to months, though a few companies eschew this 
practice. 
Before bottling, most whisky is chilled and filtered to prevent the 
possibility of haze formation when bottles are stored at low 
temperatures. This chilling must be done carefully to avoid 
affecting the flavour of the whisky. For this reason, a handful of 
distilleries, including Springbank, do not chill-filter, bottling 
at higher proofs instead as a way of preventing hazing. Most 
distillers also add spirit caramel for colour uniformity; again, 
Springbank and a few others decline to do this. 
All blenders of reputable brands would emphasise the importance of 
maintaining a consistent blend. As each malt whisky has a unique 
flavour, this means that even malt whiskies from similar 
geographical groups are not readily substitutable for each other in a 
particular blend. Nevertheless, some blenders do alter their 
brands, substituting malts according to availability and relative 
prices, but utilize existing stock holdings to ensure that change is 
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introduced gradually and the blend style is unchanged. The degree 
of substi tutabili ty is, however, generally considered to be less the 
higher the quality of the mal t, as such mal ts provide most of the body 
and flavour in a blend. 32 A rare example of a company substantially 
amending the style of a popular premium blend was United Distillers 
Master Blender Ian Grieve's creation of Bell's Extra Special in 
1995. 
In such a traditional industry, only relatively modest increments in 
productivity are possible. The alcoholic drinks industry in the 
Uni ted Kingdom achieved increases in labour producti vi ty at an 
average annual rate of 7.6% during the period 1979-1986, 
substantially higher than the average 3.6% achieved by the 
manufacturing sector as a whole during this period. 33 But in the case 
of the whisky industry, much of this increase was the product of the 
mergers & acquisitions of the period, which whilst leading to 
increases in investment and improvements in management practices, 
involved a concomitant shedding of labour. 
In more recent years productivity has improved as a consequence of 
rationalisation of production & bottling, whilst increased in-house 
distribution of brands has resulted in the major groups having much 
greater control of marketing. 34Significant investments in 
warehousing technology, especially by the larger companies, will 
continue to generate a more efficient throughput of bottled whisky, 
thereby reducing overall transport and warehousing costS. 35 Yields 
from the raw materials used in distillation have also improved in 
recent years, as illustrated in Table 2.3: 
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Table 2.3: Yields (litres of alcohol) Per Metric Tonne of Cereal 
Malt & Grain Whisky 
Year Malt Whisky Yields Grain Whisky Yields 
1990 391 371 
1991 397 372 
1992 395 373 
1993 402 377 
1994 407 374 
1995 403 374 
1996 Est 407 375 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
Wi thin the realms of public policy, further developments in the EU' s 
Common Agricul tura1 Policy (CAP) may affect the whisky industry. The 
industry is a major consumer of top quality malting barley and other 
cereals and, although as depicted in Table 2.3, the efficiency of 
conversion to alcohol has been improving in recent years, the 
industry has been restricted by EU agricultural policy to sourcing 
grains from the EU wherever possible. The EU has provided financial 
support, via the Whisky Export Refund Scheme, to compensate the 
industry at times when EU prices for cereals were above world market 
prices. 
The European Commission's II Agenda 2000 II communication, published in 
July 1997, includes proposals for reform of the CAP, including those 
relating to the support of cereals prices. This development signals 
the Commission's intention to replace price support with direct 
payments to producers, one consequence of which is likely to be that 
cereal prices wi thin the EU will move closer to world market prices. 
In turn, this will have implications for the future operations of the 
Export Refund Scheme. 36 
In a recent article in The Scottish Economic Bulletin, Ca1um Scott & 
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Peter Winstanley wrote: 
The whisky industry relies heavily on primary and secondary packaging to convey 
the image of its brands and products. Consequently, there is not as much scope 
for reductions in packaging materials in the industry as there might be in 
others. The Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 
1997 place obligations on certain businesses, including the whisky industry and 
its retail outlets, to register with the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency 
or a collective industry compliance scheme (VALPAK, WASTEPAK, etc) to recover and 
recycle specific tonnages of packaging waste and to certify that this recovery 
and recycling has been achieved. 37 
But arguably there is considerable scope for economizing on 
~ackaging inputs, an area in which the whisky industry would appear 
to have lost sight of Scotland's heritage of ascetic Calvinism. In 
contrast to the marketing of most wines, fortified wines, liqueurs 
and other spirits, the Scotch whisky industry appears to have a 
feitish for encapsulating their product in fancy tubes, cartons or 
boxes. Such packaging adds nothing to the inherent quality of the 
product, but increases the price to the consumer. Even if part of the 
saving augmented producers' surplus, scaling down such unnecessary 
wrapping would be beneficial from an ecological point of view. 
An addi tional innovation that would economize on glass and packaging 
inputs would be the substitution of the present 70cl bottle with a 
standard 1 litre bottle for all spirits sold in the European Union. 
This is discussed further in Chapter 4 in the context of the intra-EU 
duty free market, and in Chapter 7 where possible reforms to the 
present duty structure in the United Kingdom are advocated. 
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Energy is a major cost of Scotch whisky distillation, but low oil 
prices in recent times have stifled the impetus towards further 
conservation methods. An unusual use of recycled heat was the 
heating of a swimming pool adjoining Morrison Bowmore's distillery 
on Islay, whilst for many years Morrison's Glen Garioch distillery in 
Aberdeenshire grew tomatoes heated by water from the distillery. 
However, this project was subsequently abandoned, and the distillery 
has now also closed. 38 
But with such a high proportion of the final retail price of spirits 
accounted for by duty and value added tax, even substantial 
reductions in costs results in an appreciably smaller fall in the 
final price. Tables 2.4 & 2.5 disaggregate the cost of producing one 
litre of pure alcohol of malt & grain whisky in 1993. 
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Tables 2. 4a & 2. 4b: Cost Structure (pence per 1 i tre of pure alcohol) 
for Malt & Grain Whisky, 1993 
Table 2.4a Malt Whisky 
Distillation 
Raw materials (malted barley) 
Fuel, electricity & water 
Labour 
Less: sales of by-products 
Total direct costs 
Overheads 
Total Distillation Costs 
Warehousing 
Warehousing charges 
Evaporation (14.5% over 6 years) 
Finance charges 
Total Warehousing Costs 
Bottling & Packaging 
80 
14 
14 
2 
Labour 34 
Materials (bottles, caps, cartons etc) 83 
Wastage (materials and whisky) 7 
Total direct costs 
Overheads 
Total Bottling & Packaging Costs 
Total Costs 
Table 2.4b Grain Whisky 
Distillation 
Raw materials (mainly maize) 48 
Fuel, electricity & water 8 
Labour 4 
Less: sale of by products 8 
Total direct costs 
Overheads 
Total Distillation Costs 
Warehousing 
Warehousing charges 
Evaporation (10.5% over 4 years) 
Finance charges 
Total Warehousing Costs 
Bottling & Packaging 
Labour 34 
Materials (bottles, caps, cartons etc) 83 
Wastage (materials & whisky) 7 
Total direct costs 
Overheads 
Total Bottling & Packaging Costs 
Total Costs 
106 
26 
40 
25 
108 
124 
4 
52 
9 
20 
9 
30 
124 
4 
Source: James Love, The Whisky Industry 
132 
173 
128 
433 
61 
59 
128 
248 
On the basis of Tables 2.4a & 2.4b, and assuming that the average 
blended whisky contains one-third malt and two-thirds grain whisky, 
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the cost of a 70cl bottle of blended whisky at 40% alcohol by volume 
in 1993 approximated 86p. Advertising & marketing expenses may 
account for an additional £1 per bottle, giving a cost of £1.86. In 
total, according to Sutherlands Ltd the estimated realised wholesale 
price of a bottle of blended Scotch net of duty in January 1997 was 
£3.79, indicating a profit margin of just over 50%.39 The retailers' 
margin adds approximately 83p to the price, summing to £4.62. 
But with excise duty of £5.32 per bottle this figure rises to £9.94, 
to which value added tax at 17.5% is levied, giving a total selling 
price to the consumer of £11.68. 
A 50% profit margin may seem high, implying excessive rates of return 
on capital employed, but the effect of high tax rates is to markedly 
diminish the incentive for distillers to compete more vigorously. On 
the basis of the figures presented above, even if the distillers were 
to accept a halving of their profit margins to 25%, retailers' mark-
ups, duty and VAT would still result in the final price to the 
consumer being £10.55. A 50% reduction in profits thus results only 
in a 9.7% reduction in the final price. It is hard to identify 
another product where the producer has so little control over the 
final price in the market place. 
This point is often made in the economic literature when assessing 
the relative meri ts of different forms of taxation. In Public Sector 
Economics, Brown & Jackson have written: 
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When commodities are subject to very high unit taxes, the final selling price is 
not very sensitive to the producer price. For example, if a good has a unit tax of 
SOp and the pre-tax price is 20p, the customer pays £1.00. A 50% cut in the price 
of the good to lOp will reduce its price only by about 10% (assuming the cut is 
fully passed on) . 
penalised. 40 
[Hence] inefficient domestic producers are not 
In addition, in 1994, 1995 and 1996, realised selling prices have 
been lower than the official listed prices, with substantial 
discounts available. Accordingly, profit margins in those years are 
much lower than shown. The profit margin per case on export is only 
just over 30%.41 
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2.4 The Present Industrial Structure 
Here's tae us, wha's like us; 
There's gey few 0' us left! 
Old Lowlands toast 
Competition is the breath of business, but the death of profits 
Tommy Dewar 
The ownership structure of the Scotch whisky industry is complex, 
with firms vertically integrated from distilling through blending & 
bottling, brand ownership and marketing, but also horizontally 
integrated into other aspects of the alcoholic drinks industry. The 
industry is relatively highly concentrated and has been since the 
early part of this century when the Distillers Company Limited (DCL) 
began to emerge as the dominant company in the industry. By 1925 DCL 
had merged with its principal rivals and controlled approximately 
80% of grain and malt output. 
In subsequent years, mergers & acquisitions have continued as the 
predominant form of structural change in the industry. Almost all of 
the mergers have been of the horizontal form, where firms in the 
distilling industry, producing identical or similar products and 
selling in the same geographical markets, have decided to merge. By 
contrast, a vertical merger occurs when a firm producing an 
intermediate good (or factor of production) merges with a firm 
producing the final good that uses this intermediate good, or vice 
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versa. 42Throughout this Section, chronological descriptions of 
these developments in the whisky industry will be related to the 
traditional economic theories of industrial structure, which 
identify several motives for such activity. 
In his The Structure of Competi ti ve Industry (1958) 4 3, Robinson 
argued: "Firms will at some stage in their growth enter a critical 
stage which combines the technical disadvantage of smallness with 
the managerial disadvantage of being too large for individual 
control." Robinson referred to such a firm as one of I pessimum I 
size. 
Placed in such a posi tion, the owners may decide ei ther to continue at 
the same size or to accept the offer of a takeover by another company. 
In other cases owners will attempt to grow out of the critical stage. 
Substantial difficulties, however, may be faced, particularly in 
recrui ting new management personnel and raising . capi tal. 
Acquisi tion by another firm may be the only effective way of 
overcoming these difficulties. 
Seeking greater scale economies is often a motive for mergers. Rival 
firms may produce several products on a small scale within each 
plant. By combining plants into a smaller number of firms, this may 
lead to economies of increased specialisation that could not be 
achieved, or at least would take a great deal longer to achieve, 
through internal expansion. 44 
This factor also explains the spate of distillery closures in the 
1980s. For example, United Distillers determined that one Lowland 
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distillery was sufficient for blending purposes, and closed the 
Rosebank distillery at Falkirk in 1993, concentrating production at 
Glenkinchie, just south of Edinburgh. 
Whilst existing industry capacity may be sufficient to meet demand, 
many individual plants may be of a suboptimal size. Similarly, if 
economies of scale are large in relation to the annual rate of 
increase in demand, mergers may be necessary if scale economies are 
to be fully realised. The same result may be impossible, or take a 
very long time to achieve through internal expansion, because of such 
market imperfections as the control of distributive outlets, product 
differentiation advantages or simply the unwillingness of 
businessmen to take the risks of competitive expansion. 
Securing economies in marketing & distribution are often prime 
motives for merger. Two previously competing firms can combine their 
advertising efforts and possibly obtain greater discounts from the 
advertising media. Part of their previous advertising efforts may 
also have been mutually offsetting, and this can be eliminated. If 
both firms own distributive outlets, the merger may also result in 
economies here as wasteful duplication is eliminated. 
An important rationale for some mergers is the existence of 
complementarities. If one firm is strong on the research side but 
weak in marketing, and another has the opposite attributes, a merger 
of the two firms could result in benefits to both. Growth can often 
be achieved faster by merger than by internal expansion. 45 
Moreover, a firm may consider acquisition to be a safer as well as a 
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faster way of entering a new field. In a relatively slow-growing 
industry, as whisky became in the 1980s, competitive investment 
programmes involve the danger of over-capacity followed by lower 
prices and profi ts. An acquisition will be a safer way for a firm to 
expand, because it does not mean an increase in the industry's 
capacity. 
Finally, any merger or acquisition will be especially profitable 
when it results in increases in market power or when it eliminates a 
threatened increase in the intensity of competition. Once a dominant 
position has been established, mergers. may be used to protect 
it.46 
This latter motive explains in part takeovers in the 1930s and 40s by 
the large Canadian distillers Hiram Walker and Seagram, which, along 
with other mergers & acquisitions, meant that by the late 1950s the 
blended whisky 'trade' could be described as being highly 
concentrated, possessing a leading firm (DCL) and high barriers to 
entry, mainly the cost of advertising (Evely & Lit.tle, 1960).47 By 
1968 three companies (DCL, William Teacher and Arthur Bell) had 85% 
of the market in the United Kingdom, while the export market was 
dominated by DCL, International Distillers & Vintners (IDV) and 
Highland Distilleries. 48 
In their study, Evely & Li ttle drew attention to the major importance 
of external acquisition in the growth of the leading firms in trades 
that were dominated by a small number of sellers, concluding that 
there were few firms among the leaders that had not been created by 
amalgamation or had not resorted to acquisition or merger at some 
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stage of their growth. 49 
During the 1960s ownership in the whisky industry remained fairly 
stable, in sharp contrast to the years 1971-1993. Over this latter 
period a total of 82 distilleries changed hands at least once, and for 
some distilleries changes occurred with even more rapidity; eight 
distilleries changed hands twice, six changed hands three times, and 
one four times. Ashcroft & Love (1993) have estimated that this meant 
between 80% and 90% of the entire distilling capaci ty of the industry 
experienced changes in ownership in the years 1971-93. 50 
These sizeable shifts in ownership were the product of several 
influences. During the 1970s several family-controlled whisky 
companies reached Robinson I s I pessimum I size, finding themselves in 
a position in which the only means of obtaining the funds necessary 
for expansion was through being acquired. This factor was 
responsible for the acquisition of some of the most famous names in 
the industry, including the Glenlivet Distillers by Seagram and 
William Teacher & Sons by Allied Distillers. It was at this time too 
that several of the major European distillers made their Scottish 
debut, with DYC of Spain and Pernod-Ricard of France purchasing 
Macnab Distilleries and S Campbell & Son respectively. 51 
In addition, there was clearly a profit motive behind much of these 
sizeable shifts in ownership. Until 1979 whisky distilling had been 
a highly profi table industry as demand grew at an unprecedented rate, 
attracting the interest of companies new to the industry and 
encouraging already existing firms to expand their activities. Due 
to unique geographical limitations and the importance of the 
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distinct characteristics of the whisky from each distillery, 
takeover represents a much more attractive prospect than 
'greenfield' investment, which is usually only undertaken by well-
established and fairly large groupings. 
This is because blenders are very reluctant to buy immature spirit 
from a new distillery until its whisky is proven, and so the owners 
have to finance all the initial stocks for a number of years. This is 
generally only feasible if they can use them in their own blends. 52 
For those with no experience of the whisky business, takeover also 
allows the acquisition of a large amount of industry specific 
expertise. 
The recession of the early 1980s reduced the incentive for 
acquisi tion, a tendency reinforced by the Monopolies & Mergers 
Commission's decision in 1980 to block the bid by Hiram Walker for 
Highland Distilleries, one of the few remaining sizeable Scottish-
owned whisky companies. During this investigation the Monopolies & 
Mergers Commission placed great emphasis upon the potentially 
detrimental affect on competition which could result from any 
further increase in the concentration of distillery ownership. 53 
The CR5 sales concentration ratio fell from a peak of 77 per cent in 
1971 to 53 per cent in 1984 before beginning to rise again in 1985. By 
contrast, there is evidence that over the same period the ownership 
of distilleries became increasingly concentrated in the hands of the 
largest companies. In 1970, the five largest companies owned 55 per 
cent of operating malt whisky distilleries, a proportion which had 
grown to 67 per cent by 1988. At the same time, the number and 
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proportion of distilleries owned by single-distillery operators 
fell steadily from 29 per cent in 1960 to 10 per cent by 1993. 
The resolution of the apparent paradox of a decreasing concentration 
ratio together with a rising concentration in distillery ownership 
is to be found in the reduced dominance of DCL, rather than in any 
major upheaval in the industry or because of new entrants into the 
market. Between 1959 and 1966, DCL's share of the market in the 
Uni ted Kingdom fell from 75% to 50%, and by 1985 its share had fallen 
to 17%. This was largely the result of poor marketing and 
occasionally perverse decisions, such as removing Johnnie Walker 
from the domestic market in 1977, following a dispute wi th the EC over 
DCL's dual-priCing system, the primary function of which was to 
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protect its distributors from the impact of parallel exporting. 54 
The distribution of whisky in export markets is normally undertaken 
by sole agents who are responsible for the marketing and promotion of 
brands in the particular market. Large margins are therefore 
required by the sole agent to cover these overheads. Parallel 
exporters rely on the differential between the net selling price of 
whisky in bond in the United Kingdom and the gross price charged to 
the export market. Whisky is purchased, ostensibly for sale in the 
United Kingdom, but is subsequently exported and offered to 
retailers at a price substantially below that charged by legitimate 
sole agents. DCL attempted to mitigate the worst impact of the 
parallel exporters by charging the gross United Kingdom price to 
those customers who subsequently exported, effectively creating a 
dual price structure dependent on where the whisky was destined to be 
sold. 
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This practice was referred to the Commission of the EC and in December 
1977 it notified DCL that the dual pricing structure was contrary to 
EC law and must be discontinued, thus implicitly sanctioning the 
activi ties of the parallel exporters. DCL wi thdrew its best selling 
brand, Johnnie Walker Red Label, from the Uni ted Kingdom and applied 
to the Price Commission to raise substantially the price of the 
remainder of its domestic brands. Subsequently Haig Dimple was also 
withdrawn from the United Kingdom. By forcing up its prices in the 
United Kingdom and limiting Johnnie Walker Red Label to an export 
brand only, DCL protected its overseas distributors, but at dramatic 
cost to its market share in the United Kingdom. Competitors such as 
Bell's and H:i.ghland Distilleries 'benefited from DCL' s actions, 
garnering increased volume and market share for their respective 
brands. 55 Overseas, DCL performed rather better, but all of its major 
brands lost out to aggressively marketed rivals such as Ballantines 
and Chivas Regal. 56 
The company won a relaxation of the EC edict in 1983, but morale was 
~adly shaken. In December 1985 the Argyll Group, a Scottish-based 
food retailing chain, made a takeover bid which was rejected 
outright. But the management was shaken by the equivocation of the 
shareholders and the Government, and recommended the acceptance of a 
£2.7 billion offer by Guinness pIc, the brewing giant which had 
acquired Arthur Bell & Sons of Perth the year before. 57 Guinness 
acquired DCL in May 1986, after one of the most bitter and protracted 
takeo~er battles in the United Kingdom's corporate history. With 
these two acquisitions, Guinness emerged as the largest drinks 
company in the world, controlling an estimated 25.2% of whisky sales 
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in the United Kingdom and 35% of the industry's productive 
capacity. 58 
In both the takeover of Arthur Bell and DCL, the Guinness Board placed 
great store on the complementarities between the products, arguing 
that the synergies between distilling and brewing would be such as to 
create greater value for shareholders. The acquisition of a large 
amount of expertise and goodwill, particularly in the case of DCL, 
made takeover a much more attractive prospect for the brewing group 
than developing its own distilling interests. It is undoubtedly the 
case too that the merged group was able to make substantial economies 
in marketing & distribution. 
The agreed merger in 1986 between Allied Lyons and Hiram Walker 
Resources, - the wines and spirits arm of the Canadian drinks 
conglomerate for £1.25 billion, had little impact on concentration 
of sales in the home market, because none of Hiram Walker's brands had 
more than 1% of the market in the United Kingdom. But the merger 
facilitated Allied's access to Hiram Walker's international sales 
network~ a sine qua non for Allied to become a major i'nternational 
drinks company. Although Allied's Teacher's blend occupies second 
place in the Uni ted Kingdom market it has consistently failed to sell 
well abroad. 59 Allied subsequently acquired the Whitbread spirits 
division in 1990, and in 1994 the Spanish drinks company Pedro Domecq 
for £1 billion. This latter deal included DYC (Distilerias-y-
Crianza) which owned MacNab Distilleries. 
This new wave of acquisition had been encouraged by a recovery in the 
mid 1980s of whisky sales, a desire for diversification, and by the 
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substantial sums of spare cash within many companies in the United 
Kingdom. 60 
Throughout the period under discussion, Japan and the United States 
retained an interest in Scotch whisky; both countries are important 
export markets and significant producers of whisky in their own 
right. At one time, the Japanese company Suntory held a strategic 
shareholding in The Glenlivet Distillers, but the acquisition by 
Takara & Okura of Tomatin Distillers in 1986 was the first direct 
entry into a Scotch whisky distillery by a Japanese concern. Before 
the demise of Tomatin in its original form, the distillery was 
heavily involved in the export of malt whisky in bulk to Japan. 
Takara's purchase of the distillery was thus a convenient method of 
protecting this important source of supply. 61 
In 1989, Nikka Whisky Distilling became the second largest Japanese 
company to own a Scotch whisky distillery wi th the purchase of the Ben 
Nevis distillery. But the most notable Japanese involvement in the 
industry occurred in July 1994 with the purchase of Morrison Bowmore 
Distillers by Suntory. 
The management buy-outs at Inver House Distillers, bought from 
Publicker Industries of the United States, together with the sale of 
Hiram Walker's interests in the United Kingdom to Allied Lyons, more 
than halved North American involvement in Scotch whisky, leaving 
Seagram as the only sizeable representative. However, North 
American involvement increased early in 1990, when the failure of an 
attempted management buyout of Whyte & Mackay led to acquisition by 
Gallaher (the British subsidiary of American Brands), which also 
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acquired Invergordon Distillers in 1993. 62 
American Brands are the owners of the Jim Beam brands and are the 
third largest distilled spirits company in the United States. In a 
recent reorganisation, American Brands have put all their drinks 
interests under the control of Jim Beam Brands Worldwide, including 
Whyte & Mackay and Invergordon, and Whyte & Mackay has been renamed 
JBB (Greater Europe.)63 
The major changes in ownership in the whisky industry since 1971 are 
summarized in Table 2.5, which illustrates well the increasing 
concentration in distillery ownership over the past 27 years. 
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Table 2.5: Major Changes of Ownership in the Scotch Whisky Industry, 
1971-96 
Year Acquired Company 
1971 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1976 
1978 
1979 
1981 
1985 
1985 
1986 
1986 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1988 
1989 
1989 
1989 
1989 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1994 
1996 
1998 
Littlemill Distillery Co 
Tullibardine Distillery 
Deanston Distillers 
Bladnoch Distillery 
Macnab Distilleries 
S Campbell & Sons 
William Teacher & Sons 
The Glenlivet Distillers 
Whyte & Mackay Distillers 
Glenturret Distillery 
Arthur Bell & Sons 
Charles Mackinlay & Co 
Distillers Company Ltd 
Hiram Walker Resources 
Tomatin Distillers 
Barton International 
Burn Stewart Distillers 
Inver House Distillers 
Invergordon Distillers 
Whyte & Mackay 
James Burrough Distillers 
Ben Nevis Distillery 
Glenturret Distillery 
Deanston Distillers 
Invergordon Distillers 
Whyte & Mackay 
Burn Stewart Distillers 
Tobermory Distillery 
Invergordon Distillers 
Distilerias-y-Crianza 
Morrison Bowmore 
Macallan-Glenlivet 
Dewars (Guinness) 
Number of 
Acquiring Company Distilleries 
Barton Brands 
Invergordon Distillers 
Invergordon Distillers 
Inver House Distillers 
Distilerias-y-Crianza 
Pernod-Ricard 
Allied Breweries 
Seagram 
Lonrho 
Cointreau 
Guinness 
Invergordon Distillers 
Guinness 
Allied-Lyons 
Takara & Okura 
Gibson International/ 
Schenley Industries 
MBO 
MBO 
MBO 
Brent Walker 
Allied-Lyons 
Nikka Whisky Distilling 
Highland Distilleries 
Burn Stewart Distillers 
Flotation 
American Brands 
Flotation 
Burn Stewart Distillers 
American Brands 
Allied Distillers 
Suntory 
Highland Distilleries 
Ron Bacardi 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
5 
3 
1 
5 
2 
28 
10 
1 
2 
1 
2 
7 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
7 
3 
1 
1 
5 
1 
3 
1 
4 
Sources: James Love, The Economic Effects of External Acquisition in 
the Whisky Industry, The Whisky Industry, & Alan Gray, The Scotch 
Whisky Industry Review 1995 
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People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices. 
The Daily Telegraph City Editor, quoting from Adam Smith's Weal th of Nations 
(Canan edition), in respect of the luncheon at which Guinness Chairman Anthony 
Greener and Grand Metropolitan's George Bull allegedly discussed the merger of 
their two companies. 
The announcement in May 1997 of an agreed merger between Guinness and 
Grand Metropolitan (whose Scotch whisky interests were managed by 
International Distillers & Vintners-IDV) was greeted with general 
enthusiasm by most City analysts, who opined that for some years, 
shares of both companies had "underperformed the market." 
Considering the performance of the three main Scotch whisky 
companies quoted in the United Kingdom, Allied Domecq has 
underperformed by 45%, Grand Metropolitan by 20% and Guinness by 
21%.64 
Grand Metropolitan and Guinness believe that the key to the success 
of the merged company, to be styled Diageo, wi 11 be owning the leading 
brands and a broad distribution network, claiming that the economies 
of scope achievable by combining operations will save £175m a year by 
the third year after the merger - mainly by eliminating the jobs of 
about 2,000 salesmen and clerks. Industry analysts such as David 
Fleming, editor of the drinks magazine Impact: Int:ernat:ional, believe 
that both the potential cost savings and synergies from the merger 
could be even higher. 
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Undoubtedly, the products and abilities of the two companies 
complement each other. United Distillers (UD), Guinness's spirits 
division, produces Johnnie Walker, the world's biggest selling 
Scotch whisky, and Cognac through its 34% stake in Moet Hennessy, the 
drinks division of France's LVMH. It has established itself in Asia, 
where such 'brown spiri ts' are popular, and is strong in Europe. IDV 
is strong in 'white spirits' - vodka (Smirnoff, its top selling 
brand, is the second best-selling spirit in the world) and tequila -
and has a strong position in Eastern Europe as well as the United 
States. 65 
~pposition to the merger from LVMH Chairman Bernard Arnault was 
thwarted in October 1997 by means of a £250 million sweetner and an 
extended distribution deal. M Arnaul t, the only member of the 
Guinness board to vote against the proposed merger, had wanted to 
combine his spirits business with UD and IDV. This plan was thwarted 
by the rest of the Guinness and GM boards as it would have left LVMH 
owning 35% of such a new company. But it is likely that M Arnaul twill 
continue to press for the demerger of the non-drinks businesses from 
Diageo. 
A few days later the merger was given conditional approval by the 
European Commission. The conditions, which were said by drinks 
industry analysts to be relatively light, included selling two 
whisky brands, Dewars and Ainslie, on a Europe-wide basis, and the 
transferring of certain European distributorships to third parties. 
Guinness and Grand Met were believed to be privately delighted at the 
EU decision. Drinks analyst Alan Gray of Sutherlands Ltd 
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commented: 
I think the companies will be quite pleased with the European Commission ruling. 
The conditions are not too rigorous at all. What with Arnaul t, things are moving 
rapidly. At this stage I cannot see anything to indicate any great problems with 
the deal going through~66 
The final hurdle, approval from competition authorities in the 
United States, was granted in December 1997. This was followed in 
March 1998 by the sale of the Dewars and Bombay Sapphire spirits 
brands to Ron Bacardi, the Bermuda-based white rum maker, for £1.15 
billion. George Reid, Bacardi President and Chief Executive, said 
Dewar's and Bombay provided a "natural synergy" with its existing 
Bacardi Rum and Martini Vermouth brands, reinforcing the company's 
commi tment to the spirits industry "for the long haul." 
The Guinness-GM merger may oblige such offended rivals as Seagrams 
and Allied Domecq to reconsider their market positions. Diageo has a 
staggering 42% share of world whisky sales, more than double that of 
its nearest rival, Allied Domecq, and will command three-quarters of 
the premium gin market in the United States. 67 The Diageo response is 
that it will be selling less than 9% of the billion or so cases of 
spirits sold worldwide. 68 Robert Matschul1at, Chief Financial 
Officer of Seagram, has said: "Anytime two of the biggest players in 
an industry consolidate, everyone examines their position." The 
merger may incline his company to acquire vulnerable rivals. "If 
they don't feel they can go it alone, we might be a possible partner, " 
Matschullat says. 
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Allied Domecq is one possible target. Investment analysts believe 
Seagram could afford to purchase Allied, although distribution 
linkups between the two companies would be a less expensive 
al ternati ve. But the two companies operations do not complement each 
other to the same extent as Guinness's and Grand Met's.59 
For instance, Seagram's and Allied's cognacs, Martell and 
Courvoisier, and their Canadian whiskies, Crown Royal and Canadian 
Club, are strong competitors, and neither firm has a strong vodka of 
its own. That said, Seagram's lacks a standard blend such as Allied's 
Teachers, whilst Allied's portfolio of malts is limited. Other 
interested parties could include M Arnault, who may now sell LVMH's 
66% stake in Moet-Hennessy to Diageo, and privately owned firms such 
as Bacardi, whose white rum is the world's top-selling spirit brand, 
and Brown-Forman, which makes the American whiskey Jack 
Daniels. 70 
It is therefore quite likely that the Guiness-Grand Metropolitan 
merger may prompt a further round of consolidation in the industry, 
or as Int:ernat:ional Business Week amusingly put it, "For smaller 
boozemakers, it may be time for another round.,, 71 There is evidence 
that this is indeed happening, with the recent revelation of a 
possible joint venture between Burn Stewart Distillers and William 
Grant & Sons Ltd. This amalgamation reflects several of the extant 
theoretical motives for merger, in particular the problem of 
'pessimum', suboptimal size, and the role of scale and scope 
economies. 
William Grant is expected to take a major stake (49%) in Burn Stewart, 
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in return for a package including Grant's Channel Island-based 
wholesale distribution subsidiary, Quality Spirits International 
(QSI). QSI deals at the value for money end of the market - where Burn 
Stewart has traditionally been strongest. It is thought likely that, 
in addition to exchanging QSI for the Burn Stewart share stake, 
Grant's will provide warehousing facilities for Burn Stewart 
stock. 
Other advantages to the deal might include bottling hall 
rationalization. Burn.Stewart's East Kilbride facility is smaller 
than Grant's Bellshill facility which is not operating at full 
capacity. The deal would also provide a virtual tied customer for 
William Grant's grain production, as Burn Stewart has no grain 
distillery of its own. With a major stake taken by William Grant, 
Burn Stewart would also be protected against unwarrented attentions 
from a hostile bidder just as it is emerging from some very difficult 
trading years. 72 
Recently, Burn Stewart has pursued a strategy of reducing the Group's 
previous dependence on bulk sales in favour of cased sales. This is 
being achieved by developing Buyers Own Brand (BOB) business 
supplying, inter alia, Asda, Safeway, Marks & Spencer and Booker 
Distribution, and expanding sales of Burn Stewart's own Bottled in 
Scotland brands. 73 Given that sales of own-label and low-priced 
brands, mainly in the supermarket and off-licence sectors, may 
account for around 30% of the market in the United Kingdom, this would 
appear to be a wise strategy, but it does mean that Burn Stewart has 
suffered particularly badly from the weak selling prices that have 
afflicted the industry in recent years. The joint venture with 
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William Grant is therefore primarily a reflection of Burn Stewart's 
1:1eed to find ways of raising its margins and reducing its high gearing 
(96% in the year to June 1995), thus enabling its share price to rise 
once more. 74 
There has been a great deal of material published on the effects of 
mergers & acquisition upon industries in the United Kingdom in 
general, which can be compared with actual performance of merged 
companies in the whisky, industry. As the vast majority of mergers in 
the whisky industry have been of the horizontal form, attention will 
focus upon this type. A discussion of the welfare effects of vertical 
mergers can be found in Chandler (1977), Salinger (1988 & 1989), and 
Ordover et al (1990).75 
The effects of horizontal mergers upon prices ,costs and output, and 
their impl ications for welfare, may be examined in terms of 
Williamson's trade-off model (Williamson, 1968).76 
In Figure 2.1, the merger transforms a competitive industry into a 
monopoly. The industry demand curve both before and after the merger 
is DD'. The uni t cost curve before the merger is C1C' 1, constant cost 
conditions are assumed for simplicity, price is equal to unit cost 
OC1, and output is OQ1. As a result of the merger it is assumed that 
costs are reduced to C2C'2, price is elevated to OPm, and output 
reduced to OQ2. 
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Figure 2.1: The Welfare Effect of a Merger Which Achieves Cost 
Saving 
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Source: Williamson (1968) in George, Kenneth & Joll, Caroline 
Industrial Organization 
To establish the net effect on welfare it is necessary to balance 
~ains against losses. The gains in this case are equgl to area c; 
that is, they are the lower costs of producing the output of the 
monopolist. The loss is the reduction in consumer surplus which is 
associated with the fall in output brought about by the increase in 
price. 
The total loss of consumer surplus is area (a+b), but area b is 
matched by an equivalent increase in producer surplus, so that the 
net loss is equal to area a. The net gain in welfare is therefore 
equal to area (c-a). It is clear from the figure that the more the 
merger raises price and the more elastic demand is, ceteris paribus 
the larger area a will be, and therefore the more cost savings are 
needed to offset this loss. 
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In addition, if there is pre-merger market power that maintains price 
above unit cost, the cost saving must be greater if the merger is to 
result in a net increase in economic welfare. In Figure 2.2, pre-
merger price, PI is already above the competitive level C1, and the 
merger strengthens market power allowing price to be elevated 
further to Pm. 
Figure 2.2: The Welfare Effect of a Merger With Pre-Merger Market 
Power 
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Source: Williamson (1968) in George, Kenneth & JaIl, Caroline 
Industrial Organization 
If the merger leads to increased efficiency so that costs are reduced 
to C2, there is, as before, an efficiency gain equal to area c, but 
this must now be large enough to outweigh the loss of (a+d) if there 
is to be a net gain. Area a represents, as before, a net loss in 
consumer surplus and area d measures the loss in producer surplus 
caused by the fall in output from Q1 to Q2. 
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The examples given in Figures 2.1 & 2.2, in which merger results in 
lower unit costs and higher prices, describe only one possible 
outcome. It is possible that in some cases a merger between firms 
will increase competitiveness and lower prices compared with the 
pre-merger position. This is most likely where the merger is between 
small or medium-sized firms, which are then able to compete more 
effecti vely with larger companies. On the other hand, a merger may 
result in less efficiency and higher unit costs compared with a no-
merger position. 77 But this caveat nothwithstanding, Williamson 
concluded: 
A merger which yields non-trivial real economies must produce substantial market 
power and result in relatively large price increases for the net allocative (ie 
welfare) effects to be negative. 78 
But there are major conceptual weaknesses in Williamson I s approach. 
It is a partial equilibrium analysis that abstracts from all 
interactions between the various sectors of the economy, including 
for instance the knock-on effects which one merger may have in 
inducing further mergers amongst competing firms. If a merger 
redistributes income from consumers to producers, this will normally 
mean a redistribution in favour of the better off. If such a change 
is regarded as undesirable it will count against the merger and 
allowance has to be made for this. 
Another complication is that there may be I external effects I 
associated wi th a merger; a merger may increase market power, but it 
may also result in the internalising of an externality. An 
additional difficulty is presented by the theory of second best. 
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Given the existence of monopoly power elsewhere in the economy, it is 
not clear that a merger which increases monopoly power in particular 
industry will have adverse resource allocation effects. Finally, 
the model presented is a static one, which does not take account of 
the effects of merger on investment in new assets and on technical 
progress. 
Comparing the profit performance of the firm in the years following 
the merger with the profitability of the separate firms before the 
merger took place, is an alternative approach to evaluating the 
effects of merger. Some normalisation procedure has to be used to 
make allowance for such factors as a general adverse change in the 
state of trade that has nothing to do with the merger itself. One 
method is to relate the profi tabili ty of the merging companies, both 
before and after the merger takes place, to the average profit 
performance of the industries in which the firms operate. 79 
Such a procedure was followed by Singh (1971) 80, who, for a sample of 
35 mergers in the period 1955-60, found that in just over half of the 
cases there was a decline in the pre-tax profi tabili ty of the 
acquiring firms relative to the industry average both in the year of 
the takeover and al so one and two years after the takeover took place. 
A similar but much larger study by Meeks (1977)81, covering the 
period 1964-71, came to much the same conclusion. In all years up to 
the seventh year after the merger, the firms in Meek's sample showed a 
decline in profitability relative to the industry average. 
The major study of mergers in the United Kingdom is that of Hannah & 
Kay (1977).82 Their results provide very strong evidence of the 
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connection between mergers & concentration. During the years when 
merger had a predominant effect concentration increased sharply, 
whereas in those when merger was relatively unimportant 
concentration tended to remain much the same or even fall 
somewhat. 
At a more intuitive level George (1975)83 examined the increase in 
concentration as measured by the Census of Production five-firm 
sales concentration ratio between 1963-68, a period of unprecedently 
high merger activity. Once again, the coexistence of merger & 
increasing concentration was found to be unmistakable. 
More recently, Mueller (1985) studied the impact of mergers on the 
market share for samples of companies drawn from the 1,000 largest 
firms in the United States between 1950 and 1972, concluding that the 
market share of the acquired firms tended to decline much more 
rapidly than the market share of firms that remained 
independent. 84 
Ravenscraft & Scherer (1989) concluded that only if assets were 
acquired in a merger between firms of approximately equal size was 
there any indication that the effect on the profitability of the 
~ost-merger line of business was positive. Ravenscraft & Scherer 
also compared the change in profi tabili ty over time of two samples of 
similar firms, one of firms acquired by merger and the other of firms 
that remained independent. In both groups, the profitability of 
high-profit firms fell over time. But the profitability of firms 
acquired in mergers fell more rapidly over time than the 
profitability of firms remaining independent. They concluded: 
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The explanation for acquired units' sharp profit decline must be control loss 
owing to more complex organizational structures and lessened managerial 
competence and/or motivation. This control loss explanation is consistent with 
the high incidence of divestiture following acquisition and the tendency for 
sold-off units to have negative operating income in the year before their 
divestiture. 85 
In Perry & Porter's (1985) 86 model of mergers, a firm's cost function 
depends upon the amount of capital it owns, and capital is in fixed 
supply to the industry. Merger combines the capital of the 
consti tuent firms in the survivor firms, which are not more 
profi table than before unless they include almost all of the firms in 
the industry. Farrell & Shapiro (1990 & 1991) 87 also concluded that 
mergers are likely to harm consumers unless cost savings are very 
great. 
In the light of this evidence, Martin (1993) concluded: 
Empirical evidence suggests that firms involved in mergers suffer reductions in 
market share and profitability compared with similar firms that are not involved 
in mergers. Takeovers yield a one-time benefit to shareholders of acquired firms 
but do not benefit shareholders of acquiring firms. Taken as a whole, these 
results suggest that the motives for mergers must be sought in non profit-
maximizing behaviour, and that mergers cannot be interpreted as the market's way 
of enforcing profit-maximizing behaviour. 88 
Non-profit maximizing models, such as managerial, growth and life-
cycle models, are discussed further in Marris (1963) and Mueller 
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(1972).89 
A study by Cosh et al (1980)90 on mergers in the period 1967-69 
reached rather different conclusions. In this study of quoted 
companies, the control group consisted of companies that were paired 
with the merger firms in terms of year, size and industry group and 
that were free from merger activity involving quoted companies. 
Three measures of profi tabili ty were used: trading profi ts on sales, 
net income on net assets, and net dividends and retentions on equity 
assets. 
A comparison of the post-merger profi tabili ty of the merging and non-
merging firms showed no general tendency for the former to have worse 
performance. Indeed, statistically, the most striking result was 
that the merging firms had, on average, better performance in terms 
of post-tax profi tabili ty on equity assets. Furthermore, an 
analysis of post-merger changes in profi tabili ty showed merged firms 
to have the better performance on all three profit measures. 
There are clearly substantial problems in attempting to evaluate the 
effects of mergers on efficiency. Case studies may fail to be 
representative of mergers in general, and there are obvious dangers 
in relying on the replies to questionnaires. For those studies that 
rely on the published accounts of quoted companies, there are 
accounting problems that may not be fully resolved. Different 
definitions of profitability may yield different results. 
There are difficulties in finding a control group of companies with 
which to compare the performance of merging firms, particularly with 
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regard to product range and relative opportunities for internal and 
external growth. There are problems in determining how long an 
adjustment period should be allowed before the real effects of a 
merger can be seen. Those who tend to support merger activity are 
critical of some studies, because insufficient allowance has been 
made for post-merger reorganisation and not enough time allowed, 
therefore, for the benefits of the merger to be realised. 
But this argument may work the other way as well. Since individual 
studies relate to a relatively short time period, they fail to pick up 
. 
possible longer-term adverse effects on efficiency. A number of 
studies on the effects of mergers in a sector of industry covering 
only a few years may each find only a small adverse effect on 
efficiency, yet the total effect over the whole period may be 
substant ial . 9 1 
But assuming that it is possible to obtain some independent measure 
of the monopoly power effects of a merger, and that changes in 
normalized profi tabili ty can be used as a reasonable proxy for 
changes in efficiency, a summary can be compiled of the static 
welfare effects of mergers (Hughes 1989).92 
W 
Table 2.6: Static Welfare Effects of Mergers 
Normalised Profits 
Monopoly Power Raised No Change Reduced 
Raised W? w- W-
No Change W+ WO W-
Reduced W+ W+ W? 
= Social Welfare (Ignoring Distributional Considerations) 
Source: Hughes (1989) in George, Kenneth & JaIl, Caroline, 
Industrial Organization 
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In considering the linkages between the whisky industry and the 
Scottish economy, there are additional factors that need to be taken 
into account when evaluating the effects of mergers. The end result 
of most of the mergers & acquisitions in the industry discussed 
earlier is a very high degree of non-Scottish external ownership of 
an important sector of the Scottish economy, a subject of some 
concern to commentators in the past. Researchers at Stathclyde 
University's Fraser of Allander Institute have published several 
works in the area of acquisition of indigenous Scottish companies, 
concluding that whilst external takeovers may have led to 
performance enhancement in the acquired companies, the acquisitions 
nevertheless resulted in reduced regional linkages with suppliers, 
especially professional and business services. 
In Takeovers, Mergers & The Regional Scottish Economy, Ashcroft & 
Love (1993) 9 3 examined three indigenous whisky companies acquired in 
the 1970s (William Teacher, Glenlivet Distillers & S Campbell & son), 
identifying superior management practices introduced by the 
acquiring company, the most common of which were improved financial 
control and management information systems. These were introduced 
in part to facilitate reporting to the acquirer's head office, but 
also augmented the internal efficiency of the companies 
concerned. 
In addition, all three companies found investment finance easier to 
acquire as a result of the takeover; in the case of William Teacher 
this had been the principal rationale of the takeover from the pOint 
of view of the Scottish company. In two of the companies, the newly-
acquired finance enabled substantial investment in new plant, an 
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unlikely development in the absence of takeover. 
A loss of financial autonomy may be regarded as a quid pro quo for 
access to investment funds, but in the three acquired companies 
studied by Ashcroft & Love there was a tendency towards a diminution 
of responsibilities at the Scottish headquarters, in particular at 
the top level of management. In addi tion, two of the three case-study 
companies suggested that management promotion prospects wi thin 
Scotland had been reduced as a result of the takeover. Overall, 
Ashcroft & Love concluded that "The distributional effects of 
linkage reduction may have implications for the long-run development 
of the Scottish economy."94 
For example, as a result of the merger with Grand Metropolitan, the 
former spiri ts division of Guinness, United Distillers, announced in 
February 1998 that it would be closing its sales & marketing 
operation at Cherrybank, Perth in September, and moving to IDV's 
offices at Harlow in Essex. Of the 158 people currently employed at 
Perth, over 100 will lose their jobs, with 40 being offered the chance 
to relocate to Essex and 10 remaining in Perth. As Dr Alex Russell, 
Senior Lecturer in Accounting & Finance at Dundee Uni versi ty 
commented: 
It seems sad that companies are prepared to have the bulk of the work done in 
Scotland but have the top jobs located in England, so that staff who want to make 
it to the highest levels in such companies have to go South to do SO.95 
Recently, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar, also 
chastised whisky industry leaders for the seemingly inexorable drift 
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of management functions to England. His remarks, made at the recent 
Annual Conference of the Scotch Whisky Association, were given added 
poignancy on account of his sharing a platform wi th SWA Chairman John 
McGrath, who is Chairman of Diageo' s spirits division, United 
Distillers & Vintners: 
I recognize we live in a global society and I accept that Scotland has to compete 
and that will mean change. But I hope we will have a good deal of the top jobs, 
and that a lot of the decision making in the whisky industry will remain very very 
7' 
firmly based north of the border in its own land. 
As well as having disturbing implications for the long-run 
development of the Scottish economy, such a concentration of 
activi ty in the Home Counties is also potentially detrimental to the 
South East of England. Referring to the 40 positions available at 
Harlow to former Perth employees, a recent Editorial Comment in The 
Courier remarked sharply: 
Who, unless they were desperate, would eXChange a house in Perth for one in part 
of Essex, from which the last traces of character & distinction were erased long 
ago? 96 
Developments such as these suggests that public, policy toward 
mergers & acguisi tions should consider not only the potential 
effects upon market power and consumer welfare, but the effects of 
any post-merger rationalisation on sustainable & egui table regional 
development throughout the United Kingdom. 
It is also highly likely that the Diageo merger will result in the 
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disposal of more of the company's brands and the closure of one of the 
company's four Scottish bottling plants, employing approximately 
2,000 people at Dumbarton, Kilmarnock, Glasgow and Banbeath, Leven. 
Nearly 600 people are employed at Leven, where more that a quarter of 
the 8 million cases bottled are Dewar's, which the brands new owner, 
Ron Bacardi, has indicated will eventually be bottled elsewhere. Yet 
the Banbeath operation was recently voted No 1 factory in the United 
Kingdom, so it came as no surprise to industry analysts when in June 
1998 Diageo announced that the Strathleven bottling ·operation at 
Dumbarton would be closing, with the loss of 500 jobs. 
The issues surrounding the disposal of brands and the 
rationalisation of production illustrate well the dichotomy among 
the traditional efficiency criteria highlighted in standard 
econoimic literature. The welfare of consumers who have preferences 
for variety increases with the number of brands produced in an 
industry. However, if each brand is produced by a different factory, 
and each plant is constructed wi th a high fixed-cost investment, then 
from a technical point of view, the number of brands produced should 
be restricted. Hence, there will always be a trade-off between 
technical efficiency and consumer welfare. 97 
Returning to the example of Diageo's Scottish bottling operations, 
the Leven plant is set to bottle a variety of whiskies in different 
size bottles, chiefly 11 tr, 75cl and 70cl. But consumer preferences 
for United Distillers' Cardhu Single Malt whisky in square-shaped 
50cl bottles, currently bottled at Kilmarnock, would require an 
investment of up to £100,000 to enable this product to be bottled at 
Leven. 
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The large multi-national companies - Diageo and Allied Domecq of the 
Uni ted Kingdom, Seagram of Canada, Pernod-Ricard of France, Suntory 
of Japan - all have wide-ranging drinks interests of which whisky 
forms only a part, and their portfolio of whisky brands is altered to 
suit their international strategy. Such corporations can hardly be 
thought of as being part of a separately indentifiable Scotch whisky 
industry, yet they are vital to the development of the market for 
whisky. Over 70% of world sales of Scotch whisky are accounted for by 
just four groups, two of them British (Diageo & Allied Domecq) and the 
others North American (Seagram & American Brands). By 1998, 
Scottish-controlled companies were responsible for less than 13% of 
world sales of Scotch whisky. 98 
In fact, there are now only three independent Scottish registered and 
controlled whisky firms of any significance with a full stock-
exchange listing: Burn Stewart Distillers, Highland Distilleries 
(who took over Macallan-Glenlivet in an acrimoniously contested 
takeover in August 1996), and Glenmorangie, formerly styled 
Macdonald & Muir Ltd. To these must be added the three remaining 
family controlled private companies, J & A Mitchell & Co Ltd 
(Springbank Distillers, Campbeltown), J & G Grant Ltd (Glenfarclas 
Distillers, Ballindalloch) and William Grant & Sons Ltd (of 
Glenfiddich fame). Only the latter is of significant size in the 
industry. Burn Stewart remains vulnerable to takeover, as does 
Glenmorangie, according to Sutherlands: 
Overall, we believe that the shares [Glenmorangie] constitute a a solid lock-away 
investment with spice added in the shape of takeover possibility as it is one of a 
rare breed of family owned whisky groups. 
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But the company is protected to a certain extent by the fact that it 
continues to be controlled by the "B" shares which carry five votes 
compared wi th only one for the" A" shares. Approximately 55% of total 
votes are controlled by directors and trustees. 99 Likewise, whilst 
several firms have been said to have ruminated upon Highland 
Distilleries recently, any takeover would have to be cognizant of a 
complicated ownership structure and the position of major 
stakeholders such as Suntory, Orpar (the parent of Remy Martin) and 
Robertson & Baxter. 
The difficulties associated with realising greater profits from 
whisky sugg'ests that takeover & mergers, further concentrating 
ownership, will continue to be the dominant instrument of structural 
change in the industry. Every wave of takeover has been tenaciously 
resisted by some, none more so than the Guinness acquisitions, but, 
notwithstandin~ the reservations of some economists referred to 
earlier, even here the general consensus throughout the industry is 
one of admiration for the statesmanlike approach adopted by United 
Distillers in such areas as pricing, reversing the cut-price low 
quality policy which had come to prevail during the 1960s and 70s, and 
setting out to restore Scotch whisky's reputation. tOO The major new 
groupings, each with powerful production, financial and brand 
marketing resources, have also brought more stability to the broking 
market for mature whisky, dampening the previous tendency to 
cyclical phases of over and under production. tOt 
Finally, many of the alliances, joint ventures, mergers and 
acquisitions in the alcoholic drinks industry have as a principal 
motive achieving greater efficiencies in marketing & distribution, 
allowing for exploitation of scale & scope economies and savings in 
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without immediate encroachment by competitors. According to Clark 
(1940 & 1961): 
It is the ability of a firm to behave persistently in a manner different from the 
behaviour that a competitive market would enforce on a firm facing otherwise 
similar cost and demand conditions. 104 
Of course, almost all industries exhibit some degree of market power. 
In practice, therefore, public policy, both in the United Kingdom 
and elsewhere, tends to focus not only on the possession of market 
power as such, but more especially on the way in which the power is 
exercised. 
The standard approach to the study of market power, as determined by 
Bain, decomposes a market into structure, conduct and performance. 
Structure refers to how sellers interact with other sellers, with 
buyers, and with potential entrants. Market structure also defines 
the product in terms of the potential number of variants in which the 
product can be produced. Market conduct refers to the behaviour of 
the firms in a given market structure, that is, how firms determine 
their price policy, sales and promotion. Finally, performance 
refers to the welfare aspect of the market interaction - if the 
interaction in the market leads to an optimal outcome, or whether a 
failure occurs that requires the intervention of the 
regulator. '05 
Investigations into the possession and use of market power in a given 
industry conventionally being by analysing the market structure, for 
which traditional neoclassical theory identifies four principal 
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models: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly 
and monopoly. Duopoly arises when there are only two firms in an 
industry. Concentration, product differentiation and barriers to 
entry are considered to be the main factors differentiating these 
models of market structure. 106 
i) Concentration 
Table 2.8 details the market share of the major Scotch whisky groups 
in 1995, from which the degree of concentration in the industry can be 
determined. 
Table 2.8: Leading Scotch Whisky Groups Based on Market Share, 
1995 
Rank Name of Company Market Share %, 1995 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Guinness (United Distillers) 
Allied Domecq (Allied Distillers) 
Seagram (Chivas & Glenlivet) 
American Brands (Whyte & Mackay & Invergordon) 
Grand Metropolitan (IDV) 
William Grant & Sons 
Highland Distilleries/Robertson & Baxter 
Berry Bros & Rudd 
Burn Stewart 
Pernod-Ricard (Campbell Distillers) 
Others 
33.56 
10.84 
10.11 
8.75 
8.16 
7.65 
2.92 
2.44 
1.94 
1.84 
11. 79 
Total 100.0 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
The most popular method of assessing the degree of concentration in 
an industry is the CRn ratio. The CRn or n firm concentration ratio 
refers to the cumulated market shares of the n leading firms in the 
industry, and is computed as: 
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n 
CRn = L Si 
i=l 
with i = l,2 ... n 
where: the i th firm has rank i in descending order (ie where i=l that 
is the largest firm, where i=2 that is the second largest, etc); Si is 
the share of firm i in the market. This share can be defined on the 
basis of output, turnover, numbers employed, shipments, or as in 
Table 2.9, on·the basis of sales. 107 
Table 2.9: CR5 Concentration Ratios: Market Share (%) of 5 Largest 
Whisky Groups by Total Sales 
Year CR5(%) 
1988 77 (0.77) 
1989 78 (0.78) 
1990 79 (0.79) 
1991 80 (0.80) 
1992 79 (0.79) 
1993 77 (0.77) 
1994 76 (0.76) 
1995 71 (0.71) 
~he market share of the combined Guinness-GM (Diageo) group is 
~pproximately 42%, based on the 1995 case sales estimates. This 
~epresents a CR4 Concentration Ratio of 71% (0.71), with the CR5 
~limbing to 79% (0.79). 
Source: Determined From Case Sales Estimates P~esented in 
The Scotch Whisky Industry Reviews 1995 & 1996 
A value close to zero would indicate that the largest n firms supply a 
small share of the market. Conversely, a value close to 1 denotes a 
high level of concentration. The concentration ratio is popular 
because of its limited data requirements, but is flawed by its 
inability to convey the relative importance of firms within a 
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particular industry. A five-firm concentration ratio of the type 
depicted in Table 2.9 does not reveal the extent to which one or more 
firms within the top five dominate a particular market, nor does it 
~ive any information as to the number or sizes of the firms outwith 
the r group. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the second most widely used 
concentration index, and is defined as the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of the n firms in an industry, ie: 
n 
H = L C Si)2 
i=l 
with i = 1,2 ... n 
where the ith firm and Si are as defined for eRie Si, can, for 
example, be measured in terms of firm i I S sales on the market CQi) as 
a fraction of total sales CQt). Defined in this way the H index would 
be: 
n (Qi)2 
H = L i -- ~ 
i=l lQt) 
The H index combines information about the size of all firms in a 
market. It is a measure of dispersion and can vary between 0 and 1. 
If H is 0, this suggests that there is a large number of equal-sized 
firms in the particular industry, and that concentration is low. If H 
88 
is close to 1, the market is dominated by one large firm. On the basis 
of Table 2.8, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Concentration Index for the 
whisky industry in 1995 was 0.17, which suggests a lower degree of 
concentration than implied by the CR5 concentration ratio. 
The various measures of market concentration incorporate, usually 
implicitly, the assumption that there is a clear correspondence 
between a firm and a market, and that firms operate within their 
national boundaries. But multi-plant and multi-product firms, for 
example, do not belong to precisely definable, single markets. It 
follows that an industry is not necessarily congruent with a market. 
In the case of the whisky industry, with nearly 90% of whisky sold 
overseas, a domestic perspective on the concentration index may not 
reveal the complete picture. 108 For example, whilst Diageo has 
nearly 42% of the world market for Scotch whisky, the comp~ny is still 
selling less than 9% of the total spirits sold worldwide. 
Moreover, as the level of seller concentration in a market increases, 
it is not always possible to state unambiguously that there has been a 
lessening of competition. Competition among the few may be just as 
vigorous as competition among the many, although the character of the 
competitive process may be different. Instead of price rivalry, 
oligopolists may prefer to rely on product differentiation, 
resul ting in products sold on the same market no longer being 
considered as perfect substitutes by buyers. 
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ii) Product Differentiation 
Product differentiation can be either horizontal or vertical. 
Horizontally differentiated brands are ones that, if sold for 
identical prices, illicit from different consumers choices of 
different brands. Vertical differentiation, by contrast, involves 
brands that are uniformly ranked by all consumers, and 
differentiation is made upon the basis of quality. Models of 
vertical product differentiation are useful for analyzing the 
coexistence of high-quality and low-quality brands; the emphasis on 
income distribution as a determinant of the number of varieties is a 
feature that does not appear in models of horizontal product 
differentiation. For further discussion, see Beath & Katsoulacos 
(1991), Anderson et al (1992) and Gabszewicz & Thisse (1992).109 
Horizontal product differentiation models are further divided into 
two groups: non-address models, and address (location) models, 
after Hotelling (1929). A more formal discussion is given in Eaton & 
Lipsey (l98~), but the main difference between the two approaches is 
that in the non-address model all consumers gain utility from 
consuming a variety of products and therefore buy a variety of 
brands .In contrast, in the location model, each consumer purchases 
only one brand, but consumers have different heterogenous 
preferences for their most preferred brand. 110 
There can be two interpretations of location. Location can mean the 
physical location of a particular consumer, in which case the 
consumer observes the prices charged by all stores and then chooses 
to purchase from the store at which the price plus transportation 
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cost is minimized. Alternatively, location can mean a distance 
between the brand characteristic that a particular consumer views as 
ideal and the characteristic of the brand actually purchased. In 
this case, the distance between a consumer and a firm can measure the 
consumers' disutility from buying a less-than-ideal brand. This 
disutili ty is equivalent to the transportation cost in the previous 
interpretation. 
A third approach to product differentiation is found in Lancaster 
(1971). Lancaster's 'characteristics' approach assumes that each 
product consists of many characteristics (such as colour, 
durability, safety and strength); in choosing a specific brand, the 
consumer looks for the brand that would yield the most suitable 
combinations of the product's characteristics. 1 1 1 
On the whole, oligopolists feel that more permanent advantages can be 
gained over rivals through non-price competition, because 
successful product differentiation, reinforced by competition 
through the market mix (including branding, packaging, selling 
efforts and distribution) cannot be matched as quickly and 
completely as price reductions. 112 The theory of the oligopolist 
seeking brand imaging as a means of maximising sales was first 
propogated by W J Baumol (1956), and is manifest in the whisky 
industry. 1 1 3 
To a much greater extent than other branded spirits producers, the 
whisky industry devotes an extraordinary amount of resources to 
horizontally differentiating its products, creating attractive 
boxes, tubes and cartons, particularly for malt whiskies. These 
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jostle each other for space on merchants' shelves, and seek to induce 
consumers to differentiate between products as much on this basis as 
on the inherent quality of the product. 
The greater the extent to which a firm has succeeded in 
differentiating its product, the greater the extent to which it has 
raised a barrier to entry into its market. Product differentiation 
can thus be regarded as an element of market structure, but in many 
empirical studies it is also included as a barrier to entry. 
iii) Barriers To Entry 
Entry in a particular market or industry may be difficult or 
impossible, depending on the height of barriers. Barriers are all 
types of obstacles erected at the market edge by incumbent firms, by 
the nature of the product or process, and/or by the government, which 
makes entry difficult for potential entrants. Bain' s (1956) 
taxonomy of entry barriers included technology, economies of scale 
and product differentiation. Much work has been done in this area 
since then. For example, Shepherd (1990) identifies two broad 
categories of entry barriers, exogenous and endogenous. 
Shepherd describes exogenous conditions as "fundamental causes that 
cannot be altered." They lie outside the leading firms' control and 
are related to the nature of the product. They comprise: capital 
requirements, economies of scale, product differentiation, absolute 
cost advantages, diversification, R&D intensity, high durability of 
the firm's specific capital, which includes sunk costs, and vertical 
integration. 
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These are all of an economic nature. To list could be added 
institutional barriers more or less outside firms' control, such as 
government regulation, though some writers, such as Sapir (1993), 
include regulations as a third type of barrier. 
Endogenous conditions result from the strategic actions of the 
dominant firms. They include: retaliation and pre-emptive actions, 
the building up of excess capacity to bar entry, advertising and 
other selling expenses, patents, control over strategic resources 
and other strategies that leave no room for other potential branded 
products. These barriers reflect the degree of imperfection in the 
market. They can be used by the incumbent firms against both 
potential entrants and existing rivals. 1 14 
Following Stiglitz (1987), it is possible to highlight the role 
competition plays in creating entry barriers; in a market for a 
homegenous product, the existence of even small sunk costs can serve 
as an entry barrier, so that entry will not occur even if the 
incumbent continues to make abnormal profits. In this model, entry 
depends upon the strategies adopted by incumbent firms; if firms play 
a Cournot game after new entry occurs, low sunk costs would not 
renerate entry barriers. But if firms adopt a Bertrand strategy, 
price competition makes entry unprofitable for even low entry 
costs.1 15 
In their work on the brewing industry in the United Kingdom, Hawkins & 
Pass (1979) defined entry barriers as structural, institutional or 
financial in character. Structural barriers reflect the fact that 
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established companies with substantial market shares and large-
scale production and distribution facilities may have a decisive 
cost advantage. Strong consumer preferences may well favour the 
established companies, and markets outlets and/or essential raw 
material supplies may have been pre-empted. Institutional barriers 
are the accumulated advantages established firms have in owning 
patents, franchises, I icences and exclusive dealing contracts. 
Financial barriers involve the new entrant having to make a 
substantial investment in large-scale production plant, advertising 
and product development. 1 16 
Barriers to entry in the whisky industry have tradi tionally been very 
high. Such a traditional industry, where great store is placed on 
pedigree and a proven track record, naturally favours the 
incumbents. Many of the prime water sources, so vi tal in the 
production of whisky, are already controlled by existing companies, 
J?articularly in the Speyside area. The cost of financing mat'uring 
stocks and the expenses associated with advertising are further 
barriers. Consequently, as discussed earlier, 'greenfield' 
investment has been comparatively rare, and takeover of existing 
operations represents a much more attractive option. 
So on the basis of a fair degree of concentration, the great 
importance attached to prod~ct differentiation, and the existence of 
formidable barriers to entry, the market structure of the whisky 
industry could be considered fairly oligopolistic. Stigler (1942) 
has suggested that "an industry is workably competitive when, i) 
there are a considerable number of firms selling closely related 
products in each important market area, ii) these firms are not in 
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collusion, and iii) the long-run average cost curve for a new firm is 
not materially higher than that for an established firm." 
Considering this latter requirement, the whisky industry is not 
workably competitive. The issues of welfare norms and 
considerations of second best in workable competition are discussed 
further in Reid (1987). 
But in respect of Clark's view, the market structure of the whisky 
industry could be considered competitive: 
Favourable conditions include a substantial number of firms small enough, 
relative to the whole structure in which they compete, to have strong competitive 
incentives (though there is no need for atomistic smallness) and economically 
strong enough to make their competitive pressure count. 
The fundamental weakness in the approach of many exponents of 
workable competition is, of course, that they tend to exaggerate the 
significance of market structure as a determinant of conduct and 
performance. Consequently, they see the effectiveness of 
competition in a given market primarily in terms of its structural 
characteristics, providing at best only a superficial perspective. 
In Markham's (1952) words: 
A possible alternative approach to the concept of workable competition ... is one 
which shifts the emphasis from a set of specific structural characteristics to an 
appraisal of possible remedial action. A first approximation to the concept of 
workable competition when viewed along these lines might be as follows: an 
industry is workably competitive when, after its market characteristics and the 
dynamic forces which shaped them have been thoroughly examined, there is no 
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clearly indicated change that can be effected through public policy measures 
which would result in greater social gains than social losses. 1 17 
It was contended in Section 2.3 that the high levels of duty imposed 
upon spirits severely compromises the incentive for firms in the 
whisky industry to compete on price, particularly in so far as 
standard blends are concerned. A substantial cut in duty, of the 
magnitude proposed in Chapter 7, would ensure that any reduction in 
margins could be passed on to the consumer to a greater extent than 
has hitherto been possible. Such a public policy initiative would 
thus facilitate much greater competitive pressures wi thin the 
industry. 
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2.5 Recent Trends in Consumption, Production & Marketing 
The various legal statutes referred to in Section 2.2 protected the 
integrity of Scotch whisky, and laid the foundations for the growth 
and development of the blended whisky trade, to the pOint where it was 
to become one of the most important export industries in the United 
Kingdom. In the years following the restoration of production and 
trade after 1945; whisky sales both within the United Kingdom and 
abroad made respectable growth, the latter increasing from 22 
million litres of pure alcohol (lpa) in 1949 to 274m lpa in 1978. In 
its 1978, review, the National Economic Development Office (NEDO) 
Distilling Sector Working Group forecast annual growth of sales by 
volume of 4.4% into the 1980s, but the recession of 1979-81 saw an 
alarming decline in demand for whisky, especially bottled in 
Scotland blends which accounted for two-thirds of total sales. 1 18 
As Table 2.10 illustrates, sales in th~ United Kingdom have fallen by 
over a third since 1978. Table 2.11 following shows that the decline 
in exports to the United States - traditionally the most important 
market - has been even more precipi tous, falling by nearly two-thirds 
over the same period. 119 
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Table 2.10: Consumption of Scotch Whisky in The United Kingdom, 1978-
1996 (million litres of pure alcohol) 
Year Total Consumption 
1978 48.81 
1979 52.54 
1980 50.16 
1981 47.71 
1982 44.75 
1983 44.48 
1984 43.36 
1985 46.14 
1986 45.64 
1987 44.62 
1988 45.18 
1989 43.03 
1990 41.34 
1991 38.26 
1992 35.79 
1993 37.55 
1994 37.32 
1995 31.01 
1996 32.07 
Growth in - 34% 
Sales 1978-96 
Sources: The Scotch Whisky Industry 
Review 1995 
The Scotch Whisky Association 
Statistical Report 1995 & 1996 
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Table 2.11: Scotch Whisky Exports To The United States, 1978-1996 
(million litres of pure alcohol) 
Year Exports 9,,-0 of Which Bottled 
1978 94.03 60.7 
1979 86.04 62.9 
1980 74.97 56.2 
1981 77.29 53.1 
1982 78.82 53.7 
1983 68.11 55.7 
1984 68.10 56.8 
1985 65.94 58.4 
1986 59.55 57.8 
1987 58.84 59.2 
1988 53.16 58.5 
1989 48.99 59.4 
1990 46.24 57.4 
1991 40.88 54.1 
1992 38.41 56.0 
1993 40.44 56.8 
1994 38.05 57.6 
1995 35.74 59.5 
1996 33.73 62.2 
Growth in - 64% 
Sales 1978-1996 
Bulk shipments consist principally of blended whisky 
which is subsequently bottled in the United States. 
Sources: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1995 
The Scotch Whisky Association 
Statistical Report 1995 & 1996 
Unlike the rectified spirits such as gin and vodka, the nature of the 
Scotch whisky production cycle is heavily determined by the legal 
requirement to mature the spirit for at least three years, but on 
average, distilling take places six years prior to consumption for 
mal t and four years for grain whisky. There are few industries in the 
world which are so reliant upon projections of future market growth, 
where an error of one or two percentage pOints in forecasting demand 
over a five or ten year period can result in a need for an adjustment 
in production of dramatic proportions. The slump in whisky sales 
therefore had an inevitable impact on output. 
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After 1980 increasing numbers of distilleries moved to short-time 
working, and operating at less than 50% of capacity became the norm. 
As the recession deepened, distilleries began to close, and by 1983 
whisky production had fallen to just half the level of nine years 
earlier. DCL alone closed 21 of its 45 malt distilleries, one of its 
five grain distilleries, two bottling & blending plants, and two dark 
grains plants. In total, the number of distilleries fell from 125 in 
1980 to 94 in 1985. 
An upturn in sales meant that between 1989 and 1991 six of the 21 malt 
distilleries closed by the former DCL reopened, and in 1991 both 
William Grant & Sons and Speyside Distillers opened new malt 
distilleries. 12o However, rising stocks again forced production 
cutbacks to occur: in 1993 United Distillers closed 4 more 
distilleries and in 1995 Whyte & Mackay mothballed their three malt 
distilleries. In 1995, there were a total of 93 distilleries in 
operation, 85 malt and 8 grain. 
Despite distillery closures, the industry's tendency to oversupply 
has not been resolved, as indicated in Table 2.12. Although the ratio 
of stocks to consumption declined between 1987-1990, raising prices 
& profits, in the years 1989-1992 production exceeded consumption. 
It will be observed from Table 2.12 that in 1993-95 production was 
less than consumption, but data from the Scotch Whisky Association 
shows that there was a notable increment in whisky stocks in 1996. 
Nevertheless, given that whisky is consumed at an average age of 6 
years, a ratio of stock to consumption of between 6.5 and 7.0 is 
regarded as optimal by many in the industry. 121 
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Table 2.12: Production, Consumption & Stocks of Whisky 1978-1996 
(million litres of pure alcohol) 
Year ~otal Total Stocks ~atio Stocks/ Consumption as 
Production Consumption ~onsumption s,. distillation 0 
1978 459.3 370.6 2,932.2 7.9 80.7 
1979 459.0 356.5 3,034.7 8.5 77.7 
1980 415.9 367.1 3,083.5 8.4 88.3 
1981 268.0 417.9 2,933.6 7.0 155.9 
1982 247.7 350.8 2,830.5 8.1 141.6 
1983 239.1 326.0 2,743.6 8.4 136.3 
1984 253.4 335.0 2,662.0 7.9 132.2 
1985 260.6 324.3 2,598.3 8.0 124.4 
1986 264.9 410.2 2,453.0 6.0 154.9 
1987 289.7 304.4 2,438.3 8.0 105.1 
1988 329.9 335.0 2,433.2 7.3 101.5 
1989 385.5 345.6 2,473.1 7.2 89.6 
1990 436.2 366.1 2,543.2 6.9 83.9 
1991 418.3 332.5 2,629.0 7.9 79.5 
1992 384.9 338.9 2,675.0 7.9 88.1 
1993 353.0 355.5 2,672.5 7.5 100.7 
1994 358.9 369.0 2,662.4 7.2 102.8 
1995 398.7 372.4 2,688.7 7.2 93.4 
1996ES~1441.4 376.0 2,754.1 7.3 85.2 
1997Est 480.0 385.0 2,849.1 7.4 80.2 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
Consumption estimates for the main markets indicate a growth rate of 
2% between 1995 and the year 2001, fuelled mainly by growth in Single 
Malts and de luxe blends. This will require the industry to lay down 
a commensurately higher level of stocks to meet this demand. As such, 
the increases in output in the past years allied to estimates of the 
next year do not at this juncture imply over-production. 122 
The recession of the early 1980s accounted for much of the fall in 
whisky sales, but other, longer-term non-cyclical factors were at 
play. For many decades there had been, in northern markets, an 
established tradition of drinking spirits - whether diluted with 
water, mixers or other flavours - at various times of the day. This 
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had coexisted, in reasonable balance, with alternative consumer 
preferences for beers, aperitifs and wines. 
There has, however, been a marked swing in two directions over recent 
years. First, to more neutral spirits, such as vodka and light rum, 
as a preferred mixer base for cocktails. Secondly, an even more 
marked tendency for wines of all types to feature as occasional 
drinks over the bar and at home. Wine has broken away from being seen 
only as choice to accompany food, and white wine, in particular, is 
now well established as an occasional drink. 
The spread of wine bars throughout the United Kingdom and the 
popularity of wine packed in boxes - which have released consumers 
from the constraints of wine bottle quanti ties - all testify to this 
change in the home market. In the United States, the parallel swing 
to wine has been even more pronounced. This is additionally linked to 
the status and quality of the rapidly expanding domestic wine 
industry. 
Several factors have contributed to this movement in taste. One is a 
perception that wine is light in alcohol and thus fits well with the 
current concern wi th physical fitness, whereas spirits have acquired 
a reputation for being strong and even harmful to health. The 
misconception is aggravated by the second factor, that in almost 
every market wine carries a far lower rate of duty than spirits - or 
sometimes none at all. This makes it better value for money as an 
alcoholic drink. 
give 
In taxing alcoholic drinks in this erratic fashion 
the impression of applying a form of moral governments 
disapproval against drinks which are bottled at a higher 
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strength. 123 
A final factor may have been the perception that Scotch is a more 
mature person's drink, with younger people consuming American Rye 
and Bourbon whiskey or 'white' spirits such as vodka and tequila. 
This is predominantly attributable to the marketing of whiskies such 
as Jack Daniels, Jim Beam or Southern Comfort; the success of vodka, 
rum and white wine may also be a reflection of often 'racey', 
contemporary advertising promoting the attractiveness of these 
drinks to younger members of the 'smart set'. 124 
In addition, sales of these drinks, unlike Scotch whisky, were 
dominated by a few leading brands, making for greater opportunity for 
mass marketing. Table 2.13 illustrates this shift in the United 
States market from whisky to more neutral spirits such as vodka and 
tequila. The top Scotch whisky in the United States is Dewar's, 
which featured in the top 12 spirits at one time but is now in 20th 
place, although the number 2 Scotch, J&B Rare, is in 32nd 
posi tion. 1 25 Table 2.14 following shows how whisky now accounts for 
much less than half of total spirits consumption in the United 
Kingdom. 
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Table 2.13: Changes in Market Share of Spirits in the United States, 
1985-1995 
Spirit I % Change in Market Share 
US Whiskey 
Scotch Whisky 
Canadian Whisky 
Irish Whiskey 
Gin 
Vodka 
Rum 
Brandy 
Cordials 
Cocktails 
Tequila 
Total All Whisky/Whiskey 
Total Other Spirits 
-21.8 
-28.3 
-6.2 
nc 
-3.4 
+11.7 
+7.4 
+6.5 
+15.2 
+90.5 
+71.4 
-18.6 
+14.0 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry R~view 1996 
Table 2.14: Scotch Whisky: Share of Total UK Spirits Consumption 
1978-1995 
Year Whisky as % of UK Spirits 
1978 51.0 
1979 49.8 
1980 50.3 
1981 50.5 
1982 50.2 
1983 48.5 
1984 47.5 
1985 47.4 
1986 47.0 
1987 45.5 
1988 43.7 
1989 43.1 
1990 42.2 
1991 41.2 
1992 41.5 
1993 42.7 
1994 42.0 
1995 39.3 
1996 Est 40.0 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1995 
By contrast to the advertising of other spirits, until very recently, 
advertising of Scotch whisky has remained traditional, with the 
industry maintaining the view that whisky was not a young person's 
drink, but one consumers gravitated towards as they matured. 109 
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Plate 5 Young Spaniards at Jimmy'z Nightclub, Barcelona. Allied Domecq PIc. 
Scotch whisky is the dernier cri amongst youngsters in Southern Europe and the Far 
East. The success of blends such as Ballantine's in these markets, together with the 
continuing enthusiasm for single malts in the West, may ensure the industry's 
prosperity in the future. But fashion is fickle, and already there are signs in the Far East 
that wine is fast replacing whisky as the preferred drink of the ' smart set' . 
Lately, there has been a shift in attitudes, as described by The 
Economist newspaper in a recent article: 
Go to Bangkok's smartest nightclubs and the young blades and their dates will be 
living it up over Chivas Regal and cola. Spaniards, the fourth largest Scotch 
buyers, drank 25.28m LPA of Scotch in 1995, three times what they swallowed in 
1985, and the heaviest consumers were 24-30 year olds. '26 
This evidence from growing markets overseas of Scotch's appeal to the 
young lies behind the recent decision on the part of some companies in 
the industry to aim new campaigns at youngsters in the more mature 
markets of the United Kingdom and the United States. Uni ted 
Distillers' recent Bell's campaign in the United Kingdom, 
advertising for the first time through the medium of television, was 
aimed specifically at the youth market. Mindful of its growing 
appeal to young adults in Scotland, United Distillers has also 
utilized the Bell's brand in sponsoring the Scottish Premier 
Football League, whilst Highland Distilleries have supported 
Scotland's rugby team through the Famous Grouse brand. 
Overseas, United Distillers have also reinterpreted the world's best 
selling whisky, Johnnie Walker, in an attempt to make it more 
relevant to young people. The famous striding dandy has been toned 
down, and a new 'Taste Life' TV and cinema advertising campaign 
recognizes self-reliance with the challenge: "When your life 
flashes before you, make sure it's worth watching." The commercials, 
shown across Europe and Australia, combine the distinctive taste of 
Johnnie Walker Red Label with the target audience's aspiration to 
live life to the full. A further encouraging development in this 
105 
respect has been the Dewar' s campaign in the United States, launched 
in the Autumn of 1994 and aimed specifically at the 25-35 age group in 
New York. 
Guinness (now Diageo) Chairman Anthony Greener commented in the 
company's 1996 Annual Reporr: 
We are now seeing encouraging signs in the largest market for premium spirits, 
the USA, where Dewar's and Johnnie Walker Red Label achieved higher sales into 
retail for the first time in marty years, and our other premium brands showed 
continuing growth. We know that innovative brand management and well-targeted 
marketing investment generate growth, and we believe that there is no such thing 
as a mature market if you target the consumer properly and invest adequately to 
reach them. 1 2 7 
The American drinks industry's self-imposed ban on touting spirits 
on television was also broken last year when Seagram started to 
advertise its Chivas Regal brand. Having denounced the 
advertisements at the time, on the grounds that too many young people 
were taking up drinking, in April 1997 President Clinton asked the 
Federal Communications Commission to consider ways of reimposing a 
ban. Seagram is unabashed; it has surveyed 18-45 year olds and 
launched a career guidance program that plays to youthful 
aspirations 
campaign. 128 
and incorporates material from its Chivas 
Whilst there has been, therefore, an improvement in the marketing of 
Scotch in very recent years, much more needs to be done if the 
continued erosion of its domestic market share it to be halted. There 
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is also a need to promote Scotch whisky overseas generically, and 
although past SWA campaigns in the United States, Japan and Spain 
were useful, they were of modest proportions (only a few million 
pounds) . A more producti ve approach would probably be for 
individual companies to playa much greater part in generic promotion 
but to augment this with aggressive and contemporary brand 
imaging. 129 This need to raise brand awareness and loyalties is 
underscored in a recent remark of Anthony Greener: 
... increasingly affluent consumers - the majority of the population in a majority 
of countries [are] looking for increased prestige and enhanced self-
satisfaction through using and displaying more of the better-quality premium 
sector products in widely differing categories. 130 
In addition to inadequate marketing, the Scotch whisky industry has 
also been somewhat reticent in introducing innovative products, with 
even the marketing of single malts dating only from the 1960s. The 
success of the Irish whiskey-based liqueur Bailey's Irish Cream 
suggests that there are lucrative returns to be made for the 
creative, 131 but Guinness's recent attempts to clamber aboard the 
current craze for. 'alcopops' (sweet fizzy drinks with the kick of 
strong beer) has been attended by controversy, 'alcopops' raising 
the ire of those concerned with the problems of underage drinking. It 
is encouraging to note from Guinness's 1996 Annual Report that new 
brand development has been substantially increased, with such 
products as a tinned mixture of Bell's and Irn-Bru and Loch Dhu Black 
whisky, representing a doubling of expenditure to more than £17 
million. 132 
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G1enmorangie's extensive scientific research on the affects of 
different types of wood on maturing whisky appears to have paid 
dividends with the success of the recently launched Port, Sherry and 
Madeira 'Wood Finishes' Range. Astutely, too, Highland Distilleries 
diversified its spirits portfolio in April 1996 when the company 
introduced Gloag's Gin, a premium London dry gin which has been 
received very favourably by both the on and off trade. 133 
Within the domestic market, too, there is still the problem of weak 
selling prices, the result of a resistance to price increases 
generally, in the face of a more benign inflation environment, lack 
of consumer confidence, and excessi vely aggressive competition 
wi thin the industry as companies seek to maintain volumes and market 
share at all costs. Prices in the United Kingdom have been minimal 
since 1993 with only a 1.5% increase in 1994 followed by no increase 
in 1995 and a 1.5% rise in 1996. There has been an increase in own 
label sales at the expense of more profi table brands. 1 34 The current 
slump in sales of Cognac and resulting overproduction will only add 
to the difficulties faced by malt whisky producers in particular in 
achieving price rises. 
There is a feeling that as market leaders, United Distillers should 
be more aggressive in raising prices, Alan Gray arguing that "It is 
proving difficult for individual companies to depart to any great 
extent from the norm." 1 3 5 Nevertheless, the success of Highland 
Distilleries' premium-priced 'Famous Grouse' in the United Kingdom, 
to give but one example, demonstrates that well thought-out and 
targeted promotion can win market share as effectively as price 
competition, and in this respect there has been some encouraging 
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signs in recent months of more emphasis among Scotch whisky producers 
on brand building, advertising and pricing rather than on short term 
promotional activity and price discounting. 136 Price increases in 
1997 are likely to be slightly more robust at around 3%.137 
But despite the problems afflicting the whisky industry overall in 
mature markets such as the United Kingdom and United States, there is 
one rapidly-expanding sector which has defied the general trend and 
seen spectacular growth in recent years: single mal ts, the product of 
one distillery and made exclusively with malted barley. 
The creation of blended whisky in the latter part of the 19th century 
had meant that the fine malts almost disappeared from the market 
place. The blending houses became all powerful, and drinkers became 
accustomed to asking not for Glenmorangie, Macallan or Bal venie, but 
for Bell's, Haig, Johnnie Walker and Dewar's. The mal ts were buried -
some though forever - in heavily promoted brands like White Horse, 
VAT 69 and Chivas Regal. They were there, but not visible. 138 
In Scotland, single malts retained their following, but it was not 
until the postwar years that there was a revival of interest in malt 
whiskies. The success of blends, owned by a handful of large 
corporations, made the few independent distillers of malt whisky 
nervous. In 1962 William Grant & Sons began to export their single 
malt Glenfiddich, first to England, and then, in the late 1960s and 
70s, to the rest of the world. 1 39 More distillery owners followed and 
began placing their single malts in off-licences and duty-free 
shops. 
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Worldwide, single malts demonstrated very high growth over the 
period 1975-1996, with sales rising from 2.1m to 11.9m LPA, an 
increase in the share of the bottled in Scotland market from 0.7% to 
5.0%, representing a growth in malt sales of nearly 500% over the 
period. £166 million of malt whisky was bottled in 1996 for sale 
overseas, with single malts like Glenfiddich, The G1enlivet, 
Glenmorangie, The Macallan and Laphroaig establishing themselves 
internationally. Even in the United Kingdom, as Table 2.15 
illustrates, sales of single malts have almost doubled since 1978, 
partly offsetting the fall in sales of blends. In 1996, Single Malts 
commanded an approximate 7.3% share of the whisky market in the 
United Kingdom. 140 
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Table 2.15: Conswnption of Malt Whisky in the United Kingdom, 1978-
1996 (million litres of pure alcohol) 
Year Malt Whisky Sales s,. 0 of UK Whisky Market 
1978 1.21 2.5 
1979 1.28 2.4 
1980 0.95 1.9 
1981 0.81 1.7 
1982 1.01 2.3 
1983 0.94 2.1 
1984 1.12 2.6 
1985 1.21 2.6 
1986 1.30 2.8 
1987 1.48 3.3 
1988 1.63 3.6 
1989 1. 71 4.0 
1990 1. 76 4.2 
1991 1.43 3.7 
1992 1.38 3.9 
1993 1.63 4.3 
1994 1.97 5.3 
1995 2.03 6.5 
1996 2.35 7.3 
Growth in 
Sales 
1978-1996 + 94% 
Sources: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1995 
: The Scotch Whisky Association 
Statistical Report 1995 & 1996 
The establishment of the Leith-based Scotch Malt Whisky Society in 
1983 not only reflected the growing audience for malts straight from 
the cask, but encouraged more companies to market single malts by 
name vintage and at natural cask strength. 141 Several Scottish 
universities have also established highly successful malt whisky 
appreciation societies, such as the Water of Life Society in 
Edinburgh and The Quaich Society at St Andrews (currently presided 
over by the author - see Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3: Logo of The Quaich Society, University of St Andrews 
Source: University of St Andrews Quaich Society 
The trend of opening mal t distilleries to the public and of building 
visitors' centres will continue, whilst more detailed guides to the 
histories and the characteristics of the whiskies of each distillery 
are likely to become available. Whisky distilleries are rapidly 
becoming one of Scotland's most notable tourist attractions. In 
1996, over 860,000 people visited Scotch whisky distilleries, a 22% 
increase on the previous year. The largest enterprise, The 
Glenturret Distillery at Crieff (reputedly the oldest distillery in 
Scotland, see Plate 2), received over 228,000 visitors and was ranked 
as the 8th most popular attraction in the paid admissions category of 
The Scottish Tourist Board's Visitor Attractions Survey. The 
importance of these attractions is particularly significant in terms 
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of the provision of employment in remote rural communities. In 
general, visitor centres employ twice as many people as the 
distilleries to which they are attached. 142 
The full potential for single malts nevertheless remains 
underexploited, with certain sections of the industry continuing to 
take the position that whisky remains a product which people 
gravitate towards as they mature. Arranging for distillers to call 
upon The Quaich Society can be a frustratingly arduous task, with 
requests often.~et by responses that range from indifference to 
"Conducting malt whisky tastings to a group of young students and 
university academics does not fit with our current marketing 
plans." 
Such a view is perhaps myopic and misconceived, as graduates from the 
traditional Scottish universities often secure highly paid 
employment. In any case, St Andrews students in particular appear to 
have a fair degree of disposable income, an observation given 
empirical attestation by the town's thriving taverns and liquor 
stores. 
But the general industry opinion is that in the longer term the 
outlook for single malt sales is bright, as they become an 
increasingly understood and accepted drink, and that the sales 
performance of single malts is unrelated to the trend in blended 
whisky sales. However, this will require continued promotion of 
single malt brands by companies in order to differentiate their 
product, and in respect of this, it is worthy of note that wi thin the 
Uni ted Kingdom at present, the industry currently devotes 20% of its 
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marketing budget to single malts. 143 Sutherlands believe that the 
world case market of single mal ts (out of a total whisky market of 78m 
cases) could well reach 5m cases by the end of the year 2001. 144 
As well as the continuing success of single malts, Scotch whisky 
generally has opportunities in many parts of the world, in growing 
markets which should more than compensate for those in decline. As 
illustrated in Figure 2.4, export volumes, after reaching a low point 
in 1985 in the aftermath of the 1979-81 recession, grew strongly in 
1986-88. Exports fell again in the recession of 1991, rose to their 
highest level since 1979 in 1995, but edged back in 1996. But as 
Figure 2.4 also shows, the realised sterling value of Scotch whisky 
exports has increased in every year since the restoration of trade 
after World War II, excepting 1969 and 1983, reaching £2.9 billion in 
1997. 
The value of exports in current prices is a poor indicator of export 
J?erformance, as it is affected by changes in the price of the product. 
But the value of exports in real terms from the industry has increased 
substantially over the last 10 years, with exports of low-margin bulk 
malt & grain whiskies shrinking, and greater sales of high value-
added bottled in Scotland de luxe blends and single malts. 
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Figure 2.4: Exports of Scotch Whisky in Volume and Value (Current 
Prices), 1978-1996 
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• Bottled Malt 
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• Bulk Malt & oraln 
o 79 81 S3 85 87 89 91 93 96 
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Source: The Scotch Whisky Association Statistical Report 1996 
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As will be noted from Figure 2.4, the years 1979 and 1995 saw similar 
volumes of Scotch exported, but the years in between witnessed a 
noteworthy shift in the importance of specific markets. Markets have 
shrunk in the United Kingdom, United States and Japan, whilst the 
European Union has grown in importance, accounting for 36% of exports 
in 1996 (excluding the Uni ted Kingdom). In part this is a reflection 
of the expansion in EU membership, but there has also been a rapid 
growth in exports to France and Spain, the former doubling between 
1980 and 1996, the latter trebling. 1 45 In fact, in 1996 France became 
the largest market by volume, although by value the United States 
remains in first place. 
Sales of Scotch whisky by value and volume to the major, markets in 
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1996 are illustrated in Table 2.16. It will be observed that rankings 
by value in some instances differ from the position by volume, a 
factor largely explained by differing product mixes across markets. 
For example, Table 2.16 ranks Australia tenth by volume exported, 
ahead of Italy, but in terms of value realised, is significantly 
further down the league. This is principally a result of 65% of 
exports to Australia being in the form of low margin bulk blends, 
whereas the Italian market is almost 100% bottled in Scotland 
products, with 24% in the form of single malts. Margins are 
consequently much greater. 
Table 2.16: Sales of Scotch Whisky to the Major Markets in 1996 
Nation Exports by % of Rank Exports by Rank 
Volume (mlpa) Market (vol) Value (£m) (value) 
France 36.24 12.68 1 230.26 2 
United States 33.73 11.68 2 273.02 1 
United Kingdom 32.07 11.10 3 - -
Spain .J 23.55 8.15 4 183.20 3 
South Korea 11.44 3.96 5 128.90 4 
Japan 10.91 3.78 6 128.86 5 
Germany 10.25 3.55 7 98.26 6 
Thailand 9.00 3.12 8 76.34 8 
Greece 8.96 3.10 9 92.09 7 
Australia 7.47 2.59 10 36.04 13 
South Africa 7.31 2.53 11 46.97 11 
Italy 6.65 2.30 12 59.02 9 
Brazil 5.74 1.99 13 40.45 12 
Portugal 5.28 1.83 14 55.50 10 
Netherlands 4.5 1.57 15 34.34 14 
Other EU 8.37 2.90 75.27 
Rest of World 66.97 23.17 755.65 
TOTAL ALL MARKETS 288.87 100.00 -
Source: The Scotch Whisky Association Statistical Report 1996 
The market share of the leading brands of blended and malt whisky are 
detailed in Tables 2.17 & 2.18. 
116 
Table 2.17: Market Share of Top Six Blended Scotch Whisky Brands, 
1995 
Brand %UK Brand 9, 0 Export Brand 9, 0 World 
Bell's 18.1 JW Red 11.1 JW Red 9.7 
Famous Grouse 12.3 J&B 8.7 J&B 7.7 
Teacher's 6.7 Ballantine's 6.8 Ballantine's 6.0 
Grant's 5.9 Chi vas Regal 5.4 Chivas Regal 4.8 
Whyte & Mackay 4.6 JW Black 4.8 Grant's 4.6 
The Claymore 4.3 Grant's 4.4 JW Black 4.4 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
Table 2.18: Top Six Scotch Whisky Single Malt Brands, 1995 
Brand %UK Brand 9, 0 Export Brand % World 
Glenfiddich 17.5 Glenfiddich 24.5 Glenfiddich 23.2 
Glenmorangie 9.5 Glen Grant 16.9 Glen Grant 13.8 
The Macallan 6.3 The Glenlivet 9.6 The Glenlivet 8.9 
The Glenlivet 6.0 Cardhu 4.4 Glenmorangie 4.8 
Laphroaig 3.5 The Macallan 4.3 The Macallan 4.7 
Lagavulin 2.7 Aberlour 4.1 Cardhu 3.8 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
The great potential for increasing overseas sales is revealed by the 
fact that present sales account for only a small percentage of the 
spirits market and an even smaller proportion of the alcoholic drinks 
market in many of the important world markets. Even within the 
European Union, Scotch accounts for only about 13% of total spirits 
consumption, and whilst overall European spirits consumption has 
declined by about 1% annually in recent years, some premium products 
have shown growth. In the last 4 years malt whisky has grown by 75% 
and de luxe Scotch brands by 42%.146 
The Far East is an area of great promise; in 1996, the region was 
United Distillers' largest profit region, up 15% on the previous 
year. 147 The current economic difficulties in the region 
notwithstanding, Thailand, South Korea & Taiwan in particular have 
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recorded very impressive growth rates over the past decade, as shown 
in Table 2.19: 
Table 2.19: Exports of Scotch Whisky to Far East (Million 
Litres of Alcohol) 
Thailand 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Total 
1985 
1.2 
1.6 
0.5 
3.3 
1995 % Change 
6.7 +458 
9.4 +487 
2.6 +420 
18.7 +467 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
Latin America has potential too. When economic conditions improve, 
.the heavy spirits drinkers of Eastern Europe are likely to take to 
Scotch in larger quantities, with United Distillers reporting a 
significant increase in volumes and profits in these areas in 1996, 
with particularly strong performances in the Czech Republic, Hungary 
& Russia. 148 In the longer term, the Indian sub-continent is an 
attractive prospect for the industry. It is estimated that in India 
at present, out of a total population of 900 million, around 150 
million are sufficiently well off to be able to afford whisky. 
Despite religious taboos in parts of the country, substantial 
9uantities of spirits are already consumed. 149 
China's attraction to distillers, with its population of 1.2 
billion, is very well illustrated by the fact that the former 
Guinness and LVMH formed a joint venture there to sell Guinness's 
whisky brands and LVMH' s cognac. According to Guinness 's then Chief 
Executive Tony Greener, "China represents a huge opportunity for us 
in the long term. It is estimated that international brands account 
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for only 1.4 per cent of the spirits market at present. Once the 
infrastructure is in place to deliver the product to the market, 
China could be a 20 million case market for premium branded imported 
spirits by the next century."150 
Certain other noteworthy markets saw substantial growth in 1996. 
Exports to St Helena were up 68% on 1995, Tonga 100%, Wallis & Futuna 
325%, and Mayotte registered a significant increment of 8935%. 
Regretfully, these positive developments were slightly jaded by 
falls of 62% in exports to St Christoper & Nevis, a 68% decline in 
sales to the Turks & Caicos, and a similar reduction in shipments to 
The Holy See. Niue & Tokelau and The Svalbard Archipelago would 
appear to have dropped off the map; both nations registered a 100% 
fall in exports to zero. This disturbing intelligence 
notwithstanding, the boast of the Scotch whisky industry that no 
other industry in the United Kingdom achieves a wider geographical 
spread, with 89% of sales destined for over 200 overseas markets, 
would appear to be empirically correct. 151 
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2.6 Bulk Exports, Distribution & Overseas Investment 
Bulk whiskies, whether malt, blended or grain, are exclusively for 
export markets. Distilled, matured and blended in Scotland, bulk 
blend is shipped at high proof for subsequent dilution, bottling, 
packaging and distribution overseas. Bulk malt, however, is almost 
entirely admixed with locally produced whiskies to improve their 
quali ty. By comparison wi th sales of bulk blend and mal t, exports of 
grain whisky are insignificant. 152 
Historically, local bottling of Scotch whisky developed in such 
markets as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa and some European countries as a result of the adoption of 
fiscal measures by the importing country designed to discourage 
imports of Scotch whisky bottled in Scotland, and protect or develop 
their own distilling and bottling industries. Transport costs are 
another important factor, particularly in supplying markets such as 
Australia and New Zealand. 153 
In recent years, bulk exports of blended whisky have risen 
substantially to markets, such as France & Germany, where the cost of 
transportation could not be considered a significant factor. Trends 
such as this give credence to the view that, so far as secondary 
brands are concerned, Scotch whisky is becoming increasingly 
considered as simply a commodity, developments which have led the 
Scotch Whisky Association to express strong reservations about the 
potentially damaging effects of the increased shipment of blended 
whisky in bulk. 
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The arguments in favour of the bulk exporting of blended whisky are 
based on the proposition that since Scotch whisky has to meet the 
needs of a variety of consumers it is necessary to offer the cheaper, 
bulk brands as an alternative to the more expensive Bottled in 
Scotland (BIS) brands. Without the availability of bulk brands it is 
argued that consumers would simply switch to alternative, locally 
produced spirits. Similarly, it is believed that the cheaper bulk 
exported brands give consumers the taste for Scotch whisky and that 
eventually they will trade up market to BIS brands. 1 54 The trade is an 
important export earner, which benefits the companies involved and 
provides additional employment. 
The main arguments against the bulk trade in blended whisky are 
twofold. First, most of the employment benefits of the whisky 
industry to Scotland are in the bottling and handling activities 
rather than in the actual distillation of whisky. Second, although 
only processed and softened water should be added to dilute the bulk 
blended whisky before bottling overseas, there is the possibility, 
especially in smaller markets, that other spirits may be added during 
the blending operation. It can be argued therefore that the image of 
Scotch whisky can only be guaranteed if the product is bottled in 
Scotland. 155 The lower prices charged for bulk exported blends 
reduces the foreign exchange income of the Uni ted Kingdom, whilst the 
lower margins may reduce the profits of the whisky companies. 
The percentage share of the total world market held by BIS blended & 
malt whisky and bulk blend, malt & grain is summarized in Table 2.20. 
Sales of bulk blend rose strongly between 1979 and 1981 when the 
recession was deepest, but have declined sharply since then as 
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consumers have slowly returned to BIS brands, and developed an 
interest in single malts. Exports of bulk blend stood at 13.4% of 
total whisky sales in 1995. '56 
Table 2.20: Percentage Share of Total World Market Held By Each 
Whisky Category 1980-1995 
Bottled Bulk Single Bulk Bulk 
Blend Blend Bottled Malt Malt Grain 
1980 73.4 17.2 1.3 7.7 0.4 
1981 71.1 19.5 1.3 7.8 0.3 
1982 69.9 20.7 1.4 7.6 0.4 
1983 69.7 19.1 1.7 9.0 0.5 
1984 69.2 18.3 2.1 9.4 1.0 
1985 71.8 18.5 2.6 6.5 0.6 
1986 70.5 18.5 2.7 7.3 1.0 
1987 71.7 17.8 3.0 6.3 1.2 
1988 71.7 17.1 3.4 6.6 1.2 
1989 74.4 13.4 3.6 7.3 1.3 
1990 75.0 12.1 3.8 7.7 1.4 
1991 76.7 11.6 3.6 6.5 1.6 
1992 76.7 11.3 3.6 6.9 1.5 
1993 76.1 12.0 3.6 6.4 1.9 
1994 75.3 11.2 3.9 5.4 4.2 
1995 77.6 13.4 3.7 3.9 1.4 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
Bulk exports of malt whisky, as detailed in Table 2.21, are 
dispatched mainly to Japan, which after expanding rapidly in the mid 
1970s, accounted for over 70% of shipments in 1980, representing 
around two-thirds of Scotch exports to that country. By 1995 Japan 
still accounted for over 35% of exports of bulk malt whisky, 
representing 40% of total Scotch whisky exports to that country. In 
aggregate, Table 2.21 shows that bulk malt exports have fallen by a 
third since 1980, but of note in Table 2.22 following is the recent 
significant increment in shipments of bulk malt to France & Germany, 
where the malt is largely admixed with bulk grain to create cut-price 
non-Scottish blended tScotcht whisky. 157 
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Table 2.21: Exports of Bulk Malt (million litres of pure alcohol) 
1980- 1996 
Japan 90, 0 All Other Markets 90, 0 Total 
1980 16.98 73.1 6.24 26.9 23.22 
1981 15.64 68.8 7.10 31.2 22.74 
1982 16.93 74.6 5.75 25.4 22.68 
1983 16.10 65.7 8.39 34.3 24.49 
1984 13.52 52.5 12.22 47.5 25.74 
1985 9.12 51.6 8.57 48.4 17.69 
1986 10.57 51.3 10.05 48.7 20.62 
1987 6.99 38.9 10.98 61.1 17.97 
1988 7.95 41.3 11.27 58.7 19.22 
1989 10.01 48.1 10.79 51.9 20.80 
1990 11.81 54.7 9.77 45.3 21.58 
1991 8.84 50.9 8.54 49.1 17.38 
1992 9.39 50.8 9.09 49.2 18.48 
1993 7.58 42.4 10.31 57.6 17.89 
1994 5.19 32.8 10.62 67.2 15.81 
1995 4.65 35.5 6.88 64.5 11.53 
1996Est 1.85 33.6 3.65 66.4 5.50 
Total 
Growth 
1980-1995 90, 0 - 68% + 60% - 33% 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
Table 2.22: Main Bulk Malt Markets (million litres of pure alcohol) 
1993-1995 
1993 90, 0 Change 1994 90, 0 Change 1995 % Change 
Japan 7.58 -19.3 5.19 -31.5 4.65 -10.4 
Spain 1.36 +7.0 0.66 -51.5 0.84 +27.3 
Brazil 1.22 -3.9 1.26 +3.3 1.40 +11.1 
France 1.07 +13.8 2.41 +125.2 0.92 -58.5 
Sth Korea 1.99 +31.8 2.70 +35.7 0.27 -90.0 
USA 0.20 -20.0 0.10 -50.0 0.08 -20.0 
Uruguay 0.35 nc 0.34 -2.9 0.34 nc 
Venezuela 1.10 +14.6 0.45 -59.1 0.60 +33.3 
Argentina 1.00 +2.0 0.80 -20.0 0.73 -8.7 
Germany 0.15 -43.3 0.26 +73.3 0.13 -50.0 
Sweden 0.24 +118.0 0.09 -62.5 0.11 +22.2 
Dominican 0.24 - 0.34 +41.7 0.35 +2.9 
Sth Africa 0.32 - 0.24 -25.0 0.17 -29.2 
Others 1.07 -10.1 0.97 -9.3 0.94 -3.1 
Total 17.89 -3.2 15.81 -11.6 11.53 -27.1 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
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It cannot be denied that the export of bulk malt does help to improve 
the quality of the local product thereby increasing competition for 
BIS Scotch whisky in many markets. The confidence of those who say 
that Scotch whisky is well able to compete with any non-Scottish 
whisky is open to question and indicative of a lack of strategic 
understanding of the nature of competition in the international 
market for alcoholic beverages. 
It is illustrative of the progress made by the Japanese whisky 
industry that the Suntory Company now claims that it has the world I s 
top-selling whisky brand in 'Old Suntory I, a blend which is thought 
to contain up to 25% Scotch mal t whisky. In addi tion, Japanese whisky 
is estimated to have a total market share of 15% of the world 
consumption of all types of whisky, although sales are concentrated 
in the Far East. 158 This situation could only be exacerbated should 
Japanese companies, who are already putting considerable resources 
into promoting their brands in export markets, succeed in taking 
market share away from Scotch whisky in third countries such as the 
United States & Australia. 159 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the issue of bulk exports of whisky has 
aroused much acrimonious discussion, with many of the protagonists 
advocating a ban on such exports. In February 1981 a trade union 
commi ttee known as the the Scotch Whisky Combine Commi tteepublished 
a report highly critical of the policy of bulk exports, resulting in 
an unofficial agreement amongst those selling bulk mal t not to expand 
beyond levels then pertaining, and generally this has held. 160 At 
about this time, two major pieces of work were published which 
analysed the economic factors associated with a possible ban. 
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The first, by Economic Associates in 1977, concluded against a ban on 
bulk exports, reporting that at best there would only be a small gain 
in employment to be set against a probable loss of earnings to the 
balance of payments and the risk of retaliatory action. The second, 
by J K Thomson in 1979, was in favour of a ban. Thomson calculated the 
effects of a ban to be a gain in employment (greater than that 
reported by Economic Associates) and a substantial gain to the 
balance of payments. As well as this he cited the need to preserve 
the future health of the industry asa major reason for the 
ban. 1 61 
The rather different conclusions reached in the articles by Economic 
Associates and Thomson are brought about by the different values of 
the variables made in the calculations. The crucial assumptions are 
firstly the percentage of bulk sales replaced by bottled sales, and 
secondly the realised price of the replaced bottled sales. 
Reasonable arguments can be put forward for these variables being at 
any point within wide ranges of possible values. 
In all likelihood, the most likely result of a ban would be low 
replacement rates, resulting in a drop in foreign exchange earnings 
and a loss of employment. However, it is difficult to be definite 
about this since it is certainly possible that there could be high 
replacement rates (40% for bulk mal t whisky and 60% for bulk blended 
whisky) in which case the economic effects would be positive. 
Thomson suggested high replacement rates,162 but even he 
concluded: 
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The elimination of bulk exports would not have a major impact on employment in the 
Scotch whisky industry. The ending of bulk blend exports would probably be 
beneficial, while the ending of bulk malt exports would be marginally detrimental 
to employment prospects in the industry as a whole, but seriously detrimental to 
malt distilleries alone. If both types of bulk exports were ended, this study 
suggests that in 1978 and 1979 there would have been a net gain of about 1400 
jobs. However, the margin of doubt is particularly wide in the case of bulk blend 
exports. 1 63 
Moreover, if the levels of replacement of bulk export are not as high 
as is hoped, then there is likely to be large losses in both foreign 
exchange earnings and employment; prospective gains in the event of 
high replacement levels are not as high as these losses. This 
consideration was ignored by both Thomson and Economic 
Associates. 164 
The economic factors can thus be made to point either for or against a 
ban depending upon the percentage of banned bulk exports that it is 
assumed will be replaced by exports of bottled Scotch. More 
important, however, are the wider issues which concern the long-term 
health of the industry; the question of the ban on bulk exports is 
just part of the larger problem of how a well-established export 
industry should react to competition in overseas markets, 
particularly from local whisky industries enjoying comparative 
advantage. 
In deciding upon a strategy, there are lessons to be learnt from the 
experience of international trade in other products over the last two 
decades. The industries of Western nations that appear to have been 
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most successful in withstanding foreign, especially Japanese, 
competi tion, are the ones that have fought back; the failures appear 
to be the industries that reacted to competition by withdrawing into 
smaller geographical and market segments. As such, it is suggested 
that the Scotch whisky industry should consider export strategies 
requiring greater involvement in the market segments where local 
whisky industries are currently being successful, not less 
involvement as implied by the strategy of banning bulk sales. 
The strategy behind the proposed ban on bulk sales implies a 
withdrawal to a small segment of the market, whereby exports of BIS 
Scotch will only be made to the top sector of overseas markets. 149 
Thomson believes this could be accomplished by means of an export 
duty levied on bulk exports of whisky and immature spirit: 
Such a measure could be combined with a gradual reduction in the level of excise 
duty on spirits in the United Kingdom. The new measure would initially be 
unpopular with whisky exporters engaged in the bulk trade, but by making bulk 
sales more expensive the tax would have the effect of raising the price of foreign 
bottled Scotch whisky and other foreign whiskies containing Scotch malt. 
Assuming the bulk importing countries did not raise their import duties on 
bottled whisky to compensate for this United Kingdom export tax, the overseas 
market for BIS whisky would improve considerably. 1 65 
Thomson I S caveat concerning the possibility of retaliatory action in 
the event of a ban on bulk exports cannot be dismissed cavalierly. 
Even if there were a high replacement rate of bulk exports by bottled, 
the government of the importing country may subsequently decide to 
take fiscal action in order to protect its own industries. High 
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tariffs on bottled imports may be used to bring down the replacement 
rates to levels acceptable to the importing country. 
For the Scotch whisky industry, the risk of withdrawing to a small 
segment of the market is that the industry loses volume sales and 
weakens itself while allowing competitors to gain strength and 
experience in export markets. Eventually the competitors may start 
making inroads into the BIS segment of the market. It is tempting to 
argue that, because of the unique position of the Scotch whisky 
industry, the high quality segment of the market can never be 
seriously threatened by other whiskies. Certainly, the high quality 
market share is more defensible in the case of whisky. At the same 
time, the market share of Scotch in the United States is now equal to 
that of Canadian whisky, and the fact of Japanese success in other 
follower industries suggests that it would be naieve to be complacent 
about the threat. 
An al ternati ve strategy would be to compete freely in overseas 
markets against other whiskies. The lower market segments, usually 
involving local whiskies, are some of the fastest growing. This 
strategy recognizes the need to compete in these mass markets in an 
attempt to maintain the growth of the Scotch whisky industry while at 
the same time restricting the growth of competitors. This is the 
strategy adopted by the Scotch distillers who sell bulk whisky. 
Bulk blend exports are bottled overseas and sold as Scotch whisky. 
They compete, therefore, with BIS Scotch at the top of the market; 
they also compete (more directly because of price) with some local 
whiskies at the lower end of the market. In this way the bulk blend 
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trade means that Scotch competes across a range of market 
segments. 
Bulk malt exports are combined with local whiskies and sold as high 
quali ty local whisky. The bulk malt trade, therefore, ensures 
competi tion in the middle and lower market segments. The bulk whisky 
trade thus gives the industry involvement in mass markets which 
otherwise would be closed to it. This is important since there is a 
marketing view which states that consumers particularly in Japan and 
Developing countries have a bias and a loyalty towards local 
products. 
Of course this trade is not guaranteed. In the case of bulk malt 
exports, the overseas local whisky producers may use Scotch for a few 
years until their product is established and then dispense with it. 
It would, of course, be desirable to sell bulk malt in the context of 
long-term agreements, but this may not be possible. This strategy 
has distinct short term advantages, therefore, in getting Scotch 
involved in segments of the market from which it would otherwise be 
excluded, but in the longer term carries no certainty of continuing 
advantage. 
Even so, the risk of damage is a small one. It is difficul t to believe 
that the local whiskies using Scotch (given that they do not sell in 
the premium market and given that 'Scotch' is not mentioned on the 
label) would not be almost as successful if high quality Canadian, 
Irish or American whiskey were used instead of Scotch. The local 
whisky, now containing a component of high quali ty non-Scotch whisky 
would compete with BIS Scotch just as before, but the sales of bulk 
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malt would be lost. 
The industry could also consider licensing agreements with companies 
overseas. Any licensing agreement is a compromise between export 
companies who want a share of a fast-growing local market and the 
governments of the importing countries who wish to protect their 
economy and boost employment. Licensing agreements are well-
established in industries from aerospace to Coca-Cola. Their exact 
specification differs from industry to industry, but essentially 
involve employment and other benefits being split between both 
parties in production to supply the local market. 
Such an agreement involving a Scotch whisky company would probably 
mean that local whisky was blended with Scotch and bottled in the 
importing country; the agreement may also involve the question of a 
tariff on BIS Scotch. Agreements like this may only be possible where 
the local industry is not yet established. Al though it can be argued 
that potential bottling jobs are being lost to Scotland, the jobs are 
notional in the sense that it is difficult to envisage a set of 
circumstances where the bottling could be done in Scotland while at 
the same time a worthwhile share of the developing local market was 
gained. This strategy carries two advantages over freely competing 
in all markets; the exports cannot be discontinued at short notice, 
and the agreement might include some other benefits such as tariff 
preferences. 
Finally, the whisky industry could consider direct investment in 
overseas markets. In competing against local whisky industries in 
export markets, the Scotch whisky industry finds itself at a 
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disadvantage with respect to the following factors: import tariffs, 
especially against bottled products, consumer loyalty to (or 
preference for) local products against imports, and lower costs for 
the local industries, primarily because of labour rates and interest 
charges. 
These factors, especially the first which is under the control of the 
government of the importing country, makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, for the exporters to gain complete victory over the local 
industries. Companies that have been successful in this sort of 
si tuation have been the ones that have recognized the nature of their 
comparative disadvantage and adjusted their strategy in order to 
compete. In some cases this has meant that they have invested in 
production facilities in the local market. Such a strategy offsets 
the comparative disadvantage in the export market while at the same 
time protecting the home industry. 
While 'potential' jobs are lost to the home economy by establishing 
some production facilities overseas, the strategy enables the 
industry to compete more successfully in export markets and the 
resulting continued growth of the industry affords protection for 
already established jobs, and offers an opportunity for the creation 
of new, particularly skilled ones, at home. The essence of the 
strategy is compromise; if the success of the local industry is 
recognized as inevitable, the exporting companies should become 
involved in the local industry and its success. This will enable them 
to grow both at home and overseas. 
This strategy might work well for the Scotch whisky industry. 
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Companies could invest in production facilities in the importing 
countries, the produce of which could be blended wi th bulk Scotch and 
bottled in the importing country. The whisky could then be sold as 
local whisky. A company making such an investment could then adopt a 
more integrated marketing policy; it would be offering to the local 
market: a) High Quality Local Whisky, b) Scotch whisky, bottled 
locally and c) Bottled in Scotland Scotch. 
It would be a fallacy to argue that having local production 
facilities in the export market loses jobs to the Scottish economy. 
The only circumstances in which this would be true would be if local 
whiskies and BIS Scotch were direct 'alternatives to the consumer. 
Price differences alone make this impossible. The way to preserve 
jobs and profitability is to maintain the growth and health of the 
industry, even if compromises have to be made. This is the inevitable 
conclusion in view of the experiences of other industries threatened 
by overseas industries with comparative advantages. 166 
Experience suggests that it is essential to compete in export markets 
against a wide range of types of whisky. Some companies are already 
doing this by exporting bulk whisky, but they have no control over 
what happens to the whisky nor any guarantee of the trade continuing 
when it ceases to be useful to the importers. Better strategies may 
involve companies more directly in the export markets either through 
licensing agreements or investment in off-shore production 
facilities. 
132 
The feasability of these strategies will depend upon the countries 
and circumstances in question as will the financial viability. 
Al though government regulations and financial difficulties will 
doubtless present problems in particular cases, it is truly 
surprising that Scotch whisky companies have so little direct 
investment overseas in the export markets which account for nearly 
90% of consumption. 167 
Most companies rely heavily, if not exclusively, on sole 
distributors, and the industry considers that this system is of great 
importance to the success of Scotch whisky abroad. The system rests 
on a double commitment, with the brand owner allocating distribution 
rights to a sole agent in the allocated area, and the distributors for 
their part promoting the brand. The distributor has to decide on the 
pricing policy, ensure sufficient supplies of stocks, report back on 
local competition, finance extensive advertising, promotional 
campaigns and expenditure on a motivated sales scheme. 
Whilst the efforts of the distributors have generally been 
successful in the promotional function geared to local market 
condi tions, as it would not be financially viable for smaller 
companies to have a subsidiary in each market, the reliance on export 
marketing strategies using sole distributors evolved in the age of 
slow communication, and is arguably less appropriate in major 
overseas markets with the coming of transcontinental air services. 
Moreover, the system means companies lack direct management 
expertise and experience in these export markets, making it more 
difficult to implement any strategy which involves investment or 
involvement overseas. 168 
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Lack of overseas investment is just one piece of evidence that the 
Scotch whisky industry is not adapting its marketing policies to 
changing circumstances. Suggestions that the advertising of Scotch 
is not as imaginative as that of some rival industries, examined 
earlier in Section 2.5, is another. A ban on bulk sales is a policy 
which also does not seem to have a basis in circumstances as they now 
are. Scotch whisky, while still a unique and generic product, is 
nevertheless substitutable in bulk whisky market segments. 
Bulk sales of Scotch, if banned, would undoubtedly be replaced to a 
large extent by high quality bulk whisky from elsewhere. The Scotch 
whisky industry runs the risk of losing its bulk sales to competitors 
whilst gaining nothing. If the experiences of other industries is at 
all relevant, it is the forceful strategies that are likely to prove 
successful and the withdrawal strategies that are likely to 
fail.169 
Recently there have been some encouraging indications that the 
whisky industry is beginning to contemplate the need for re-
appraising its exporting strategies. George Bull, ex-Chairman of 
the former Grand Metropolitan, suggested that part of the rationale 
for the merger with Guinness was the potential benefits to both 
companies of the synthesis of Guinness I s distribution networks with 
Grand Metropolitan IS ability to create new brands, by applying 
modern distilling techniques to local spirits, as it did in Brazil to 
create a fast-growing brand called Dreher. 170 
In addition, during the last year the former GM acquired a majority 
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shareholding in Navarro Correas, a wine distributor in Argentina, 
and is engaged in a j oint venture in China to produce and distribute 
both local and international spirits brands. In its 1996 Annual 
Review, Grand Metropolitan summarized its strategic approach to 
emerging markets: 
The strategic approach to entering into new markets is broadly similar for all 
GrandMet businesses. It is to start small and targeted, often with specially 
created brands and with modest capital investment, sometimes in joint venture 
partnership with a local producer/distributor. As brand awarensess begins to 
develop, international brands are introduced with significantly higher levels of 
investment. 1 7 1 
Allied Domecq own or control several companies in the rapidly growing 
Latin American market, including Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and 
Columbia. The Domecq brandies, with their strong local franchise, 
provide the critical mass to support the building of international 
brands such as Ballantine's Scotch whisky. The company has also 
responded to the opportunities manifesting themselves in Eastern 
Europe by establishing wholly owned sales and marketing companies. 
Allied's Beefeater gin is now the market leader in the rapidly 
augmenting Czech market. 172 
Highland Distilleries current jOint venture in India is a further 
encouraging sign of a shift in attitudes, and suggests too that it is 
not necessary to have a capitalisation on the scale of Diageo to 
engage in overseas investment. The Indian government granted 
approval for Highland Distilleries and Remy Cointreau to invest 
approximately £1 million in a jOint venture with an Indian partner, 
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to involve the blending, bottling, sales and marketing of liquor 
products including Scotch whisky, local whisky derivatives and some 
Remy brands. DCM Shriram, the chosen partner, is an established New 
Delhi based company concerned with the manufacture of sugar and the 
distillation of potable alcohol. 173 
Finally, Glenmorangie has invested £600,000 to date in its Indian 
venture, the principal element of which is developing the local 
bottling of its Highland Queen brand. 174 Glenmorangie has also 
secured a licensing agreement in China, to import both cased goods 
and bulk whisky, and to produce and distribute locally and 
nationally. The production unit, sales, marketing and financial 
capabilities are all controlled by expatriate Hong Kong Chinese 
management. 175 
Throughout much of the developing world, most of the spirits drunk 
are inadequately marketed, poorly manufactured local concoctions, 
so western drinks firms may discover other opportunities comparable 
to those detailed here. 176 
Such overseas ventures may also be wise in light of the constraint on 
strategies in the United Kingdom. In Competitive Strategy (1980), 
Michael Porter 177 identified five competitive forces acting upon a 
company: 
i) The Power of Suppliers 
ii) The Power of Buyers 
iii) The Degree of Competition Between Current Rivals 
iv) The Threat of Entry 
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v) The Threat of Substitute Products 
In respect of the whisky industry, forces iii) and v) are clearly the 
most relevant. In Competitive Advantage (1985)178, Porter argued 
that only three strategies exist that can succeed in overcoming these 
forces in the long run. These are differentiation, cost leadership 
and focus. But neither strategy is a panacea for any of the major 
firms in the industry. 
Porter defines a firm seeking differentiation as: 
Seeking to be unique in its industry along with some dimensions that are widely 
valued by buyers ... lt is rewarded for its uniqueness with a premium price ..• A 
firm that can achieve and sustain differentiation will be an above average 
performer in its industry if its price premium exceeds the extra costs incurred 
in being unique ... The logic of the differentiation strategy requires that a firm 
choose attributes in which to differentiate itself that are different from its 
rivals. 
This was the strategy adopted by the pioneers of the blended whisky 
trade in the l860s, and by William Grant & Sons with the introduction 
of the single malt Glenfiddich a century later. In the present 
circumstances such a strategy is problematic. In the market for 
single malts and de luxe blends, each firm can differentiate on the 
basis of the unique nature of their particular product, and 
reasonable margins can be earned. This is much more difficult in the 
market for standard blended whisky, where in recent years 
competitive pricing has become the key factor. 
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The cost leadership strategy is based upon having the lowest costs 
and consequently the greatest profit margins, rather than on 
offering the lowest price. Cost leadership strategies require the 
firm to exploit any economies of scale and experience. Porter argues 
that low cost producers "typically sell a standard, or no frills, 
product and place considerable emphasis on reaping scale or absolute 
cost advantages from all sources." 
As discussed in Section 2.3, with tax accounting for such a 
substantial proportion of the final selling price of whisky, 
discount pricing is ultimately limited. Consequently, the cost 
leadership strategy has suited some of the larger players in the 
industry. For instance, this strategy is reflected in the inexorable 
process of merger & acquisition within the industry, which 
facilitates economies of scale, particularly in bottling & 
packaging, marketing & distribution. In this respect, the 
Distillers Company (now United Distillers & Vintners) has 
traditionally been the dominant firm in the whisky industry, and 
looks set to continue to be as part of the Diageo group. 
Porter has described Focus as a stategy based upon: 
The choice of a narrow competi ti ve scope wi tliin an industry. The focuser selects 
a segment or group of segments in the industry and tailors its strategy to serving 
them to the exclusion of others. 
Focus can either be on cost, where the firm seeks a cost advantage in 
the target segment, or on differentiation, where a firm seeks 
differentiation in its target segment. Cost focus is the strategy 
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behind bulk exports of Scotch whisky, where the company attempts to 
access a market on the basis of a standardized product and a low 
price. Differentiation focus is an appropriate description of the 
small independent bottlers, or the handful of privately owned 
distilleries producing a premium product. The Springbank Distillery 
at Campbeltown, despite being a very small player in the industry, 
has secured a loyal following for its premium malt whiskies in 
specialist off-licences, independent bottlings, the duty free 
market, and overseas. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
In the introductory Section of this Chapter, it was stated that no a 
priori conclusion as to the exigency of government intervention in 
those areas most directly impacting upon the whisky industry was 
possible wi thout an examination of factors which were intra vires the 
industry to affect. Such an appraisal has been consummated, and a 
number of pertinent conclusions emerge. 
Section 2.2 discussed the history of distilling, revealing that it 
was only timely intervention by the government in the early to mid-
19th century that laid the foundations for the evolution of Scotch 
whisky into one of the United Kingdom's most conspicuously 
successful export industries. Even at the high water mark of 
Manchester liberalism, therefore, it was accepted that in the case of 
Scotch whisky at least, a completely laissez-faire disposition was 
inappropriate. 
In Section 2.3 on the production of whisky, it was suggested that such 
a tradi tional industry does not lend itself easily to innovation, and 
in most areas where this has been attempted, the general consensus is 
that there has been an accompanying trade-off in quality. For 
example, traditional low-ceiling and earthen floor warehouses are 
held by traditionalists to be more favourable to the maturation of 
quality malt whisky than modern, more economical superstructures. 
In this respect, it is worthy of note that two whiskies in particular, 
Springbank & The Macallan, generally held to be the premier grand cru 
classe of malt whiskies, are produced utilising some very 
traditional (and expensive) methods that most distilleries now 
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eschew. 
In attempting to justify its takeover of Macallan-Glenlivet in 
August 1996, Highland Distilleries argued that the company had been 
"underperforming." It is a moot point whether this was due to 
inadequate marketing & distribution (as Highland would no doubt 
contend) or a result of the higher costs associated with the 
fastidious attention to excellence highlighted in Section 2.3. 
It should be noted nevertheless that it was revealed in Highland 
Distilleries' 1996-97 year to end-August figures that Macallan 
volumes were up 21% on 1995, the last published figures prior to the 
acquisi tion, while profi ts from Macallan were ahead 45% under the new 
management, leading a recent business editorial in The Scotsman to 
comment: 
Its [Highland Distilleries] hostile acquistion of Macallan-Glenlivet last year 
is also bearing early fruit, largely vindicating its claim during the battle that 
the Macallan malt would benefit from the bigger group's marketing expertise and 
well-established distribution system. 1 79 
Single mal ts are obviously the unique product of a single distillery, 
and the sine qua non for premium blended whiskies are that they 
contain mal ts from each of the whisky producing regions. Malt whisky 
production does not therefore lend itself to concentration in the way 
of grain distillation. The latter is already chiefly conducted in 
vast complexes in Lowland Scotland, as are the various' 'dark grains' 
plants which convert the residue of distillation into animal 
feed. 
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Many distilleries are virtually fully automated, and whilst there 
may be some scope for innovation in energy conservation, in this area 
too the industry continues to invest a considerable amount of effort. 
In any case, Table 2.2 in Section 2.3 illustrated that distilleries 
have never operated at anything approaching full capacity, so 
significant increases in output are possible without the need for a 
corresponding increment in capital. Sizeable reductions in cost are 
only really possible in bottling & packaging, where some scope for 
economies of scale exists. Economies in sales & marketing and in the 
distribution of whisky overseas have tended to follow from mergers & 
acquisitions, discussed in Section 2.4. 
The process of merger & acquisition in the Scotch whisky industry has 
resulted in the industry becoming highly consolidated. The 
reservations of those who contend that external control of some 
whisky companies has had a negative effect upon the Scottish economy 
are persuasive, but some difficulty was encountered with the 
definition of "external control." Ex libris the works of the Fraser 
of Allander institute, this would appear to mean any firm registered 
outwith Scotland. 
Perhaps a more appropriate definition, assuming Scotland remains 
part of the United Kingdom, would be companies where decisions are 
made overseas, and on this yardstick, firms registered in the United 
Kingdom still accounted for over 75% of Scotch whisky production in 
1995. 
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Moreover, Scottish Production Database figures reveal that 
overseas-owned firms accounted for 20% of whisky industry employment 
in 1994. This compares with a 28% share of employment for overseas 
owned firms in the manufacturing sector as a whole. In addition, at 
£19,500 in 1994, average wages per employee were higher in overseas 
owned firms than the £17,200 average in companies owned in the Uni ted 
Kingdom. 180 
Mergers & acquisitions look set to continue to be the predominant 
form of structural change in the industry, which is not surprising 
given the difficulty of 'greenfield' investment in an industry which 
places such great store on pedigree and a proven track record. Scotch 
whisky competes against a whole host of spirits, not to mention other 
alcoholic drinks, and in mature markets at least, for a declining 
share of consumers' expenditure. 
It is arguably only large groupings, with powerful brand imaging and 
extensive distribution networks, that have the wherewithal to most 
effectively rise to this challenge. For example, in the financial 
year ending in 1996, United Distillers increased its marketing 
investment by 10% to a record £332 million; the success of such 
products as UD' s 'Classic Malts' is evidence of what can be achieved 
given the necessary resources. 181 
This said, any further merger involving Diageo pIc is problematic, 
considering the existing dominance in the market of that company. 
The onus should always be on those proposing a merger or takeover to 
demonstrate convincingly that it is in the public interest, rather 
than on the competition authorities having to prove otherwise; at 
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present, the MMC must be able to identify specific adverse effects to 
advocate thwarting a merger. The I public interest I in this context 
can be taken to include not only the traditional consumer welfare 
issues surrounding mergers, but also the long-run development of the 
various regions of the United Kingdom in the aftermath of any 
rationalisation of post-merger activity. 
Section 2.5 detailed the growth in Scotch exports since 1945, and the 
substantial fall in sales in more mature markets since the late 
1970s. Recessionary forces were only partly responsible, as there 
has also been a long-term secular decline in whisky consumption in 
such countries as the United States and the United Kingdom. Much of 
this was perhaps inevitable as consumers substituted into other 
alcohol derivatives, especially wine, but marketing and innovation 
in the whisky industry has been shown to be wanting. Even the 
promotion of the by now highly successful single malts dates only 
from the 1960s. 
Section 2.5 ended on a more up-beat note, depicting the success in 
recent years of Scotch in newer markets. Section 2.6 looked at the 
issue of bulk exports, concluding that banning bulk sales would be a 
highly retrograde step. A more appropriate strategy would be 
accompanying bulk sales with innovations in distribution, in 
~articular contemplating investment in overseas facilities. 
Recently, there have been encouraging signs of some companies in the 
industry following this path, which is welcome news given the 
limi tations for the whisky industry of some of the traditional 
managerial strategies proposed for firms in the domestic market. 
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It is tempting to conclude that prospects for the whisky industry are 
~enerally bright, with rising sales of single mal ts & premium de luxe 
blends in the more mature markets of the United States and Western 
Europe beiIlg augmented by a steady growth in blended whisky sales for 
admixing by youngsters, especially in the fashion-conscious markets 
of Southern Europe, and the dynamic economies of the Far East and 
Latin America. This catch-all strategy is one advocated by Alan 
Gray, whisky analyst at Sutherlands: 
Whisky needs to be promoted as a versatile drink capable of being consumed by all 
age groups, at various times of the day, and suitable for mixing with lemonade, 
ginger ale and other soft drinks or cordials, as well as being imbibed as a 
straight drink. 1 82 
But in a recent article, The Economist newspaper sounded a cautionary 
note, albeit colourfully: 
Telling one fogeyish group of consumers that whisky should be compared to a 
vintage claret, whilst reassuring another that it is fit to be sloshed around 
with Irn-Bru, looks a dangerously contradictory message. It will work only if 
the Scotch market divides into two quite separate ones. Of the two, single malts, 
which remain secure at the top end of the market as a safely 'aspirational' 
product, have the most certain future. Blends, newly trendy,. may - for a time -
have a wild time down in the disco. But fashion is fickle. Who knows how long it 
will be before the young blades want to try something else? 
anyone? 1 83 
Tequila, 
Disturbingly for the whisky industry, this sceptical tone was given 
empirical support in a comment in a recent edition of The Scotsman 
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newspaper: "In the Far East, wine is fast replacing spirits as the 
favourite tipple." 184 Fashion is indeed fickle, and it is indicative 
of the problems facing the whisky industry that Sutherlands have 
predicted the compound growth rate in consumption of Scotch to the 
year 2000 to be a mere 2%.185 
On the whole, the message to be gleaned from perusing Chapter 2 is 
that whilst there is limited scope for performance improvement, 
certainly in the field of marketing & distribution, the distillation 
of whisky is almost unique (excepting other alcohol producers) 
amongst industries in the United Kingdom. Unique because such a 
substantial element of the final price of the product - tax - is ul tra 
vires the industry to meaningfully affect. 
In times past times, circumstances necessitated a more proactive 
stance by the publ ic authorities to ensure the continuing success of 
the whisky industry. The industry may be approaching a comparable 
~ass today, with government action all the more important when the 
importance of a healthy whisky industry to multitudinous sectors of 
the Scottish economy is considered. 
relationship that attention now turns. 
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It is to this latter 
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CHAPTER 3: THE WHISKY INDUSTRY AND THE REGIONAL SCOTTISH ECONOMY 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter examines the interlocking relationships between the 
whisky industry and the wider Scottish economy. The numbers directly 
employed by the industry are disaggregated by region and activity, 
and the Scottish Input-Output Tables are scrutinized to determine 
the value of Scottish inputs sourced by the whisky industry. 
Utilizing the multiplier estimates presented in the Input-Output 
Tables, the approximate number of jobs dependent upon the whisky 
industry's sourcing of Scottish supplies is estimated. 
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3.2 Direct Employment by the Whisky Industry 
The Gaelic term for Scotch, uisge beatha, means, literally, 'the 
water of life'. Scotch whisky is the water of life for many remote 
islands and glens in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, where 
whole communi ties can depend on a single distillery. But in_ addi tion 
to distilling, which accounts for about 17% of employment in the 
industry, firms also employ people in areas such as maturation & 
warehousing, blending, bottling & packaging, transport & 
distribution and advertising & marketing. 
Where such activities are undertaken by distillers 'in house', the 
employment can be thought of as 'direct'; when the services are 
bought in, they are regarded as creating 'indirect' employment. 
Hence, in Table 3.1, employment in transport, distribution, and 
marketing is allocated to 'direct' and 'indirect' employment as 
appropriate. This offers ·a graphic overview of the chain of 
employment in the whisky industry. 
Table 3.1: Chain of Employment Activities in the Whisky Industry 
Direct & Indirect 
Employment 
Induced Employment 
Source: Pieda, The Economic Significance of Scotch Whisky 
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Employment in the whisky industry peaked in 1978 at just over 25,000, 
but by 1988 it had fallen to about 14,000, at which level it has since 
stabilised. This decline in employment was mainly accounted for by 
the rationalisation which took place following the slump in sales in 
the aftermath of the 1979-81 recession, and the subsequent takeovers 
of the mid 1980s. 1 Direct employment as at September 1996, 
categorized by region, is detailed in Table 3.2. This census by The 
Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) includes approximately 98% of the 
industry' s di~ect employment, and only 5% of that employment is based 
outwith Scotland - primarily in London. 
Table 3.2: Direct Employment by the Whisky Industry as at September 
1996, Categorized by Region 
Region 1996 1995 !l, 0 Change 
Highland 546 513 +6 
Grampian 1481 1576 -6 
Strathclyde 6641 6808 -2 
Lothian 1592 1691 -6 
Central & Fife 2036 2117 -4 
Tayside 553 589 -6 
Rest of UK 496 404 +23 
Total 13,345 13,698 -3 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Association Statistical Report 1996 
A graphic illustration of the distribution of this employment by 
region and activity is shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 following. 
The Strathclyde, Grampian and Lothian regions together account for. 
70% of the industry's Scottish workforce. The greatest 
concentration of employment can be found in Glasgow City District, 
reflecting the large numbers of grain distilleries, warehouses, 
blending plants and offices located there. Glasgow, Edinburgh and 
Perth are the main administrative centres. 
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As Table 3.4 illustrates, nearly half (45%) of all direct employment 
in the industry is connected wi th blending, bottling, and packaging, 
most of this being located in Dumbarton, Renfrew and Kirkcaldy 
districts, a reflection of the need for a high amount of 
predominantly unskilled & female labour, and the necessity of 
minimising transport costs. 2 
Table 3.3: Scotch Whisky Employment By Region (% Share) 
· ·strathc!Vde 45.1 
LothIan 13.3 
central & FIfe 16.8 
oramplan 11.4 
HIghlandS 
& Islands 3.6 
Rest of UK 3.2 
TaysIde, Dumfries 
& calloway 6.7 
Source: Pieda, The Economic Significance of Scotch Whisky 
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Table 3.4: Scotch Whisky Employment By Activity (% Share) 
Blending 81 
Bottling 45.6 
Maturation 81 
Warehousing 9.6 
Malting 81 
Distilleries 17.9 
other 7.9 
Offices 11.6 
Distribution 1.8 sales 81 Marketing 5.6 
Source: Pieda, The Economic Significance of Scotch Whisky 
Moray district, in Grampian, is the single most important district in 
terms of the number of malt distilleries, warehouses and visitors 
centres. The remaining distilleries are widely scattered in many 
rural and island communities. Island communities have their own 
distinct economic difficulties, which have raised concerns as to 
their economic viability. A recent report by the Fraser of Allander 
Institute for Allied Distillers examined the Hebridean island of 
Islay, whose population fell by 2.7% between 1980 and 1993. The 
report concluded that this population loss is stemmed by the 
employment associated with whisky, accounting for 90.3% of 
manufacturing jobs and almost a fifth of all employment. 3 
The Annual Employment Survey (AES) gives information on the full-
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time/part time shares of total employment in the whisky industry. 
94% of total employees in the industry are full-time (defined as 
those working more than 30 hours a week.) This is similar to the 
proportion of total manufacturing employees in Scotland that are 
full time. 
The Scottish Production Database reveals that at an average of 
£17,600 in 1994, gross wages per employee in the whisky industry were 
some 17% higher than the Scottish manufacturing average of £15,000. 
This is partly a reflection of the higher number of administrative, 
technical and clerical staff, but primari ly due to higher pay in the 
industry for each type of employment. 4 
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3.3 Indirect Employment: The Scottish Regional Input-Output Model 
Scotch whisky companies indirectly support employment in various 
sectors of the economy as a resul t of their sourcing of raw materials, 
manufactured and service inputs to their production process. The 
main categories of 'indirect' employment include cereals 
producers/suppliers, energy producers, bottling & packaging 
companies, distribution & haulage companies, business services 
(including advertising), and capital goods manufacturers. 
In order to measure' the indirect employment generated as a result of 
Scotch whisky industry purchases it is necessary to have a detailed 
compositional breakdown of the supplier inputs. Table 3.5 details 
the principal inputs to the Scotch whisky industry in 1994. The 
inputs exclude imports from the rest of the United Kingdom and 
overseas, and hence relate only to domestic demand. The final three 
columns represent the proportion of each industry's domestic output 
destined for the whisky industry in 1979, 1989 & 1994. 
162 
Table 3.5: Whisky Industry: Scottish Inputs 1994 (£m) 
Input Amount (£m) 
Agriculture 
Paper & Board Products 
Retail Distribution 
Wholesale Distribution 
Glass & Glass Products 
Architects 
Banking 
Other Business Servies 
Grain Milling & Starch 
Spirits & Wines etc 
Electricity 
Sugar 
Coke Ovens, Oil, Nuclear Fuel 
Sanitary Services 
Plastic Products 
Hotels, Catering, Pubs etc 
Road Transport 
Renting of Machinery 
Beer Brewing 
Recreational Services 
Accountancy Services 
Others 
176.6 
56.5 
41.3 
39.6 
30.5 
25.9 
24.9 
20.7 
18.6 
17.5 
12.4 
9.5 
8.B 
8.4 
7.7 
7.5 
7.1 
7.4 
6.7 
6.4 
6.3 
79.8 
TOTAL 620.1 
% Domestic Output 
1994 1989 1979 
8.4% 
9.1% 
0.8% 
0.8% 
18.9% 
1.6% 
1.3% 
1.1% 
51.8% 
0.9% 
0.4% 
9.8% 
0.4% 
1.6% 
1.0% 
0.3% 
0.4% 
0.8% 
2.1% 
0.4% 
1.4% 
11.5% 5.4% 
8.9% -
1.5% -
1.5% -
47.0% 23.0% 
1. 7% 
1.8% 
1.8% 
1.0% 
6.4% 
7.7% 12.0% 
2.5% 1.2% 
6.4% 2.3% 
11.9% 17.9% 
2.1% 
Source: Scottish Input-Output Tables 1994 
It will be noted from Table 3.5 that the dependence of the Scottish 
agricul tural, glass and paper & board sectors upon the whisky 
industry, measured in terms of the percentage of these sectors 
domestic outputs destined for the whisky industry, despite 
decreasing somewhat in recent years, is still significant. The glass 
industry in particular was identified by James Love in his various 
publications on the economy-wide effects of external takeover as 
having experienced significant linkage reductions with externally 
acquired whisky firms in the 1970s. 5 
A further indication of the reliance of the agricultural sector upon 
the alcoholic beverages industry is given in Table 3.6, which shows 
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that two-thirds of Scottish barley is destined for brewing and 
distilling. 
Table 3.6: Destination of Scottish Barley, 1995 (000 tonnes) 
Malting & Distilling 
Other Human & Industrial Usage 
Exports 
Seed 
Stock Feed 
Sales Into Intervention 
TOTAL OUTPUT 
786 (66%) 
189 
o 
11 
201 
o 
1187 
Source: Scottish Abstract of Statistics No 25 1996 
The importance' of Scotch whisky production to the agricultural 
sector is also apparent given the lack of alternative employment. 
The Rural Development Commission expects 100,000 job losses in 
agricul ture over the next decade and 50,000 associated redundancies 
because of CAP reform. A fortiori, therefore, a reduction in whisky 
production would seriously compound these difficulties. 6 
These purchases of inputs by Scotch whisky companies constitute 
outputs for their immediate suppliers. To achieve those outputs the 
immediate suppliers, in their turn, purchase inputs from other 
firms, this constituting another set of outputs, and so on back up the 
supply chain. Thus the initial round of purchases by Scotch whisky 
companies represents the beginning of a ripple effect, spreading 
backwards through the Scottish economy and impacting upon a wide 
range of sectors. This multiplier process is described in more 
detail in the next section. 
This chain of backward linkages is detailed extensively in the 1994 
Scottish Input-Output Tables, 123x123 matrices which: 
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... record in detail the relationships between different sectors in the economy as 
they combine to produce the total of goods and services in anyone year. They 
record the flow of goods and services both between industries themselves and 
between industries and Final Demand sectors (Consumers, Government, Investment, 
Stock Change, Visitors and Exports). In addition, they include information on 
the flow of Imports into the economy and information on the incomes generated 
wi thin each industry. In this way, they provide an additional important 
dimension to the Regional Accounts which, as a subset of the UK National 
Accounts, are concerned only with the composition of the main Final Demand flows 
in the economy. 7 
The tables also incorporate household income and consumers' 
expendi ture, thus allowing the induced as well as indirect effects of 
any exogenous shock to be modelled. 8 Input-Output analysis is 
essentially an exercise in comparative statics; it is implicitly 
assumed that the economy is in an equilibrium position and is 
subjected to an exogenous shock which leads, through multiplier 
interactions, to some new equilibrium position at which the overall 
level of economic activity is either higher or lower than before. 9 
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3.4 The Multiplier Process 
The Input-Output Tables also include information on Type I output, 
employment and income multipliers. A Type I multiplier is a measure 
of the combined direct and indirect effects of a change in industry 
final demand on output, employment or income across Scotland, but 
ignores the additional impact induced by increased consumer 
expenditure resulting from the initial increase in final 
demand. 10 
It will be noted from Table 3.7 that the whisky industry's derived 
income and employment multipliers in 1989 were relatively high in 
comparison with other Scottish industries, with whisky's position 
vis-a-vis 78 other manufacturing sectors given in brackets. The 
highest ranked output multiplier in 1989 was attributed to milk & 
milk products, income multiplier, grain milling & starch, and 
employment multiplier, tobacco. 
Table 3.7: Type I Multipliers: Scottish Manufacturing Industry 
1989 (Effects of £lm Increase in Final Demand) 
Sector: Whisky Highest Ranked 
Output Multiplier 1. 75 (10) 2.15 
Effect on Incomes 0.32 
Effect on Employment 24.0 
Income Multiplier 3.21 (3) 4.66 
Employment Multiplier 3.66 (6 ) 9.15 
Sources: James Love, The Whisky Industry 
Scottish Input-Output Tables 1989 
Average 
1.47 
1.83 
2.16 
The output multiplier of 1.75 attributed to the whisky industry 
suggests that for every increase of Elm in final demand for whisky, 
perhaps due to increased exports, there is an overall increase in 
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total Scottish output of £1.75m. Income and employment effects 
(included for whisky) relate to the total direct and indirect 
employment income or employment generated by a change in final 
demand, so a £lm increase in final demand for whisky should increase 
total employment in all Scottish industries by 24. 11 This diminutive 
figure is a reflection of relatively high capital intensity and low 
employment/output coefficients in the industry, 1 2 with whisky 
ranking only 88th out of 114 industrial sectors in terms of the 
employment effect associated with a change in final demand. 
However, a different picture emerges when the multiplier effect not 
of a change in final demand, but of each individual job created in the 
industry is considered. In 1989, each new whisky-related job 
increases total employment in Scotland by 3.66, giving the whisky 
industry a position in 6th place out of 78 manufacturing sectors, far 
ahead of any of the 'hi-tech' or 'sunrise' industries. 13 
The employment created directly and indirectly by Scotch Whisky 
companies and their associated suppliers has a further impact on the 
Scottish economy, as the employment income generated will be used to 
purchase goods and services. This will, in turn, create additional 
income and employment, in a wide range of activities. These third 
round 'induced' effects are captured in 'Type I I' multipliers, which 
express the ratio of the direct, indirect and induced employment 
change to the direct employment change occasioned by an increase in 
final demand. 14 
Obviously, the size of this multiplier effect will depend upon the 
'leakages' which occur which divert expenditure away from domestic 
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consumption. The 1989 Input-Output Tables record an employment 
multiplier of 4.63 for the sector 'Spirits & Wine. ' 
Employment multipliers are the multipliers most commonly 
encountered in work on the Scottish economy, because analysts and 
policy makers are primarily concerned wi th the employment effects of 
any innovations in the regional economy. Multipliers are derived 
from" the Leontief Inverse Matrix, produced as part of the Scottish 
Input-Output Tables. The Leontief Inverse Matrix shows how much of 
each industry's output is needed, in terms of direct and indirect 
requirements, to produce one unit of a given industry's ou"tput. 
From the Annual Census of Employment, it is possible to determine 
total full-time equivalent (FTE) employment in each industry. This 
information, together with figures for the total output of each 
industry, facilitates the calculation of 'employment per unit of 
output' coefficients. These, combined with the Leontief Inverse, 
produce Type I and Type II employment effects. These employment 
effects reveal the total increase in employment in the Scottish 
economy as a whole, which resul ts from a uni t increase in final demand 
for the output of a particular industry, such as whisky. Using the 
disaggregated employment effects for a particular industry, it is 
possible to determine the Type I and Type II employment 
multipliers. 
The mathematical definition of these Type I & Type I I Multipliers is 
as follows: 
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Where lij = amount of industry its output required per unit 
output of industry j (that is the ijth cell of 
Leontief Inverse matrix). 
Ai = income from employment per unit output of industry i. 
and Vi = FTE employment per unit output of industry i 
i,j = 1 to 123 
output multiplier (j) = l:i lij 
income effect = l:i Ai lij 
income multiplier = (l:i Ai lij)/Aj 
employment effect (j) = l:i vi lij 
employment multiplier (j) = (l:i vi lij)/vj ljj 
For further explanation, see Alexander & Whyte (1994)15. 
A certain degree of circumspection is in order when using 
mul tipliers. The data from the Input-Output Tables. and the 
multipliers attributed to the whisky industry are actually taken 
from the Input-Output Tables Sector 68 'Spirits & Wines etc'. 
'Spirits & Wines', a broader definition of the industry than Class 
15.91 of the 1992 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 92), is the 
lowest level of disaggregation available from the Input-Output 
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Tables. The activities comprising this wider category are detailed 
in Table 3.8, but Class 15.91 of SIC (92) accounts for over 97% of 
employment in and output of 'Spirits & Wines' in Scotland. 16 
Table 3.8: Spirits & Wines As Defined in Scottish Input-Output Tables 
1994 
SIC(92) Description 
15.91 Manufacture of distilled, potable, alcoholic beverages 
15.92 Production of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials 
15.93 Manufacture of wines 
15.93/1 Manufacture of wine of fresh grapes and grape juice 
15.93/2 Manufacture of wine based on concentrated grape must 
15.94 Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines 
15.94/1 Manufacture of cider and perry 
15.94/2 Manufacture of other fermented beverages 
15.95 Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages 
Source: The Scottish Economic Bulletin No 55 September 1997 
Class 15.91 is defined to consist of the manufacture of distilled, 
potable, alcoholic beverages. In addition to the manufacture of 
whisky, this definition includes the manufacture of brandy, gin, 
liqueurs, etc, although obviously whisky accounts for the vast 
majority of activity under this heading in Scotland. It is not 
possible to differentiate between whisky and these other acti vi ties, 
as with the exception of HM Customs & Excise, and latterly Scottish 
Whisky Association Database production figures, no official 
statistics are available at a more disaggregated level. 17 
The use of input-output analysis requires data on the relationship at 
the margin between the factor inputs and outputs for each industry, 
ie marginal technical coefficients. In input-output analysis 
rarticularly restrictive assumptions are made about this 
relationship; it is assumed that factor inputs are combined in fixed 
proportions, and that constant returns to scale prevail. Moreover, 
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the existing average technical coefficients, derived from the input-
output tables, reflect an average of production functions 
established at different pOints of time in the past and not the 
~roduction function based upon the latest technology. 
The simplest, but not the only interpretation of this condition is to 
take the average input-output relationships observed in the existing 
input-output tables and to assume that they will apply unchanged as 
marginal relationsh:i,ps in the foreseeable future. For example, if 40 
units of agricultural output are required as part of the input to 
~roduce 200 units of whisky at present, then in the future 80 units of 
agricul tural output will be needed in the production of 400 units of 
whisky. 
This line of reasoning is open to a number of obvious criticisms. It 
fails to allow for varying factor combinations, it fails to provide 
for scale effects, and it confuses present average relationships 
wi th future marginal relationships. The failure to allow for 
variations in factor combinations can be partially defended for 
short term predictions on the grounds that, with a given technology 
and production method in the short run, factor combinations will be 
relatively fixed. 18 
But constructing Input-Output Tables takes several years, and if the 
economy undergoes significant technological and structural change, 
or a major recession, in the intervening period, the tables may not 
reflect the underlying structure of the economy. Many industries 
are likely to have experienced significant productivity gains since 
1989, and allowance for this has to be made when using 
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multipliers. 
If there is substantial spare capacity in the economy the link 
between changes in output and changes in employment is less clear; it 
may be possible to increase capacity utilisation wi thout hiring more 
labour. Multiplier analysis assumes that there are no changes in 
~rices, wages or expenditure patterns taking place in response to a 
single change in final demand, and that increases in activity in 
Scotland will not lead to I crowding out I elsewhere wi thin the United 
Kingdom economy. 
probably valid. 19 
In the short run at least such assumptions are 
Finally, it should be noted that the multipliers referred to in this 
Chapter are essentially medium-term multiplier estimates. If the 
economic impact is to be considered over a limited period, then the 
indirect effects on suppliers will not have fully buil t up, and lower 
multipliers than those depicted would be more appropriate. 20 
But according to James Love: 
All these limitations imply is that the actual effects of the changes suggested 
may not be as significant as those derived from the multiplier ratios. They do 
not suggest that change would take place in the reverse direction or not at all, 
and there is empirical evidence which suggests that in practice multipliers do 
not vary very markedly through time. 21 
This latter statement may need to be qualified in the light of 
evidence from the most recent Input-Output Tables, published in 
September 1997. These Tables relate to 1994, and record the 
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following values for Type I & I I multipliers attributed to the whisky 
industry: 
Table 3.9: Employment Multipliers: Scotch Whisky Industry 1994 
Multiplier Value Rank (Scottish Manufacturing) 
Type I 2.47 8 
Type II 3.10 
Source: Scottish Input-Output Tables 1994 
Given that the SWA has estimated current employment in the whisky 
industry to be of the order of 13,345, a Type I I employment mul tiplier 
of 4.63 suggests that an additional 48,442 jobs are sustained across 
the Scottish economy. Of course the process also works in reverse; 
wi th over 11,000 jobs shed in the industry since 1978, a mul tiplier of 
4.63 implies an additional loss of nearly 40,000 jobs across 
Scotland. 
But with a Type II employment multiplier of 3.10, only 28,025 jobs are 
sustained indirectly across the Scottish economy by the whisky 
industry. So the total contribution of the Scotch whisky industry to 
employment in Scotland as a result of direct, indirect and induced 
employment is disaggregated in Table 3.10, on the basis of both the 
1989 and 1994 multiplier estimates: 
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Table 3.l0:Total Employment Impact of the Scotch Whisky Industry: 
1989 & 1994 Multiplier Estimates 
Employment Type 1989 Multipliers 1994 Multipliers 
Direct 13,345 
Indirect 35,498 
Induced 12,944 
Total 61,787 
1989 Type I Employment Multiplier: 
1989 Type II Employment Multiplier: 
1994 Type I Employment Multiplier: 
1994 Type II Employment Multiplier: 
13,345 
19,617 
8,408 
41,370 
3.66 
4.63 
2.47 
3.10 
The estimate for total employment based upon the 1994 multiplier 
estimates is analogous to the figure of 47,500 determined by the 
Fraser of Allander Institute in their report for Allied Distillers in 
1995. 22 
But in their recent article on the whisky industry, Scott & 
Winstanley determined that total Scottish employment dependent upon 
the whisky industry was of the order of 33,200, based upon the 1994 
multiplier estimates. But they assumed that only 10,700 people were 
directly employed by the whisky industry, utilising output, 
employment and wages figures from the Scottish Production Database 
(SPD) which is maintained by The Scottish Office Education & Industry 
Department. 
SWA output and employment figures are likely to be higher than SPD 
figures as the SWA figures include returns from some SWA members who 
would not be included in the SPD whisky classification, as production 
of Scotch whisky is not recorded by the SPD as their main 
acti vi ty. 23 
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The fluctuating multiplier values calculated for 1989 and 1994 
obviously make estimating the level of employment dependent upon the 
whisky industry difficult. There are a number of possible reasons 
for the sharp fall in the multipliers over the five year period; these 
include lower direct employment in the industry itself, import 
penetration, an absolute fall in the quantity of whisky produced, and 
increments in productivity. 
The number of people directly employed in the whisky industry has 
fallen only slightly since 1989, from approximately '14,000 to 
13,345. This in itself would not be sufficient to account for the 
contraction in the mul tiplier estimates. Comparison of the 1989 with 
the 1994 Input-Output Tables reveals that import penetration 
actually fell over the five-year period. Inputs to the whisky 
industry from the rest of the United Kingdom and overseas totalled 
£440.3 million in 1989, but were a mere £137.6 million in 1994. 
The explanation would appear to be that there was simply less whisky 
produced in 1994 than in 1989. In 1989, approximately 428 million 
Ii tres of pure alcohol (LPA) were distilled; in 1994, this figure had 
fallen to just under 355 million LPA. But in addition, productivity 
within the industry & suppliers seems to have increased as well; in 
1989, the industry sourced £991.5 million worth of Scottish inputs, 
implying that each LPA produced in that year necessitated £2.32 worth 
of Scottish inputs. In 1994, the industry purchased £620.1 million 
of Scottish products, suggesting a cost of only £1.75 per LPA 
distilled in that year. 
However, by 1996 production had increased to over 429 million LPA, 
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the highest level since the late 1970s. Presumably, therefore, 
Input-Output Tables for 1996 would present Type I & Type I I 
mul tiplier estimates for the sector Spirits & Wines that were 
comparable to those for 1989. Of course, producti vi ty in the 
industry & suppliers could have continued to increase in more recent 
rears, in which case the multiplier estimates would be 
correspondingly smaller. 
In the light of these difficulties, in Chapters 4 & 7 where the 
multiplier estimates are further utilised, calculations will be 
presented on the basis of both the 1989 and 1994 values. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This Chapter has analysed the many and varied linkages between the 
whisky industry and the Scottish economy. Scotch whisky companies 
directly employ people in Highland, Lowland, Island, rural and urban 
Scotland, and in multifarious activities - from relatively low-
skilled bottling & packaging operatives, to highly-skilled, sturdy 
artisans. The latter category includes those engaged in coopering, 
distilling, and engineering, Real Men's jobs that invariably provide 
a lifetime of employment, from apprentice to journeyman, and 
finally, Master Craftsman. 
Scrutiny of the Scottish Input-Output Tables revealed that the 
whisky industry sourced approximately £620.1 million of suppl-ies in 
1994, from a wide array of Scottish industries. It was noted that the 
agricul tural, glass and paper & board sectors are particularly 
dependent upon the patronage of the whisky industry. In addition, it 
was observed that the injection of income into the Scottish economy 
from those directly & indirectly employed by the whisky industry and 
its dependent suppliers creates substantial additional employment 
across Scotland. 
The Type I and Type II multiplier estimates associated with the 
whisky industry fell over the five year period 1989-1994, 
principally because of a reduction in the absolute quanti ty of whisky 
distilled, necessitating fewer Scottish inputs, and as a result of 
increases in producti vi ty across the Scottish economy. But in recent 
years, output in the whisky industry has increased sharply, and 
whilst there may be some offset due to further increases in 
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productivity, this suggests that current multiplier values could be 
closer to the 1989 estimates. 
The several multiplier estimates presented in this Chapter will be 
applied in Chapters 4 and 7 when the impact of exogenous shocks upon 
final demand for whisky is cogitated. The conclusions arrived at in 
this Chapter as to the salience of the whisky industry to the wider 
Scottish economy suggests that such permutations in demand are 
likely to impact not only upon the whisky industry, but have 
pervasive ramifications right across the Scottish economy. 
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CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES I: DUTY FREE 
4.1 Introduction 
Section 4.2 of this Chapter studies the intra-European Union duty 
free market, and in particular, that element which is accounted for 
by sales of Scotch whisky. Estimates of the value of this market to 
the whisky industry are presented, along with projected growth rates 
to July 1st 1999, the date on which European Finance ministers 
decided unanimously in 1991 that intra-EU duty free will be 
abolished. 
Section 4.3 seeks to determine the impact abolition of the intra-EU 
duty free concession will have upon the whisky industry, and, 
utilising the multiplier estimates presented in Chapter 3, the 
potential effects on the regional Scottish economy are discussed in 
Section 4.4. Section 4.5 considers the various justifications 
advanced for retaining the intra-EU duty free concession post 1999. 
Section 4.6 concludes. 
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4.2 The intra-EU Duty Free Market 
In early 1997 the Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) commissioned the 
European Travel Research Foundation (ETRF - a body established in 
1995 to provide information to the campaign against the abolition of 
duty free) to compile a report on the potential effects of the 
abolition of intra-EU duty free shopping upon the Scotch whisky 
industry. The report, written by Pieda PIc and entitled The 
Abolition of Intra-EU Duty Free Shopping: Impact on Scotch Whisky 
and other UK Spirits, was published in July 1997. 1 
On the basis of information presented in the ETRF' s 1995 Statistics, 
Pieda estimated the total value of intra-EU duty free sales to be of 
the order of £2.9 billion in 1995, of which £0.8 billion were sales of 
alcoholic drinks. SWA Databank figures reveal that in 1995, sales of 
duty free Scotch whisky in the European Union amounted to 
approximately £300.5 million. By examining data presented by the 
ETRF on passenger journeys, Pieda were able to estimate that 62% of 
these sales took place on travel wholly within the European Union, 
hence Pieda hypothesized that Scotch whisky sales of £185 million 
were 'at risk' in the event of ending duty free within Europe. 
But this figure underestimates the true impact of abolition in 1999, 
as sales are anticipated to grow considerably over the remaining 
years of the concession. Between 1991-1995, duty free sales of 
whisky wi thin the EU grew in value by 17.9%, a reflection of increases 
in per capi ta incomes and a greater propensity to travel. Assuming a 
comparable growth in sales over the years to 1999, Pieda concluded 
that intra-EU duty free sales of Scotch could amount to as much as 
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£218 million in 1999. Of this total, ferry sales are estimated at 
£112.7 million and sales through airports and airlines at £105.3 
million. 2 
The ETRF also commissioned National Economic Research Associates 
(NERA) to determine the potential impact upon public finances in the 
Uni ted Kingdom of the abolition of the intra-EU duty free market. The 
report, entitled The Impact on UK Public Finances of the Aboli tion of 
Intra-EU Duty & Tax Free, concluded that the abolition of duty-free 
shopping will cost companies in the United Kingdom more than £340 
million a year, jeopardise 10,000 jobs and produce no benefit for 
Government finances. 3 
This alarming conclusion is predicated upon a number of assumptions. 
NERA assumed that consumers may respond to the abolition of intra-EU 
duty free in a number of different ways: 
i) Purchasing same goods duty paid in former duty free outlet 
ii) Purchasing same goods tax paid in the United Kingdom 
iii) Buying duty paid goods overseas 
iv) Higher sales on extra-EU routes 
v) Trading down to cheaper alternatives 
vi) Switching to general consumption 
vii) Saving the money currently spent on duty free 
i) Purchasing same goods tax paid in former duty free outlet 
The United Kingdom's Airports Authority (BAA) has claimed that 
intra-EU duty-free liquor sales will not be replaced by duty paid 
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sales in the same outlets after 1999. In compiling their report for 
the ETRF, NERA considered studies by The Netherlands Economic 
Insti tute and JRA Limited on duty free purchases, and conducted their 
own interviews with companies involved in the duty free industry: 
Views expressed at the interviews we held with companies involved in the duty 
free industry tend to confirm BAA's claims that abolition of intra-EU duty free 
sales will not be replaced by duty paid sales. The general industry view, 
supported in some cases by market research, is that passengers regard duty free 
purchases as a luxury, particularly the more expensive brands. 4 
ii) Purchasing same goods tax paid in the United Kingdom or 
iii) Buying duty paid goods overseas 
NERA I S analysis of passenger destinations from the United Kingdom to 
other EU countries suggests that over 90% of passengers travel to a 
country where duty rates are lower for spiri ts. For 90% of passengers 
it would therefore be worthwhile waiting until they reach their 
destination before buying these products. For the remaining 10%, 
Uni ted Kingdom high street prices are cheaper. This suggests, that, 
to the extent that the same products are still purchased, there will 
be a significant substitution from United Kingdom retailed products 
to products sold in other EU countries. 
Other people interviewed by NERA, however, suggested that there may 
still be a market for specialist or prestige goods: the buying power 
of the former duty free outlet, plus the advertising benefits to the 
supplier from having a display at an airport or on a ferry, may be 
sufficient to ensure that margins can still be earned on these types 
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of products. 5 
iv) Higher sales on extra-EU routes 
The expectation of higher sales on extra-EU routes is offset by a 
number of factors. For example, loss of intra-EU duty free sales may 
mean that costs go up for the duty free retailer, because suppliers 
are no longer willing to offer such a large discount. Prices will 
therefore be higher than currently at duty free outlets. Passengers 
may be confused as to when they are entitled to duty free purchases, 
and may therefore buy less. Retailers may be unwilling to offer dual 
pricing, so that all passengers will see an average price, set 
between the current duty free price and the higher duty paid 
price. 6 
v) Trading down to cheaper alternatives 
So far it has been assumed that consumers will continue to purchase 
products of a similar quality when prices increase, adjusting 
volumes rather than substituting into alternatives. However, as 
prices increase, some consumers may seek cheaper brands in order to 
preserve pre-abolition volumes. There is no quantitative evidence 
on the extent to which consumers are likely to trade down, but a 
comparison of the market share of the different categories of 
alcoholic beverage in the United Kingdom, compared to their share in 
duty free purchases, reveals some notable differences, as revealed 
in Table 4.1.7 
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Table 4.1:Share of Products in Alcohol Expenditure (%): 1997 
Category Duty Free Purchases Domestic Expenditure 
Spirits 85 22 
Wines 14 20 
Cider & Perry - 4 
Beer 1 54 
Source: NERA The Impact on UK Public Finances of The Abolition of 
Intra-EU Duty & Tax Free 1997 
In domestic expenditure, beer is the main purchase; for duty free 
expendi ture, spirits account for most of the purchases. This 
suggests that faced with significantly higher prices for spirits .in 
the aftermath of the abolition of intra-EU duty free, consumers will 
either trade down vertically to cheaper brands, or substantially 
reduce their expenditure on the more expensive spirits by 
substituting horizontally into other products. 8 Evidence presented 
on cross-price and own-price elastici ties of demand in Chapters 6 & 7 
reinforces this finding. Consumers are more sensi ti ve to changes in 
the price of spirits than other alcoholic products, and as the Henley 
Study revealed, in everyone of the EU member states examined there 
was price sensitive competition between spirits and one or both of 
beer and wines. 
vi) Switching to general consumption and/or 
vii) Saving money currently spent on duty free 
Consumers may cease purchasing duty free products altogether in the 
aftermath of abolition and instead substitute into general 
consumption in the United Kingdom or save the money currently spent 
on duty free. Depending on the degree of substitution away from 
former duty free products, NERA conc 1 uded that general 
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consumption/saving could amount to between 5% and 40% of current 
expenditure on duty free alcohol. 9 
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4.3 Impact Upon the Whisky Industry of Ending Duty Free 
It was held in Section 4.2 that quantifying the effects upon the 
whisky industry of abolishing intra-EU duty free in 1999 will be 
problematic. Hitherto, there has been no comparable situation where 
the price of spirits has risen sharply and permanently vis-a-vis wine 
and beer; the econometric estimates of cross-price and own-price 
elastici ties of demand presented in Chapters 6 & 7 involve a partial 
equilibrium analysis and relate to the experience of relatively 
small price changes, which were not known to be long-lasting. Large 
and permanent shifts in prices, occasioning a general adjustment in 
all prices & factors, have been comparatively rare and have occurred 
some considerable time in the past when the market for alcoholic 
drinks was less competitive than it is now. 
Increases in prices in the aftermath of abolition will be regarded as 
'permanent' and consumer behaviour may adjust accordingly - it is 
conceivable that demand for spirits will fall to a greater degree 
than that implied by the elastici ty estimates presented in Chapters 6 
& 7. But whatever the precise outcome, it is undoubtedly the case 
that the impact of abolition on Scotch whisky producers will be 
greater than that on manufacturers of other alcoholic beverages. 
Scotch whisky represents 27.8% of EU duty free liquor sales - a much 
higher proportion than any other product. The second highest spirits 
category is Cognac with 8.8% of the total. 10 
The loss in volume will be greatest for standard blends but the 
proportionate impact will be larger for single malts. Pieda 
estimated that the loss of single malt sales could be as much as 77% 
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of pre-abolition levels. This represents some 13% of total world 
sales, a figure in excess of current malt sales to Asia and South 
America combined, and approaching the total of sales to North 
America. 11 
One reason for the dominance of Scotch whisky- which is at variance 
with the share of spirits in total alcohol consumption - is the 
distinct price advantage enjoyed by duty free outlets over high 
street stores, which gives these outlets a particular image which 
features prominently in their marketing strategies. This price 
advantage in duty free outlets is much greater for spirits than for 
other alcoholic drinks because tax is a much higher element of high 
street prices for spirits. 12 
There are likely to be longer-term adverse impacts upon 
international sales of Scotch whisky which cannot be quantified. 
Scotch whisky producers believe the environment of international 
travel has encouraged consumer experimentation in purchasing new 
products, enabling the industry to access new consumers in a manner 
which is not possible in high street stores. 1 3 For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, the success of single malts owes much to the 
pioneering efforts of William Grant & Sons, whose Glenfiddich single 
malt was first introduced to the duty free market in the 1960s. 
Competitive pricing in duty free outlets encourages consumers to 
purchase more expensive de luxe blended whiskies and single malts, 
which they may not have considered purchasing in high street 
stores. 
Abo1i tion will force Scotch whisky to compete wi th other products for 
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intra-EU custom in the same unfavourable tax environment that it 
faces in the high street. When sales fall, duty free retailers may 
not provide the same shelf-space which Scotch presently enjoys. The 
need for separate distribution channels for intra and extra-EU 
travellers at EU outlets will further compound the difficulties 
faced by Scotch whisky.14 
Finally, there is likely to be a further loss to the whisky industry 
from the abolition of intra-EU duty free in 1999. Whilst duty free 
spirits are generally vended in 1 litre bottles, under EC Directive 
75/106 the European Commission decreed that from January 1st 1992, 
the standard bottle size throughout EU domestic markets must be 70 
cl, 30% smaller. So to the extent that subsequent to the abolition of 
intra-EU duty free consumers purchase a lesser quantity of spirits 
tax paid, there will be an additional reduction in volumes of whisky 
traded. 
The Scotch Whisky Association Industry Databank provides data on the 
volume of Scotch sold through or shipped to EU duty free outlets over 
1991-95. In 1995 duty free shipments of Scotch from the United 
Kingdom to EU member states were 7.245 million LPA .. Duty free sales 
in the United Kingdom were 3. 667m LPA, giving a total of all EU duty 
free shipments/sales of 10.912m LPA (SWA Industry Oatabase). The 
distribution of sales by these categories is shown in Table 
4.2.15 
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Table 4.2: EU Duty Free Sales/Shipments of Scotch Whisky 1995 
(million LPA) 
Category EU UK Total EU % 
(except UK) 
Malt 0.825 0.430 1.255 
Deluxe 1.164 0.607 1.771 
Standard 5.152 2.576 7.728 
Secondary 0.103 0.053 0.156 
Total 7.245 3.667 10.912 
Share 
11.5 
16.2 
70.8 
1.4 
Source: SWA Industry Databank, in Pieda PIc The Abolition of Intra-
EU Duty Free Shopping 1997 
But three further calculations are needed in order to estimate the 
volume of Scotch whisky sales threatened by the abolition of intra-EU 
duty free in 1999. Data provided by the leading Scotch whisky 
companies supplying duty free outlets indicate that diplomatic & 
mili tary channels and ships I stores, which will be unaffected by the 
ending of intra-EU duty free, accounted for 17.9% of all EU 
sales/shipments in 1995, the remaining 82.1% being sales through 
ai.rports, airlines and ferries. Applying this factor yields total EU 
duty free sales/shipments of 8.959 million LPA in 1995. 
The ETRF estimates that for wines and spirits, intra-EU duty free 
sales account for 75% of total EU duty free sales. Pieda calculated 
that applying this percentage, yields intra-EU duty free sales in 
1995 of 6.719 million LPA that are at risk from abolition. Scotch 
Whisky Association Databank figures reveal that total worldwide 
sales/shipments of whisky in that year were 292.87 million LPA, so 
intra-EU duty free sales of Scotch whisky represented approximately 
2.3% of total Scotch sales/shipments in 1995. 
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Finally, an allowance has to be made for the likely increase in sales 
by 1999. Rising real incomes and the falling cost of travel are 
expected to continue to be at work over the period 1995-99. Pieda 
estimated that total intra-EU duty free sales of Scotch whisky could 
increase by 17.9% in the years to 1999, resulting in total 
sales/shipments of 7.922 million LPA on the eve of abolition. 16 
A study by The Netherlands Economic Institute in 1989 estimated that, 
on abolition, the demand for Scotch whisky through former duty free 
outlets might fall by 30-53%. The NERA study suggested that intra-EU 
sales of Scotch whisky might fall by 27-48% assuming no trading down 
to cheaper alternatives, and by 68-80% assuming 100% trading down. 
The internal estimates for the latter study result from NERA' s 
computing 'low', 'medium' and 'high' case substitution scenarios. 
The various Scotch whisky companies interviewed for the Pieda study 
furnished a 'best guest' estimate that, on average, half of their 
intra-EU duty free sales might be lost post-abolition. 17 
On the basis of this evidence, Pieda concluded: 
Overall, the calculations suggest that there could be a total fall in sales in 
1999 from £218m pre-abolition to £82m post-abolition, a fall of £136m or 62% (all 
measured in 1995 prices) as compared with pre-abolition levels. 1 8 
Given the degree of uncertainty involved, estimates as to the 
consequences for the whisky industry of abolition will have to 
include a degree of sensititity analysis. At a minimum, all the 
quoted studies assume that intra-EU duty free sales of Scotch whisky 
will fall by 30% in the aftermath of abolition. But is is conceivable 
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that sales could fall by 50% or even 80% from present levels. 
According to SWA Databank figures, total sales/shipments of Scotch 
whisky in 1995 amounted to 292.87 million LPA, a growth of 9.2% in the 
four years since 1991. Assuming a comparable growth rate to 1999, 
total sales/shipments of Scotch whisky in that year should be 
approximately 319.81 million LPA. 
This figure does not include Ships' Stores and duty free sales in the 
Uni ted Kingdom. Pieda estimated these to sum to 5.620 million LPA in 
1995, but believe this figure could increase by 17.9% to 6.626 
million LPA in the years to 1999. 19 So total sales/shipments of 
Scotch whisky on the eve of abolition of intra-EU duty free could be 
of the order of 326.44 million LPA. 
After contracting steadily for a number of years, the number of 
people directly employed by the whisky industry has stabilised at 
around the 14,000 level; at end 1995, employment stood at 13,698. On 
the assumption that the numbers directly employed by the whisky 
industry will remain at approximately this level in the years to 
1999, this suggests that on the basis of total whisky production of 
326.44 million LPA in that year, the volume of output per capita will 
be approximately 23,831 LPA. Ceteris paribus, this suggests that the 
7.922 million LPA of whisky destined for the intra-EU duty free 
market on the eve of abolition will be sustaining 332 jobs in the 
whisky industry. 
The academic studies considered in Section 4.2 concluded that 
between 30% and 80% of intra-EU duty free sales of Scotch whisky will 
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be lost in the aftermath of abolition. On the basis of the 
calculations above, therefore, job losses in the whisky industry 
associated with ending intra-EU duty free could be as detailed in 
Table 4.3: 
Table 4.3: Job Losses in the Whisky Industry Associated With Ending 
Intra-EU Duty Free in 1999 
Fall in sales from current levels Job losses 
30%. 100 
50% 166 
80% 266 
The existence of considerable spare capacity in malt & grain 
distilleries means that a substantial increase in output could 
perhaps be realised wi thout hiring many more staff; the reverse side 
of this coin suggests that losing a proportion of the intra-EU duty 
free market in 1999 may not result in quite as many jobs losses as 
fredicted. In other words, it does not necessarily follow that a 10% 
increase in output will demand a 10% increase in labour, or, in the 
case of losing intra-EU duty free, a 30% reduction in sales from pre-
abolition levels results in a 30% fall in industry employment. 
But in the analysis of the employment effects of abolition above, the 
assumption is of fixed technical relationships among factors and 
between factors and products, and that constant returns to scale 
prevail. But coefficients may change over time, either because of 
changes in relative prices or because of technical progress. This is 
discussed further in Chapter 3, but for the present purposes the 
failure to allow for variations in factor combinations can be 
partially defended for short term predictions on the grounds that, 
with a given technology and production method in the short run, 
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factor combinations will be relatively fixed. 
Moreover, even if these estimates of employment losses in the 
industry are exaggerated, any reduction in whisky output will impact 
upon suppliers. The potential affects of the abolition of intra-EU 
duty free in 1999 upon the regional Scottish economy are considered 
in the next Section. 
195 
4.4 Impact Upon Wider Scottish Economy of Ending Duty Free 
The previous Section reported upon estimates presented in the extant 
literature, suggesting that between 100 and 266 jobs could be lost 
wi thin the whisky industry as a result of the abolition of the intra-
EU duty free market in 1999. The purpose of this Section is to 
determine the impact upon the wider Scottish economy of linkage 
adjustments in the aftermath of a fall in output in the whisky 
industry. 
Mul tiplier estimates discussed in Chapter 3 vary between the 1989 and 
1994 Scottish Input-Output Tables. Given the degree of uncertainty 
involved, the total estimated employment impact upon the Scottish 
economy of the loss of intra-EU duty free sales of Scotch whisky in 
1999 is summarized in Tables 4.4 & 4.5, on the basis of the 1989 and 
1994 multiplier values. 
Table 4.4: Estimated Employment Impact Upon Scottish Economy of Loss 
of Intra-EU Duty Free Scotch Whisky in 1999: 
1989 Multipliers (Type I: 3.66, Type II: 4.63) 
Job Losses Fall in Sales From Current Levels 
30% 50% 80% 
Direct 100 166 266 
Indirect 266 442 708 
Induced 97 161 258 
TOTAL 463 769 1232 
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Table 4.5 Estimated Employment Impact Upon Scottish Economy of Loss 
of Intra-EU Duty Free Scotch Whisky in 1999: 
1994 Mutlipliers (Type I: 2.47, Type II: 3.10) 
Job Losses Fall in Sales From Current Levels 
30% 50% 80% 
Direct 100 166 266 
Indirect 147 244 391 
Induced 63 105 168 
TOTAL 310 515 825 
In sum, total estimated job losses range from 310 to 1232, depending 
upon the degree to which sales of Scotch whisky fall in the aftermath 
of abolition, and the employment multiplier estimate used. 
Differences in the short and long run elasticities of demand for 
whisky will also determine the number of jobs that are eventually 
lost. 
In their report on the abolition of intra-EU duty free shopping, 
Pieda assumed that lost Scotch whisky sales would amount to 62% of 
pre-aboli tion levels , resulting in approximately 1000 job losses. 20 
Similarly, on the basis of the calculations above, a 62% loss in sales 
would result in a contraction in employment of 954, according to the 
1989 employment multipliers (used by Pieda), or 639 on the basis of 
the 1994 estimates. 
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4.5 Justifications for Retaining Duty Free 
The lady doth protest too much, methinks 
William Shakespeare Hamlet III.ii 
In Sections 4.3 & 4.4 above, it was contended that the current level 
of intra-EU duty free sales of Scotch whisky could contract by 
between 30% and 80% in the aftermath of abolition in 1999. The 
calculated effects upon employment throughout the whisky industry 
and wider Scottish economy are job losses of between 310 and 1232. 
Predictably, therefore, the whisky industry has railed against 
abolition, believing it to portend an annus horribilis for the 
industry in 1999. 
In May 1996, the Scotch Whisky Association met with officials of Her 
Majesty's Customs & Excise, to argue the industry's concerns at the 
portentous consequences of abolition, and to ascertain the 
willingness of the government to seek a review of the EU Council's 
decision. HM Customs & Excise retorted that convincing data would be 
required if Ministers were to be persuaded to raise the issue in the 
Council. 
In October 1996, following reports that the Irish Presidency 
intended to raise the issue, the Association reminded the 
Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke, of the industry's concerns and 
objectives. In response, Mr Clarke undertook to give "very careful 
consideration" to any proposals for a review, but doubted whether 
this would lead the Council to change its mind. Informal 
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consul tat ions were undertaken at the November ECOFIN, but with 
opposi tion from the United Kingdom and others, there was no consensus 
in favour of asking the Commission for a review. Nevertheless, the 
Irish Presidency later confirmed that it would continue to press for 
a study to be carried out on the implications of abolition. 21 
During the summer of 1997, the SWA had meetings with the new 
government at ministerial and official level to discuss the negative 
effects on the whisky industry of ending intra-EU duty free. But on 
the 28th August, a spokesman for the Treasury stated that HM 
would 
Government -w.i-l1. not be lobbying the European Commission on behalf of 
the whisky industry: 
The measure [abolition of intra-EU duty-free] had been decided upon and signed up 
to by member states in 1992. At the time, the EC had hoped that they could bring 
it in in 1992, but because of concerns raised by the industry over its 
implementation it was put back to allow the industry time to restructure 
itself. 2 2 
At a conference in Brussels on September 24th 1997, industry 
representatives made a last ditch attempt to save the intra-EU duty 
free concession post 1999, claiming that abolition would threaten 
140,000 jobs, with peripheral regions suffering most,23 but the 
Commission remained unconvinced and ruled against any reprieve. 
The EU Taxation & Single Market Commissioner, Mario Monti, appealed 
to duty-free shop operators to start concrete preparations for 
converting their shops to tax-paid retail outlets. Said he: "The 
industry has been given seven and a half years to prepare ... it is high 
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time you used this time constructively, instead of trying to turn the 
clock back. Duty free sales distort competition."24 
The latter comment is somewhat rich given the Commission's highly 
inequi table proposals for the harmonisation of alcohol excises 
across the European Union, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
Pieda concluded in its report on the abolition of intra-EU duty 
free: 
In a market context within which competing products were treated equally, there 
would clearly be no case for the continuation of intra-EU duty free shopping. In 
the EU, however, the basic condition is not met for alcoholic drinks, as existing 
excise duty regimes discriminate heavily against spirits. Spirits (and Scotch) 
compete on a level playing field only through EU duty free outlets. The 
paradoxical conclusion is that the abolition of intra-EU duty free sales for 
alcoholic drinks will move the EU further from the ideal of the single market as 
far as these products are concerned. 25 
This point was also made in a recent article in The Scotsman by Hugh 
Morison, the Director General of the SWA, who has argued that the 
Commission legislated in 1992 to ban duty free after taking the view 
that duty rates across the EU member states would have been largely 
harmonized by 1999: 
Today's single market still consists of 15 member states with 15 different tax 
regimes. The reality is that duty free is the only true single market where tax 
does not distort price. Its abolition will only worsen discrimination against 
spirits. 
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The business editorial on the next page concluded on similar lines: 
"Ironically, at the moment duty free is the only real single market in 
which whisky, spirits and wine compete equally on price without 
discriminatory taxes. " 26 
But this notion that intra-EU duty free shopping represents a 'single 
market' does not stand closer scrutiny. Table 4.6 is taken from the 
1997 Pieda report on the abolition of intra-EU duty free shopping, 
and shows very clearly the substantial variations in duty free 
savings for travellers between ·different airports within the 
European Union. Whilst a Dane purchasing a standard blended Scotch 
whisky may save over 77% on Copenhagen prices when he buys at Rome 
Ciirport, the same whisky would cost an Italian almost 40% more in .. 
Stockholm's 'duty free' outlet than it would at a domestic 
retailer. , 
Table 4.6: Percentage of Duty Free Saving For Travellers: Standard 
Blended Whisky At Major Airport Outlets 1997 
Percentage ofDTF Saving for Travellers; Standard Scotch Blend; Major Airport Outlets 
Airport 0uIId London Dublin FnmIdIut Paria 
__ 
Brussels Rome Madrid Lisbon AIha1s Copcnhagat Stockholm HclsinlU 
IIR 1'2 coon 
Citizenship 
Danish 70.24 71.44 73.99 72.45 72.93 68.96 77.15 74.76 72.15 73.35 69.73 66.33 67.90 
Swedish 66.50 67.84 70.72 6898 69.52 65.06 74.28 71.59 68.65 70.00 65.93 62.10 63.86 
Finnish 65.27 66.67 69.65 67.85 68.40 63.78 .'73.34 70.55 67.50 68.90 64.68 60.71 62.54 
British 49.91 51.92 56.22 53.63 54.43 47.76 61.55 57.52 53.13 55.15 49.06 43.33 45.97 
Irish 45.92 48.09 52.73 49.93 50.80 43.60 58.48 54.13 49.40 51.57 45.00 38.81 41.66 
Dulx:h 35.09 37.70 43.27 39.91 40.95 32.31 50.17 44.95 39.27 41.88 33.99 26.57 29.99 
BeIgjan 29.22 32.07 38.14 34.47 35.61 26.19 45.67 39.97 33.78 36.62 28.02 19.92 23.66 
French 25.70 28.69 35.06 31.21 32.40 22.51 42.96 36.99 30.48 33.47 24.44 15.94 19.85 
Gennan 21.58 24.74 31.46 27.40 28.66 18.22 39.80 33.50 26.63 29.78 20.25 11.28 15.42 
Greek -2.75 1.38 10.19 4.87 6.52 -7.16 21.21 12.86 3.86 7.99 -4.50 -16.25 -10.84 
Portwruese -12.58 -8.05 1.61 -4.23 -2.41 -17.40 13.58 4.53 -5.33 ~.80 -14.49 -27.36 -21.43 
Spanish -18.16 -13.41 -3.27 -9.40 -7.50 -23.23 9.29 ~.21 -10.56 -5.81 -20.17 -33.69 -27.46 
Italian -23.24 -18.28 -7.71 -14.10 -12.II -28.52 5.4 -4.52 15.31 -10.35 -25.33 -39.43 -32.93 
Source: Pieda PIc, The Abolition of Intra-EU Duty Free Shopping 
The reality is that the absence of tax allows for almost as great a 
variation in prices between different 'duty free' outlets as 
. 
pertains as a result of diverging rates of alcohol duties across 
Europe. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that the higher the 
alcohol excise as a percentage of retail prices, the greater the 
f 
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proportion of the tax free saving garnered by the duty free 
outlet. 
Overall, the NERA study found that duty free products were as much as 
20% more expensive than the equivalent high street prices less duty 
and VAT. This comparison gives some indication of the margin that 
duty free outlets make on their products, in addition to the normal 
retailers margin. 27 
But this is to understate the true mark-up, as duty free outlets have 
advantages over other retailers in terms of purchasing power, a 
product of high sales volumes and attractiveness of venue in respect 
of advertising. In addi tion, duty free outlets have access to a large 
captive market; numerous idle passengers aboard ship or in airport 
lounges, in a relaxed holiday mood and with cash to spend. Pieda 
stated: 
In practice, the duty free outlets have such strong market positions that they 
can (and do) force the factory gate price down to, and in some cases below, the 
'normal'level. 28 
As an example, a certain 21 year old malt whisky currently retailing 
for approximately £44.00 costs the average retail merchant in the 
Uni ted Kingdom about £36.50. Of this figure, duty and VAT amount to 
£12.50. The in-bond price of this product should therefore be about 
£24.00. But in fact, this particular whisky is purchased by the major 
duty free outlets for a mere £10.00. The whisky would probably sell 
in an airport for £40.00. This price represents a £4.00 "saving" to 
the consumer, but implies a huge profit margin for the airport 
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operator of 75%, compared to 17% for the high street liquor 
store. 
As another example, a litre of Bell's blended Scotch whisky currently 
retails for approximately £15.00. Of this figure, £7.60 is accounted 
for by excise duty, assuming 40% abv (in reality, export strengths 
are usually 43% abv). VAT amounts to £2.63, so the total tax is of the 
order of £10.23. Duty and VAT free, a litre of Bell's should 
therefore be priced at about £4.77. 
At this price, the standard retailers' margin would still accrue to 
the duty free merchant, and as stated earlier, due to purchasing 
power may be able to acquire the product for significantly less than 
the average off licence. But for the sake of argument, it will be 
assumed that the duty free outlet purchases whisky in bond for the 
same price as a national chain of supermarkets. 
A survey of any major duty free outlet will reveal that prices are 
seldom if ever as low as £4.77. Occasionally an outlet may offer a 
litre of blended Scotch such as Bell's for about £8.50, but in 
general, consumers can expect to pay anything up to £11.00. In this 
example, at any price over £9.89, the duty free outlet is garnering 
over half of the 'duty free' tax saving for itself. 
As a further indictment of the duty free retailers, in a tract 
published by the Adam Smi th Institute entitled "Too Much To Swallow: 
The Case for Lower Excise Duties on Alcohol"(1995), Keith Boyfield 
revealed that in July 1995, a 70cl bottle of Teacher's whisky could be 
purchased in Tuscany for £5.32. This is equivalent to £7.60 a 
203 
litre. 29 Indeed, throughout Southern Europe, low rates of excise 
duty mean branded spirits generally cost less than in a supposedly 
'duty free' store, a fact attested to in Table 4.6. 
Standard neo-classical economic theory, with its emphasis upon 
competitive markets and complete information, would argue that the 
existence of such substantial returns suggests the possibility for 
profitable arbitrage activity. But observation of the duty free 
industry in reality suggests that it is a good example of market 
failure; the market is far from competitive and there is an 
information deficiency in so far as consumers are not at all informed 
as to the net of tax price of the product they are purchasing. 
Consider a flight from Edinburgh to Lisbon. The traveller has the 
choice of purchasing duty free products from the single BAA outlet at 
Edinburgh airport, onboard the aircraft, or at the single duty free 
store at Lisbon airport. The impracticality of carrying a wide range 
of liquor products aboard an aircraft renders the in-flight market 
less attractive to consumers than those at the airports. So within 
each airport, the traveller is faced wi th a monopoly provider of duty 
free products. The allocative inefficiency of such a monopoly is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Allocative Inefficiency of Monopoly 
o 
(a) perfect competition . 
o 
(b) Monopoly 
I MR 
I 
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In perfect competition (Part a), the quantity of duty free products 
traded is Qc, Price Pc, and consumers' surplus is represented by the 
shaded triangle. Duty free outlets' excess profits are zero in the 
long-run equilibrium. Under a single price monopoly (Part b), output 
of duty free products is restricted to the profit maximizing level 
(where MC = MR) at Qm, and the price increases to Pm. Consumers' 
surplus is reduced to the small shaded triangle. The duty free 
monopolist garners the rectangle underneath. But the grey triangle 
represents the deadweight loss of restricting output of duty free 
products to less than the efficient level. The area above Pc is the 
loss of consumers' surplus, and that below Pc is the loss of 
producers' surplus. 
Clearly it would be impractical to have a number of competing duty 
free outlets onboard a ship, much less in an aircraft cabin. But were 
the public authorities to oblige both sea and air port authorities to 
allow other licensed operators upon their premises, and the 
information aysmmetry between retailers and consumers were 
attenuated or even eliminated, then it would be possible to move 
closer to the competitive outcome illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
In reality, the existence of powerful brand imaging in the market for 
alcoholic products suggests that such innovations would result in 
the duty free market approximating more closely to an oligopolistic 
or monopolistic competition outcome, rather than the idealized 
scenario of perfect competition illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the consumer, such moves could 
well lead to an improvement in welfare. 
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Similar stratagems have been adopted in the Uni ted Kingdom in respect 
of the various 'beer orders' , which forced the owners of tied houses 
to allow innkeepers to stock at least one 'guest beer' on their 
premises. But it is perhaps not surprising that such market access 
policies have not been adopted at Europe's ports & airports. Most 
remain under state ownership, and even in the United Kingdom, it was 
never likely that Conservative administrations would have wished to 
contemplate a move which would have diluted the profits of the 
Airports Authority prior to privatization. 
It has also been contended in traditional theories of welfare 
economics that the imposition of commodity taxes, such as will be 
imposed upon alcoholic beverages sold in duty free outlets after 
1999, represents a welfare loss to both consumers' and producers' , as 
well as an excess burden resulting from consumers substituting into 
non-taxed products with a lower ranking on their preference scale . 
. This subject is discussed in much greater depth in Chapter 5.4, but 
for the present purposes, excess burden in a partial equilibrium 
setting is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Alcohol Taxation: Standard Excess Burden 
50= s,. 
Q 
Quantity of WhiskY sold (bottles) 
Source: Brown & Jackson, Public Economics 
Prior to the introduction of the tax, equilibrium occurs at pOint E. 
A specific excise tax of t is levied upon alcoholic beverages, 
raising the supply curve to Sg. Consumers' surplus falls by PoPgBE, 
producers' surplus by PnPoED, and the excess burden is represented by 
the shaded area BDE. On the basis of this analysis, overall welfare 
would be sustained by not levying the tax; that is to say, by 
retaining the intra-EU duty free concession in perpetuum. 
But this conclusion is premised on a number of highly restrictive 
assumptions. In the first place, the analysis is of a partial 
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equilibrium; once all other factors and prices in the market have 
adjusted, the resulting welfare loss may not be so great. It is 
as sumed that all market s are per f ect 1 y compet it i ve , and that a 
Pareto-optimum prevailed prior to the introduction of the tax. But 
it has been demonstrated above that the intra-EU duty free market is 
far from competi ti ve. Hence the imposition of an excise which 
extracted some of the abnormal profits made by producers could be 
justified on equity grounds. 
Much of the rhetoric flowing from those concerned with maintaining 
duty free fails to take account of the fact that from the perspective 
of welfare economics, the income effect of extending excise taxes to 
duty free products simply represents the transfer of resources from 
producers and consumers to the government, and does not affect 
overall welfare. In Figure 4.2, therefore, whilst the gross loss 
from the excise tax is PnPgBED, if what is provided by the tax revenue 
is of equal value to the revenue that pays for it, then the 
deadweight loss is reduced to BDE. In Chapter 5.4 this analysis is 
extended to suggest that if consumers are continuously compensated 
for the income effects of price changes, the excess burden becomes 
even smaller. 
Finally, the existence of negative externalities associated with 
alcohol consumption suggests that the taxation of alcohol could well 
be Pareto improving. This subject is considered in much greater 
depth in Chapter 5.5, but at this juncture it could be argued that 
vending a substantial quantity of alcohol tax free, at a price that 
does not fully take into account the social costs associated wi th its 
consumption, diminishes overall social welfare. 
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Proponents of retaining the duty free concession after 1999 have 
argued that whilst the special taxation of alcohol may well be 
justified on the grounds of negative externalities, in certain 
places, namely within the market for intra-EU travel (or their 
lucrative businesses), alcohol should be vended tax free because the 
EU has failed to develop a harmonized regime for excise duties. 
Any final conclusion on this issue would therefore have to attempt to 
determine the extent to which the deadweight loss of imposing taxes 
on hitherto duty free products did or did not outweigh the social 
costs of the extra alcohol consumption not reflected in the duty free 
price. But on the basis of the evidence presented in this Chapter, it 
is contended that continuing to sell alcohol duty free, at a price 
that fails to reflect fully the social costs of its consumption, does 
not offset the welfare loss from a disrupted alcohol market in 
Europe, but reduces overall"welfare even further. 
Airlines and ferry companies have also argued that high mark-ups on 
duty-free sales enable them to increase profits and hence lower the 
cost of fares. The major air and shipping lines have contended that 
the loss of duty-free revenues could force up air-ticket prices in 
Europe by 5-20%, and ferry prices by even more, since on-board sales, 
including duty-free, account for roughly half of ferry operators' 
income. 31 
The cross-Channel ferry sector in particular continues to see its 
profits actually and potentially threatened from a variety of 
sources, of which the proposed abolition of intra-EU duty free in 
1999 is only one. Ever increasing competition from the Channel 
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tunnel and the rigid new safety rules for ro-ro vessels agreed under 
the auspices of the various SOLAS (Safety Of Li fe At Sea) Conventions 
have had a further impact upon costs. In addition, if the relaxation 
of personal imports of duty-paid goods across the European Union does 
occasion a gradual harmonisation of alcohol duties, the propensity 
to embark on 'booze cruises' from the United Kingdom and the 
Scandanavian countries will gradually diminish. 
Such jaunts are popular with travellers as well as being highly 
profitable for the ferry operators, but arguably they represent an 
inefficient use of resources, and provide lucrative opportunities 
for criminal acti vi ty (discussed further in Chapter 7). A long-term 
trend of rising real incomes and greater leisure time amongst 
Europeans will ensure that throughput at air and sea ports continues 
to increase, with or without the presence of duty free. The strong 
pound and warm weather in the summer of 1997 ensured that ferries 
sailing from ports in the south of England were loaded to the gunwales 
with families making for the continent, for whom duty free was a 
bonus, but not the raison d 'etre of travelling. On-board retailing 
and catering services will still be highly profitable even after the 
abolition of intra-EU duty free in 1999. 
This point was also made recently in respect of air travel, by James 
Currie, the EU Commission's Director-General for Customs & Indirect 
Taxation: 
Travel overall is going up by 7% per annum. The increase in air travel in the EU 
had been enormous - not because of duty-free shopping - but because of 
liberlisation which has been driving down fares. 3 
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4.6 Conclusions 
Section 4.2 of this Chapter ruminated upon the intra-EU duty free 
market, revealing that in 1995 the market was worth approximately 
£185m to the whisky industry. Utilizing estimates presented in 
recent reports by National Economic Research Associates and Pieda 
PIc, it was concluded that consumers may react to abolition in a 
variety of ways, but even in a best case scenario for the whisky 
industry, producers may well lose 30% of the current level of intra-
EU duty free sales. 
The possible impact of this loss upon the whisky industry and wider 
Scottish economy was explored in Sections 4.3 & 4.4, with preliminary 
estimates suggesting that job losses associated with the contraction 
in whisky sales could be between 310 and 1232 in total. Section 4.5 
considered the arguments advanced in favour of retention of the 
concession after 1999. 
However, the data presented revealed that a substantial element of 
the tax free saving is currently extracted by the duty free retailer, 
and not passed on to the consumer. In fact, many so-called 'duty 
free' products, particularly spirits such as whisky and gin, are 
cheaper duty paid in some Medi terranean countries than in 'duty free' 
outlets. The arguments frequently advanced that duty free sales 
represent the 'only true single market' for alcoholic drinks in 
Europe were also shown to be specious, given the evidence of widely 
varying prices across different outlets. 
The irresistible conclusion to be drawn is that calls by those 
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involved in the intra-EU duty free trade for its retention after 1999 
constitute pleas for favourable treatment, with little rational 
economic justification. Duty free originated in an era of high 
barriers to trade in the form of customs duties, tariffs, taxes, and 
restrictions on the personal import of goods between nations. With 
the arrival of the Single European Market, such a concession is 
arguably outmoded within the European Union. To the extent that 
fares are artificially subsidised by duty free sales this distorts 
the effe~tive operating of the market for travel, and confounds 
attempts at rationalisation & reconstruction within the transport 
industry, especially in cross-Channel ferry services. 
As a recent article in the Economist newspaper commented 
colourfully: 
Duty-free sales in Europe represent a subsidy of some 2 billion ecus a year to the 
cigarette puffing traveller or the itinerant toper on a Baltic booze cruise. 
Claims about job losses ignore bigger potential gains from scrapping this 
subsidy. Why should tax-payers subsidise the fares of travellers, who tend to be 
better off? Like all subsidies, duty-free sales distort competition, both in 
travel (not available on trains) and in retailing. Against all these blemishes, 
failure to harmonize EU taxes in no way justifies keeping duty-free. 33 
Nevertheless, the deleterious effects upon the whisky industry and 
wider Scottish economy of losing all or part of the current level of 
sales in intra-EU duty free outlets cannot be ignored. In Chapter 7, 
it is argued that were the government in the United Kingdom to reduce 
the excise applied to spirits, such that all alcoholic beverages are 
taxed on the same basis according to alcoholic content, this would 
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rectify an inequity and enable the government to lobby wi th much more 
credibility for fairer tax treatment overseas. 
By increasing sales of whisky, this would also have the effect of 
creating jobs both wi thin the industry and across the Scottish 
economy. In fact, the estimated number of jobs created by the 
~roposed reduction in spirits duties offsets those threatened by the 
complete loss of intra-EU duty free sales of Scotch whisky in 1999. 
To the extent that there is partial replacement of intra-EU duty free 
sales after 1999, there may well be a net creation of jobs. 
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CHAPTER 5: PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES II: ALCOHOL TAXATION 
5.1 Introduction 
Wretches, hired by those to whom excise is paid. 
Dr Samuel Johnson on His Majesty's Excisemen 
Section 5.2 of this Chapter examines the history of alcohol taxation, 
and the bearing of past prejudices upon the current regime of alcohol 
excises in the United Kingdom, which is analysed in more detail in 
Section 5.3. In Sections 5.4 and 5.5, the rationale for the special 
taxation of alcohol is considered in terms of various propositions, 
amongst the most frequently advanced of which are concerns for 
efficiency and equity in taxation, the favourable treatment of 
various manufactures and regions, the utility of excise taxes as 
revenue earners for governments, and health and welfare 
considerations. Section 5.5 concludes. 
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5.2 The History of Excise Taxes 
Thae curst horse-leeches o'th' Excise, 
Wha mak the whisky stills their prize! 
Haud up thy han' Deil! ance, twice, thrice! 
There, seize the blinkers! 
An' bake them up in brunstane pies 
For poor damn'd drinkers! 
Exciseman Robert Burns, Scotch Drink 
The taxation of alcoholic drinks in the British Isles has a long 
history. Norman Kings claimed a proportion of all wine imports as 
payment for ensuring the traders I safe passage, 1 and Edward I imposed 
a monetary tax on wine imported to England as early as 1303. Beer and 
spiri ts, on the other hand, were first taxed in 1643 when the English 
Parliament levied excise taxes to pay for its army in the English 
Civil War. 2 A year later the tax was extended to Scotland, "To supply 
and relieve the necessities of the armies sent forth for Reformation 
and Defence of Religion, ,,3 but in the same year the Scots Parliament 
also imposed an excise tax on spirits, at the rate of 2s 8d per Scots 
pint (about one third of a gallon), probably to meet the military 
expenses of the Royalist army. 
On the Union of Parliaments in 1707, the revenue from the excise on 
spirits was incorporated with income from other duties under the 
Edinburgh-based Board of Excise, to be used to defray the costs of the 
civil administration in Scotland. But the Treaty between England and 
Scotland stated that there should be no malt tax in Scotland, so when 
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Plate 6 His Majesty's Excise Officer performing his duties. Source unknown. 
The Distilling Act of 1823 required all Scotland's distilleries to be licensed and to make provision for a resident Excise Officer. The rapid development 
of the industry in the 19th century was to ensure the Crown of a lucrative stream of income from this source. 
in 1713 the malt tax was extended from England to Scotland (at half 
the rate, possibly because of the poorer quality of Scottish barley), 
it met with ferocious opposition. Sir Robert Walpole raised the tax 
in 1725 to 3d per bushel of mal t, in lieu of a proposed excise duty of 
6d per barrel on ale. 4 The resulting riots culminated in the infamous 
Porteous Affair, in which Captain Porteous, a member of the Edinburgh 
City Guard, was murdered. 
Genever had been introduced from Holland in 1690, and production, 
together wi th consumption, boomed throughout the 18th century, 5 to a 
level nearly four times the current average in the United Kingdom. 6 
In an attempt to mitigate the health problems and social disorder 
that resulted , successive tax increases were introduced. 7 Indeed, a 
marked stimulus to the output of Scotch whisky was the imposition of 
the Gin Act in 1736, which taxed heavily gin produced in E~gland or 
imported genever from Holland. 8 
The political and social animus towards spirits was formidable 
throughout the Victorian era, as exemplified by Cobden's Commercial 
Treaty with France in 1860. This cut the import duty on wine 
substantially, causing a mini-boom in wine drinking during the 
period 1860-1890, and was motivated not just by an ideological 
commi tment to free trade, but also a desire to induce people to imbibe 
wine, a 'civilised' and 'respectable' drink, instead of spirits. 
Gladstone described spirits as "not only an evil in themselves, but 
fruitful parents of crime. liS 
The spirits tax was raised by 30% in 1909, and during the First World 
War, the supposedly deleterious effects of excessive alcohol 
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consumption upon the war effort in the form of widespread 
drunkenness and alcoholism, especially amongst female munitions 
workers drinking gin - occasioned substantial increases in taxation 
and tougher licensing regulations. David Lloyd George, The Prime 
Minister in-waiting and a leading temperance advocate, commented 
during a speech at Bangor in February 1915: 
We are fighting Germany, Austria, and Drink and, as far as I can see, the greatest 
of these deadly foes is the drink ... drink is doing more damage in the war than 
all the German submarines put together - we have great powers to deal with drink 
and we mean to use them. 
The emergency wartime restrictions appeared to have a dramatic 
impact upon alcohol consumption and the level of alcohol abuse, 
persuading the authorities to retain most of them in peacetime, 
albeit in an attenuated form. lOIn 1918 the excise duty on spirits was 
doubled. It was then raised by another 66% in 1919 and by a further 
40% in 1920, equivalent to raising the 1918 excise duty by a factor of 
five, and all within two years. 1 1 There was, however, no 
corresponding increase in the duty on wine, which had not increased 
since 1889, decisively setting apart the taxation of spirits vis-a-
vis other alcoholic beverages. In 1919, responding to questioning on 
this anomaly, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain 
remarked: II I would I ike to get more money out of wine ... (but), people 
do not buy wine." 12 
These budgets were to lay the foundation for the United Kingdom's 
present structure of alcoholic drinks taxation, with successive 
increases in excise duties every year. Value Added Tax was also 
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imposed on alcoholic beverages at the rate of 10% from 1 April 1973, 
8% from 29 July 1974, 15% from 12 June 1979, and 17.5% from April 1st 
1991. 13 As VAT is levied upon the duty-paid price, it is in effect a 
tax upon a tax, which has the effect of widening the absolute 
differential between excises on different categories of alcoholic 
beverage. 
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5.3 The Present Duty Structure in the United Kingdom 
But in this world, nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes 
Benjamin Franklin letter to Jean Baptiste Le Roy 1789 
As detailed in the foregoing Section, the current regime of indirect 
taxation in the United Kingdom levies two taxes on alcoholic 
beverages: excise duties and Value Added Tax. The latter is an ad 
valorem tax levied' at 17.5% and applied uniformly to beer, wines and 
spiri ts in common wi th most other goods liable to VAT. Premium brands 
tend to suffer most from this form of tax since they cost more to buy 
than inferior alternatives, and for this reason, specific taxes are 
often preferred over ad valorem taxes since they give producers a 
greater incentive to manufacture goods of a higher quality; the 
higher is the pre-tax price, the lower is the specific tax as a 
percentage of the final duty-paid price. 14 
Excise duties in the United Kingdom are applied according to the 
alcoholic content of each beverage, but, reflecting the past 
prejudice against spirits, regard the alcoholic content of beer, 
wine, spirits and cider & perry differently. There is a separate 
structure for 'intermediate' drinks and an additional one for 
'mixed' drinks.15 
The taxation of beer was changed on June 1 1993 and there is now a 
charge per hectolitre (100 litres) of beer of £10.82 for every per 
cent alcohol by volume. 1 6 The dutiable unit for spirits is the' Ii tre 
of alcohol' which currently attracts a duty of £18.99, which 
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translates into a specific tax of £5.32 for a 70cl bottle at 40% 
alcohol by volume. 
Wine is defined into 4 groups for excise purposes: 'light', 'medium', 
'heavy' and 'sparkling', with still table wine taxed at a uniform 
rate per hectolitre of finished product. For wine of an alcoholic 
strength of 11%, the implied level of duty per litre of pure alcohol 
is £12.54. For wine of strength 13%, the implied duty level is 
£10.80. 17 Thus, somewhat perversely, the level of duty per unit of 
pure alcohol falls as the alcoholic content increases. In addition, 
sparkling wine pays more duty than fortified wine, even though the 
latter is stronger. 
For cider and perry, the excise duty is charged at one rate up to a 
strength of 8.5% alcohol by volume; thereafter, the duty applied is 
on the same scale as that for wine. 18 Table 5.1 details the current 
duty charged per centilitre of pure alcohol in the United Kingdom. 
Table 5.2 following translates this into the approximate duty 
applied to typical 'pub measures' of each of four kinds of alcoholic 
drink, each containing a comparable quantity of alcohol. 
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Table 5.1: Duty Charged Per Centili tre of Pure Alcohol For Four 
Different Kinds of Drink, 1997 
Beverage ABV November 1995 November 1996 
Fortified Wine 17.50% 10.70p 10.70p 
Beer 4.93% 10.82p 10.82p 
Table Wine 11.20% 12.54p 12.54p 
Scotch Whisky 40.00% 19.78p 18.99p 
Note: The duty paid price is subject to VAT of 17.5% 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Association Statistical Report 1996 
Table 5.2: Approximate Duty Applied to Four Typical Measures of 
Alcoholic Drink, Each Containing a Comparable Quantity 
of Alcohol, 1997 
Beverage ABV November 1995 November 1996. 
80ml Fortified Wine 17.50% 14.98p 14 .. 98p 
284ml (1/2 pint) Beer 4.93% 15.15p 15.15p 
125ml Table Wine 11.20% 17.56p 17.56p 
35m1 Scotch Whisky 40.00% 27.69p 26.59p 
Note: The duty paid price is subject to VAT of 17.5% 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Association Statistical Report 1996 
It will be noted from Tables 5.1 & 5.2 that the implied tax rates per 
unit of pure alcohol are not uniform between drinks and there is a 
substantial tax bias against spirits, the duty rate per unit of 
alcohol levied on spirits being nearly twice that applied to beer. 
Indeed, when VAT is included, the total tax on a typical bottle of 
spirits amounts to almost two-thirds of the price; by contrast, the 
comparable proportion on an average bottle of wine is 39%, and on 
beer, 33%. 
These inequities were worsened in the new government's first budget 
on July 2nd 1997, when Chancellor Gordon Brown announced an across-
the-board increase in duties on alcohol of 3%, effective of January 
1st 1998. This will add 1p to the price of a tot of whisky, or 19p on a 
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70cl bottle. By imposing a uniform percentage increase, Mr Brown 
widened the absolute differentials between the taxation applied to 
different categories of alcoholic beverage. 
It is argued in the next two Sections that this discrimination is not 
justified by any principle, and is to a very great extent the result 
of the historical prejudice discussed in Section 5.2. The 
international ramifications of this domestic bias against an 
indigenous industry are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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5.4 The Rationale for Alcohol Taxation: Taxation & Welfare 
Considerations 
As discussed in the previous Section, alcoholic beverages in the 
United Kingdom are subject, in common with certain other 'luxury' 
food products such as coffee and confectionery, to the full value 
added tax rate of 17.5%. But in addition, alcoholic products 
attract, and have done since at least the 14th century (as Section 5.2 
detailed), specific excise taxes. Such special taxation was once an 
important source of revenue to governments, and even today as much as 
£5.5 billion is raised by alcohol duties. 19 
As far as the VAT element is concerned, there would appear to be a 
widespread consensus both within and outwith the United Kingdom and 
the wider European Union as to the utility of broadly-based sales 
taxes. An important component of the Commission's 1987 proposals 
"Completing The Internal Market," was the establishing of minimum 
rates for value added tax across the European Union. The Commission 
proposed that VAT should lie wi thin two bands: 14-20% for the 
majority of goods and services, and 4-9% for a limited range of 
essentials such as .most foods, domestic energy, books & newspapers, 
and public transport. 20 
Such authori ties as Nicholas Kaldor have argued that consumption is a 
better tax base than income - that people should be taxed according to 
what they take out of the common pool rather than what they 
contribute. The relative merits of direct and indirect taxes are 
considered further in Li ttle (1951), Friedman (1952), Walker (1955), 
Harberger (1974) and Atkinson (1977), but it is very unlikely that 
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governments will wish to reduce sales taxes significantly, 
especially given their importance as revenue earners; in 1996, for 
instance, receipts from VAT amounted to over £43 billion in the 
United Kingdom. 22 
The specific taxation of alcohol, however, requires justification, 
as it is likely comparable sums could be raised by extending excise 
duties to other goods & services, widening the VAT base, or via 
direct taxation. Various contentions have been advocated wi th which 
to judge a good tax, and to justify alcohol duties in particular, but. 
in essence they can be categorized into considerations of: 
i) Efficiency 
ii) Sumptuary Goods 
iii) Equity 
iv) Convenience 
v) Revenue 
vi) Production Bases & Regional Specialities 
vii) Public Health & Externalities 
The previous Section also revealed that the current excise regime in 
the United Kingdom taxes spirits, on a degree of alcohol basis, at 
almost twice the rate applied to wine and beer. Such discriminatory 
treatment of spirits will also be examined in the context of these 
arguments. 
i) Efficiency 
The efficiency criterion of a good tax is that it should occasion 
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minimal distortion to the Pareto optimum condition for production & 
exchange - the tax should interfere as little as possible with the 
principle of an allocation of resources such that none can be made 
better off without making somebody else worse off. 
The excise tax has come to be singled out in standard economic 
literature as especially inefficient, as it induces consumers to 
purchase goods that have an inferior ranking on their preference 
scales. It has been argued by such authorities as Hicks (1939), 
Joseph (1939) and Allen & Brownlee (1947), that commodity taxes 
resul t in an excess burden that could be avoided if they were replaced 
by a Pareto improving general tax on consumption or income which did 
not interfere with consumer preferences. 
This is because a proportional income tax or a general sales tax 
levied at a uniform rate on all goods and services only has an income 
effect, which simply transfers resources from consumers to the 
~overnment, but an excise, being selective, in addition induces 
households to substitute non-taxed (or lower taxed) goods for taxed 
(or higher taxed) goods. 22 
Evidence presented in Chapter 6 suggests that alcoholic beverages 
are in most instances close substitutes for each other. This being 
the case, the higher duties levied upon spirits will likely induce 
consumers to substitute into wines and beers. According to Pareto's 
formulation, therefore, reconstituting alcohol duties such that 
each beverage is taxed at an identical rate according to alcoholic 
content would be Pareto improving, as the scope for tax-induced 
substi tution between different categories of beverage would be 
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eliminated. 
Excess burden in a partial equilibrium setting is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1: Excise Duties on Whisky: Standard Excess Burden 
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Prior to the introduction of an excise duty on whisky, there is an 
original demand curve Do and an original supply curve So, with 
equilibrium price and quanti ty of Po and Qo respectively. The supply 
curve is shown to be upward sloping I implying diminishing returns in 
the production of whisky. This is a somewhat unrealistic 
simplification, but is made for the purposes of illustration. A tax 
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of t per bottle is levied. Before the introduction of the tax, firms 
in the whisky industry were willing to supply Qo bottles at the price 
Po. But after the tax they will require a price of Po + t in order to 
be willing to supply Qo bottles. The supply curve will thus shift 
vertically upwards by the amount of the tax 8g. The difference 
between the two supply curves is t, the amount received by the 
government for each bottle sold. 
As consumers are faced with 8g, they will demand Q1 bottles for which 
they will pay a tax-inclusive price of Pg. Producers will receive Pn 
,= Pg - t. The effect of the tax is thus to raise the price paid by the 
consumer from Po to Pg, reduce the price received by the producer from 
Po to Pn, reduce the whisky industry output by Qo - Q1, and bring in 
revenue of PnPgBD to the government. 
Prior to the introduction of the tax, consumers' surplus was PoAE and 
producers' surplus was FPoE. After the introduction of the tax, 
consumers' surplus falls to PgAB and whisky producers' surplus to 
FPnD. There is thus a gross loss from the tax of PnpgBED. But if what 
is provided by the tax revenue is of equal value to the revenue that 
pays for it, then the deadweight loss or excess burden to society is 
reduced to the shaded area BDE. I f the government services provided 
from the tax are worth more to the public there may not be quite such 
an excess burden. 
Where there are significant income effects, the calculation of the 
excess burden is slightly more complicated. In any final 
determination of excess burden, concern should focus only on the 
substitution effect of the price change, because income effects will 
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cancel out if the government spends the money raised by the tax. 
This is shown in Figure 5.2, which is Figure 5.1 with the addition of 
a compensated demand curve Dc. 
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Dc shows the amount of whisky that would be purchased by consumers who 
are continuously compensated for the income effects of price 
changes. If a tax raised the price paid by consumers from Po to Pg, 
and if the revenue raised were used to compensate consumers, the 
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consumers would remain on their compensated demand curves. In these 
circumstances, they would reduce their consumption of whisky from Qo 
to Qs, and the excess burden would be the shaded area GEH, manifestly 
less than BED. Thus using ordinary demand curves overstates the 
excess burden, but if income effects are small, the differences in 
the two measures could be ignored. 23 
It will also be readily apparent from Figures 5.1 & 5.2 that the 
incidence of the tax is shared between consumers and producers. In a 
partial equilibrium setting, incidence analysis simply involves the 
application of general price theory to taxation. Demand schedules 
for untaxed goods and related factor supply schedules are assumed to 
remain unchanged. 
In a profit-maximising competitive world - and, except for extreme 
circumstances, in monopoly situations too - the direction and extent 
of an excise-induced price change, the incidence and excess burden 
thus depends upon the demand and supply elasticities of the taxed 
commodi ty. The general rule is that the more elastic the supply and 
the more inelastic the demand, the greater the amount of the excise 
borne by the consumer relative to the producer. Thi s appears 
logical, since with elastic supply the producer can readily leave the 
industry, and with inelastic demand, the consumer is less able to 
turn to alternative goods. Generally, it is assumed that supply is 
the more elastic, particularly in the longer-run, and therefore, a 
forward shifting of the tax to consumers is considered the more 
plausible outcome. 
Modern incidence theory attempts to account for all changes in real 
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income. In a general equilibrium setting, the effects of a tax on 
households are examined both in their role as consumers of goods and 
services - the income-uses side of the budget - and that of suppliers 
of factors of services - the income-sources side. 24 Calculating the 
extent of the excess burden thus becomes more problematic. 
The superiority of an income tax over specific excise taxes, such as 
those levied upon alcohol, is illustrated more formally below, in 
both a partial and general equilibrium setting. A partial approach 
to the problem confines itself to the effects of the taxes on the 
choice which a typical consumer makes between the two goods, as 
opposed to a more general analysis of a simple economic system. In 
both instances, it is assumed that perfect competition prevails, 
that there are no external effects and that a Pareto-efficient 
allocation of resources pertains before either tax is imposed. The 
supply of the factors of production is fixed, and these factors are 
fully employed both before and after either the income tax or the 
excise tax is imposed. 
To abstract the analysis from distributional considerations, each 
individual will be assumed to be the same, that is to have the same 
income and tastes. Nei ther tax involves any administrative or 
compliance costs, the same amount of revenue has to be raised 
whichever tax is used, and the pattern of government spending is the 
same in both cases. The taxes will be applied to a simple two-good 
(alcohol & soft drinks) model. Finally, the choice of tax is between 
a specific excise tax, which is levied upon alcohol, but not upon soft 
drinks, and a proportional income tax which is levied on all 
incomes. 25 
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Figure 5.3: Indifference Curve Analysis of an Income Tax/Specific 
Excise Tax: Partial Equilibrium 
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Source: James & Nobes, The Economics of Taxation 
Figure 5.3 represents the position of a typical individual with a 
choice of consuming different combinations of alcohol and soft 
drinks. Before either tax is imposed, and with a given money income, 
the individual faces a budget constraint ofAB, which shows that he 
could consume a maximum of B of alcohol or A of soft drinks, or some 
combination of alcohol and soft drinks. The slope of AB reveals the 
relative prices of alcohol and soft drinks. The consumer's 
preferences are represented by a set of indifference curves, each of 
which is a locus of the combinations of alcohol and soft drinks 
between which the individual is indifferent. If the consumer wishes 
to maximise the benefits he derives from consumption, he will choose 
that combination of alcohol and soft drinks which enables him to 
reach his highest possible indifference curve, given his budget 
constaint. Without either tax the highest attainable indifference 
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curve is II, and so the individual will consume at point Pl. 
A specific excise tax levied upon alcohol has the effect of shifting 
the consumer's budget constraint from AB to AC. It must swivel in 
this way because, if the individual consumed only soft drinks, he 
wOuld be able to buy the same amount as before. The increase in the 
slope of the budget constraint signifies an increase in the relative 
price of alcohol. Given a budget· constraint of AC, the highest 
attainable indifference curve is now 12. The difference between the 
levels of benefit derived at PIon indifference curve II and at P2 on 
indifference curve 12 represents the amount the consumer is worse off 
as a result of the tax. 
If an income tax is imposed instead, the effect is also to shift the 
budget constraint inwards. The income tax does not distort the 
consumer's choice between alcohol and soft drinks, and so their 
relative prices must remain the same. Therefore, the new budget 
constraint DE must be parallel to AB. The tax simply reduces his 
income so that he can afford less of both. As the income tax is 
required to raise the same revenue as the excise tax, DE will pass 
through P2, so that the individual is left with sufficient income to 
be able to buy the same combination of goods, irrespective of the tax 
to which he is subjected. However, with a budget constraint of DE he 
can attain the higher indifference curve of 13. 
Clearly the consumer is better off on 13 than 12. On the basis of the 
assumptions enunciated, therefore, an income tax inflicts less 
excess burden on the taxpayer than does a specific excise tax of equal 
yield, because it interferes less with consumer choice and the 
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allocation of resources. 
The foregoing argument depends upon the indirect tax being imposed 
upon alcohol but not on soft drinks. If the tax were levied on both 
~OOdS, the analysis would be the same as that for an income tax. The 
crucial point is that the excess burden of a tax depends on the extent 
to which the tax distorts the price mechanism. This result suggests 
that a tax system with a broad base is likely to impose less excess 
burden than one with a narrow base. If the collection of the tax is 
spread over a large number of goods and activi ties, then generally it 
will interfere less with consumer choice than if taxes were 
concentrated on a smaller area of the economy.26 
In the case of alcohol duties, it can be seen that a system which 
taxes all beverages equally merely induces substitution between 
alcohol and untaxed goods such as food, but discriminatory taxation 
between categories of alcohol (as exists between spiri ts and wine for 
instance), will induce substitution of the type illustrated 
above. 
The general equlibrium approach is not limited to the consumption 
side of the economy: it also includes the production of goods. The 
simple two-commodity model of alcohol and soft drinks is retained, 
and it continues to be assumed that each individual is the same and 
has the same income and expenditure patterns. 
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Figure 5.4: Indifference Curve Analysis of an Income Tax/Specific 
Excise Tax: General Equilibrium 
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TT in Figure 5.4 represents the production possibility frontier and 
shows the combinations of alcohol and soft drinks which can be 
produced. It is concave to the origin because the production of 
alcohol and soft drinks is subject to diminshing returns. The slope 
of TT at any point represents the social opportunity cost of 
producing each good in terms of the other. The highest indifference 
curve attainable by the individual is 11 I 1 I which means that his most 
preferred combination of alcohol and Soft drinks is the point Cl. 
ThiS is also the point which maximiseS profit for producerS and is 
economically efficient. 
At Cl , the tangent to both TT and 1111 is the line PP , the Slope of 
which repreSents the initial relative price of alcohol and Soft 
drinks in terinS of each other. This saine price ratio inticHly faces 
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both producers and consumers. Finally, as an additional simplifying 
assumption, is it supposed that the tax revenue raised is shared out 
equally among the taxypayers. 
If a specific excise tax is imposed upon alcohol , its price will rise, 
and the relative price ratio will become steeper as shown, for 
example, by P'P'. As a result consumers buy less alcohol but more 
soft drinks. But because the tax revenue is redistributed among 
consumers, the representative individual is not forced inside the 
production frontier. However, given the new relative price ratio, 
the highest attainable indifference curve is now 1212. Producers 
still face the real opportunity cost of producing soft drinks in 
terms of alcohol. This is shown by the price ratio represented by the 
slope of QQ. It is only the prices between producers and consumers 
that have been distorted. 
However, a wedge has been driven between the price paid by the 
consumer for alcohol and that received by the producer. Again, 
consumers have substituted away from consuming alcohol as though the 
higher price were the result of a higher social opportunity cost of 
production, whereas it is only a result of the tax. As the tax 
revenue is redistributed to taxpayers, the difference in benefit 
between IIII and 1212 is the excess burden of the specific excise 
tax. 
Contrast this result with that of an income tax. Under the previous 
assumptions such a tax would not affect the relative prices facing 
consumers. Also, because the tax is returned to taxpayers, the 
representative individual could continue to attain IIII. 
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It follows, therefore, that in these circumstances the income tax 
imposes no excess burden. So from both the partial and general 
equilibrium approaches it is possible to conclude that a specific 
excise tax has a greater excess burden than an income tax. 27 
But modifications of the excess burden theorem are required if the 
assumption of a fully competitive equilibrium is relaxed. The 
traditional doctrine must also be modified if market failures are 
interpreted to include situations in which the production or 
consumption of certain goods gives rise to external economies or 
diseconomies not accounted for in market prices. In these cases, 
private benefits or costs differ from social benefits or costs, and 
it may be argued that an excise (or subsidy) aimed at closing the gap 
may move the economy closer to optimum conditions. 28 This argument 
has particular relevance in the context of the externalities 
associated with alcohol consumption, a subject explored further in 
Section 5.5. 
For the present purposes it will be assumed that in general, 
commodi ty taxes are a second best al ternati ve to a more general sales 
or income tax. But as Figure 5.5 indicates, when elasticities are 
high, tax receipts tend to be lower and excess burden higher than when 
elasticities are low. Both graphs have the same original price and 
quantity and the same tax. The difference in the shaded areas shows 
the difference in excess burden associated with the different 
elastici ties. This suggests that unit taxes should tend to be 
concentrated on goods with low demand and/or supply 
elasticities. 29 
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Figure 5.5: A Comparison of Excess Burden with Differing 
Elasticities 
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This theory was first propogated by Frank P Ramsey (1927) following 
its proposal to him by A C Pigou. Ramsey concluded: II If some 
commodi ties only are to be taxed, then that should be taxed which has 
the least elasticity of demand, but if the supply of labour is 
absolutely inelastic, all the commodities should be taxed equally. II 
In general, excess burden is minimised if consumption falls 
proportionately to demand elasticities when the supply of labour is 
fixed, and if consumption falls equiproportionately when the supply 
of labour is variable. 30 
The Ramsey, or Inverse Elasticity Rule, is discussed in detail in 
Baumol & Bradford (1970).31 It has often been used to justify high 
rates of duty on alcohol, for which demand has traditionally deemed 
to be inelastic. But evidence presented in Chapter 7.5 on own-price 
elasticities suggests that the commonly-held view as to the 
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inelasticity of demand for alcoholic beverages is misplaced. 
In addi tion, most studies of price elasticity in the alcoholic drinks 
market have concurred that beer is significantly more price 
inelastic than either wine or spirits. Hence the inverse elasticity 
rule suggests that beer should be taxed at a higher rate than either 
wine or spirits (the reverse of the present situation in the United 
Kingdom). But to minimise the loss of efficiency on the supply side, 
commodities need be taxed at the same rate in so far as they are 
competitive in consumption. So, although according to the Ramsey 
formulation, taxes on commodities (such as beer) with a relatively 
low elastici ty of demand do less damage than taxes at the same rate on 
commodities with a high elasticity (wine & spirits), excess burden 
occurs still because of the substitution induced by variations 
between rates of duty on these different commodities. 
ii) Sumptuary Considerations 
The notion that alcohol is a 'luxury' product has encouraged the 
application of special duties on sumptuary grounds. With this in 
mind, Corlett & Hague (1953) extended the Ramsey Rule and suggested 
that when there are two commodities, efficient taxation requires 
taxing the commodity that is complementary to leisure at a relatively 
high rate. If it were possible to tax leisure, an optimum result 
would be obtainable - revenues could be raised wi th no excess burden. 
Although the tax authorities cannot tax leisure, they can tax goods 
that tend to be consumed jointly with leisure, indirectly lowering 
the demand for leisure. If alcohol is taxed at a very high rate, 
people consume less alcohol and spend less time at leisure. Taxing 
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complements to leisure at high rates thus provides an indirect way to 
tax leisure, and, hence, move closer to the perfectly efficient 
outcome that would be possible if leisure were taxable. 32 
It is readily apparent that there is a fundamental contradiction 
inherent in the arguments advanced for the special taxation of 
alcohol. If the thrust of policy is to tax alcohol heavily so as to 
reduce its consumption, in so far as behaviour is influenced, excess 
burden is correspondin.gly larger; if excess burden is small, so is 
the reduction in consumption, and the sumptuary purpose of the tax is 
not fulfilled. 33 
The Corlett-Hague rule has been extended to include a sumptuary tax 
on any commodity considered a I luxury I, for which demand is deemed to 
be inelastic. In his Excise Systems (1977), Cnossen refers to the 
results of a fairly detailed study in the Uni ted States in 1965, which 
found that retail price changes on luxury goods generally equaled the 
excise increase, presumably because related price elasticities of 
demand were low and supply elasticities large in the relevant range 
of output of the taxed products. Hence excess burden was minimised 
and the incidence of the tax largely borne by consumers. 34 
But Cnossen refers to a study undertaken more than 30 years ago, when 
leisure was at a much higher premium, and the market for goods & 
services associated with leisure was undoubtedly less competitive. 
It was noted above that the widespread belief as to the inelasticity 
of demand for alcoholic beverages is misplaced. Indeed, recent 
empirical evidence, also from the United States, suggests that even 
for luxuries such as yachts, demand is fairly elastic. As part of the 
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budget agreement reached with the Democrat-controlled Congress in 
1990, President Bush imposed a sumptuary tax upon yachts. The 
deleterious effects upon the Maine boatbuilders were a significant 
factor in his losing this normally conservative state in the 1992 
election. 
Another problem with the Ramsey Rule is that price elasticities of 
demand vary over time and place and their computation is subject to a 
wide margin of error. The supply of labour may not be significantly 
variable in the context of changes in the rates of duty on part;i.cular 
commodities such as alcohol and tobacco; and if it were significantly 
variable, it might either expand in response to an increase in duty in 
order to maintain consumption or contract because untaxed leisure 
had become more competitive with the commodities subject to 
duty. 35 
The Ramsey Rule implies that indirect taxes should be levied on other 
goods for which demand is price inelastic. As this is often a 
feature of products such as food which form a high proportion of the 
income of low income households, a uniform application of the Ramsey 
Rule might result in a highly regressive system of taxation, which 
wpuld cause a proportionately greater reduction in the welfare of 
poorer households. This interpretation has been demonstrated more 
formally by Deaton (1981), under the assumption of weak separability 
of preferences. Such a policy would not be likely to command support 
on equity grounds. 36 
In sum, therefore, any discriminatory tax on a particular good or 
service faces the dilemma that taxes on luxuries (with elastic 
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demand) increase excess burden and thus the loss of economic welfare, 
whereas taxes on necessities (with inelastic demand) fall 
disproportionately on the poor and are thus regressive. 
The inequitable nature of this outcome is a reflection of the single-
household assumption: the objective function of the maximisation 
does not care about equity and the solution reflects only efficiency 
cri teria. Extending the single-household economy of the Ramsey Rule 
to incorporate additional non-identical households introduces 
equity considerations into the determination of the optimal tax 
rates. The principal paper in this area is Diamond & Mirrlees (1971) 
in which was presented the first integrated analysis of this issue. 
Other important references are Diamond (1975) and Mirrlees (1975). 
The value of the Ramsey Rule is therefore primarily in providing a 
framework and method of analysis that can easily be generalised to 
more relevant settings. 37 
iii) Equity 
It is widely held that taxes should bear some relationship to abili ty 
to pay. Taxes should be comparable for people in the same economic 
position (horizontal equity), but different for people in different 
economic circumstances (vertical equity). Horizontal equity may be 
associated with the concept of equal treatment before the law. 
Vertical equity, on the other hand, is related to the income 
redistribution function of the tax system that lessens differences 
in primary distribution caused by the market mechanism; it is 
associated with progressive taxation. 
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The excise base is a poor indicator of taxpaying ability. Given the 
same income, excises discriminate on the basis of the consumption or 
use of particular goods or services, and thus the burden of excises 
depends upon consumption patterns. Hence, excises flout the 
principle of horizontal equity. 38 This can be seen in the case of the 
present structure of alcohol duties in the United Kingdom; 
differential rates of taxation between beverages implies that 
consumers with identical income patterns but alternative drinking 
preferences are not treated equally. 
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that alcohol duties in the 
Uni ted Kingdom are at variance with the principle of vertical equity 
as well. Consumption accounts for a higher proportion of the income 
of low income households, 39 as illustrated in Figure 5.6. 
Figure 5.6:Expenditure on Alcohol as % of Household Weekly Income 
1993 
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Source: Pieda PIc, Overtaxing Our British Spirit 
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The most recent evidence extracted from the Family Expenditure 
Survey and depicted in Figure 5.7, shows that beer and spirits have 
much the same consumption profile when analysed against income 
category, whilst wine consumption is concentrated in higher income 
groups. 
Figure 5.7: % Alcoholic Drinks Expenditure Devoted to Each Category: 
According to Household Weekly Income, 1993 
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In the light of this evidence, vertical equity arguments for high 
duties on alcohol in general are dubious, and even if they were to be 
the basis for alcohol taxation, would suggest taxing spirits and beer 
on the same basis and discriminating against wine. Equity is more 
appropriately secured by progressive inceme taxes than specific 
commodity taxes, a point made by John Kay & Michael Keen in Sijbren 
Cnossen's (1987) Tax Co-ordination in the European Community: 
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It is clear that excise taxation is an extremely blunt instrument with which to 
pursue distributional objectives;' while it is only in special cases that 
commodity taxes have been shown to be superfluous (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1976) one 
would certainly expect income tax transfer schemes to be a more powerful device 
that alcohol taxation, particularly in view of the heterogeneity of consumers' 
preferences towards these goods. Distributional considerations may be relevant 
in some less developed countries with creaky institutions and unsophisticated 
income taxes; they should be given little weight in the EC. 40 
Professor Sijbren Cnossen, whose Excise Systems is still the most 
authorative work on the theory and practice of excise duties in most 
of the countries of the world, concludes on similar lines: 
There appears to be less potential for progressive excise taxation in high-income 
countries ... on the whole, they [excises] do not appear to be very progressive in 
high-income countries. 41 
iv) Convenience 
Convenience was proposed by Adam Smi th as one of the criteria by which 
to judge taxation: "All nations have endeavoured, to the best of 
their judgement, to render their taxes ... as convenient to the 
contributor, both in time and in the mode of payment.. as is 
possible." In this respect at least, the system of bonded warehouses 
facilitates economical collection of alcohol duties. But if 
convenience were the basis for alcohol excises, then the tax could be 
levied on any number of commodities. Even if convenience were 
accepted as an appropriate basis for alcohol taxation, such a tax 
should be comparable across all alcoholic drinks. There is no reason 
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to believe that collection costs are higher for spirits than for wine 
and beer. 
v) Revenue 
In the foregoing discussion of an efficient tax system, it was 
concluded that excise taxes were an inferior al ternative to a general 
sales tax or income tax. The existence of negative externalities 
associated with alcohol consumption, discussed further in the 
Section 5.5, qualifies this general principle in welfare terms, but 
does not do so in respect of a purely revenue-raising rationale for 
alcohol duties. 
As was argued in Section 5.2, the specific taxation of alcohol and 
other commodities in the United Kingdom was originally a convenient 
method for governments to raise revenues, at a time when the vast 
majori ty of the population did not pay income tax. Writing in 1776, 
Adam Smith observed that "taxes upon consumable commodities owe 
their origin to the impossibility of taxing the people, according to 
their revenue, by any capitation. 1142 
The growth of the temperance movement in the 19th century, epitomized 
by Liberal politicians such as Gladstone and Lloyd George, ensured 
that whilst commodi ty taxation in general fell out of favour, alcohol 
was to continue to be a candidate for special taxation. The existence 
at the close of the 20th century of a highly developed tax & benefit 
system, which is able to equate direct taxes much more equitably to 
ability to pay than indirect taxation, has rendered the revenue-
raising rationale for alcohol taxes much less relevant. 
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vi) Production Bases & Regional Specialities 
In the overall context of alcohol taxation, discriminatory taxation 
against spirits was justified in a Working Document by some Members 
of the European Parliament by reference to the nature of the 
production process: 
The production of alcohol by natural fermentation, a slower and more costly 
process, cannot be compared with the production of alcohol by distillation, an 
industrial process. It is therefore impossible, as much for technical reasons as 
for economic and social reasons, to encompass all alcoholic beverages in a single 
tax bracket, however tempting this solution might appear. 
This argument implies that beverages which are costly to produce 
deserve favourable tax treatment in order to compete in the market 
place with other beverages. Such reasoning could also be made to 
apply to a vast range of commodities, favouring luxury goods as 
compared to low cost products. Such, a system would be regressive in 
nature and would run counter to the ~rinciple that the cost of 
production should be reflected in retail prices in order to ensure 
the economic use of available resources. 
In the same Working Document 
exceptional treatment may be 
considered to be: 
the view is also expressed that 
justified where the beverage is 
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Difficult to produce and subject to stringent production standards and rigorous 
inspection ... leaving aside the regional and social aspects of the production of 
natural sweet wines, the disappearance of regional specialities, which owe more 
to agriculture than to industry, would not be in the interests of the consumers, 
because their choice, far from being widened, would be reduced. 43 
A year previously, a similar resolution had also been passed by the 
European Parliament: 
The harmonisation of taxes on wine, beer and alcohol (including spiri tous 
beverages) ... should take into account the economic and social aspects of the 
manufacture of these products, particularly as regards their importance for the 
less favoured regions of the Community. 
Devoid of their spurious reasoning, these resolutions are nothing 
less than a plea for exceptional treatment of certain regions. 
Regional specialities reflect consumer preferences, and will 
continue to exist so long as these preferences persist, without the 
need for the social engineering implicit in these arguments. 44 
Marginal regions should be supported overtly by regional policy, and 
not surreptitiously by consumer taxation. 
Even if these arguments concerning production bases and regional 
speciali ties were valid they would not constitute a reason for 
discrimination against all distilled products. Scotch whisky is 
subject to a long period of maturation, which in terms of duration and 
cost is not inherently different from the ageing of wine. As the 
appellation 'Scotch' signifies, it is also the archetypal regional 
speciality and a product which is of critical economic and social 
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significance to agricultural communities which are amongst the most 
rural and marginal in Europe. 45 Over 90% of Scotch whisky production 
takes place in areas that have been recognized by the European Union 
as eligible for Regional Fund Assistance. 
The special taxation of alcohol cannot, therefore, be justified in 
efficiency, Sumptuary, equity, convenience, regional or indeed any 
economic terms. This leaves just one argument ~ that of negative 
externali ties associated with alcohol consumption - which may 
commend high alcohol excises. It is to health and social welfare 
considerations that attention now turns. 
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5.5 The Rationale for Alcohol Taxation: Externalities 
Beying moderately taken, it cutteth fleurne, it lighteneth the mynd, it quickeneth 
the spirits, it cureth the hydropsie, it healeth the straguary, it pounceth the 
stone, it repelleth gravel, it puffeth away ventositie, it kepyth and preserveth 
the hed from whyrling, the eyes from dazelying, the tongue from lispying, the 
mouth from snafflying, the teeth from chatterying, the throte from rattlying, the 
weasan from stieflying, the stomach from wornblying, the harte from swelling, the 
bellile from wirtching, the guts from rurnblying, the hands from shivering, the 
sinoews from shrinkying, .the veynes from crurnplying, the bones from akying, the 
marrow from soakying, and truly it is a sovereign liquor if it be ordlie 
taken. 
Raphael Holinshead (1577) compiler of The Chronicles of England, Scotland & 
Ireland on the virtues & qualities of usque baugh. Emphasis added. 
If a body could just find oot the exac' proper proportion and quantity that ought 
to be drunk every day, and keep to that, I verily trow that he might leeve for 
ever, without dying at a', and that doctors and kirkyards would go oot 0' 
fashion. 
James Hogg 
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Moderation, Sir, aye moderation is my rule. Nine or ten is reasonable 
refreshment, but aifter that it's apt to degenerate intae drinkin! 
A serious-minded Scot defining the subtle divide between sufficiency and excess 
in Derek Cooper The Whisky Roads of Scotland 
L'abus d'alcohol est dangereux pour la sante: consommez avec moderation. 
The abuse of alcohol is dangerous to health: consume with moderation. 
'Moderation statement' required for all alcoholic beverage advertising in 
France. 
Many people enjoy drinking and the social occasions alcohol 
accompanies. It has been suggested that when drunk in moderate 
amounts, alcohol reduces the risk of cardiovascular disease and 
relieves stress in a wide range of age groups. It also provides 
calories wi thout fat and several trace elements such as copper which, 
though essential for the smooth running of the heart, are in short 
supply in convenience diets. 46 
The notion that the moderate consumption of alcohol may actually have 
a salutary affect on health was given notoriety in November 1991 when 
the CBS 60 minutes program introduced Americans to the I French 
paradox I, the premise of which was that the French have a low 
incidence of heart disease, despite having a high fat diet and being 
the world I S heaviest drinkers (12.6 Ii tres of alcohol at 100% alcohol 
by volume per capi ta, compared wi th 7 Ii tres in the United Kingdom). 
In the wake of this revelation, red wine sales in the United States 
nearly doubled in the following nine months. 47 
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It would appear that the 'French paradox' has received official 
sanction in the form of the latest guidelines on sensible drinking 
issue by the Department of Health, which revised upwards the 
suggested safe weekly levels of intake of alcohol from 21 to 28 units 
for men, and 14 to 21 units for women. Equally important was 
publication of the Government Working Group's View that the so-
called Ledermann theory that any rise in total consumption 
automatically brought a corresponding rise in misuse was 
unreliable. 48 
In the light of this evidence, a minority have questioned the 
efficacy of the traditional excise taxes on alcohol. Not 
surprisingly, the drinks industry frequently claims that the 
positive externalities of drinking are generally overlooked, and 
contends that that high taxes on alcohol hurt the innocent moderate 
drinker, without affecting the heavy drinkers that cause the 
problems. One Pieda brief has written: 
It is doubtful whether taxation policy is a sensible instrument for regulating 
alcohol consumption in the interests of health. For example, drink related 
health problems are much more common in the high consumption, wine producing 
member states of the EU than in the United Kingdom. However, in these member 
states there is a clear tendency for total alcohol consumption per capita to 
fall. As taxation on wine remains zero or minimal, the fall reflects education 
and changed life styles, and is not tax induced. 49 
In a tract published for the Adam Smith Institute entitled "A 
Disorderly House," Dr Barry Bracewell-Milnes argued: 
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Any such computations [as to the social costs of alcohol consumption] are open to 
challenge on statistical grounds and on grounds of causality - what is the 
relationship between the level of consumption and the resulting social losses? 
But they are more readily open to challenge on the grounds that they 
systematically omit all the relevant data on the other side of the account. 
A patient who dies prematurely as a result of heavy consumption of alcohol may 
save the Treasury a great deal of money through the reduction in payments for his 
state retirement pension and other social security payments; he may also 
substantially reduce his calIon private.pension funds. Both of these effects 
are benefits for the rest of society. Moreover, an individual who dies early as a 
result of drinking would otherwise have died eventually of something else, and 
there is no a priori reason for believing that the alcohol-related disease is 
more costly to treat than the alternative. 
This report argues that public finance theory shows no good reason for imposing 
excise duties on alcohol in an industrialised country. 50 
A European Parliament Resolution of January 1986 recommended that 
the Community should work towards: "The gradual and complete 
aboli tion ... of taxes on alcohol, since they are a relic of an 
undemocratic mentality." It would appear that The European 
Parliament disliked the apparent paternalism of government's 
attempts to control consumer choices. 51 John 0' Hagan (1983) has 
asserted: "There are very good reasons for abolishing special taxes 
on alcohol altogether."52 
0' Hagan believes that there is evidence to suggest that the dependent 
heavy drinker is well informed and empirically behaves in accordance 
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with rationality, {Room 1983)53, and suggested too that there may be 
few drinkers of legal age who are unaware of the fact that serious 
private costs could follow from excessive alcohol consumption. 
Courts in the United Kingdom and North America have not accepted 
dependence on alcohol as an exception to their general assumption of 
rationality on the part of citizens and criminals. 
concluded: 
O'Hagan has 
If misuse of alcohol is but a symptom and not the cause of the problem [of 
alcoholism], it could be argued that attacking the source (eg home baCkground, 
unemployment) is the more appropriate solution for alcohol abuse. Legislative 
methods (eg drink-driving laws) and educational programs (eg public information 
on the consequences of alcohol abuse) are direct and, if properly formulated, 
should therefore be much more discriminatory and fairer than taxes as a means of 
curbing excessive use of alcohol. 
A high tax policy for control purposes could also have alarming distributional 
effects - resulting simply, perhaps, in a massive transfer of resources from the 
families of heavy drinkers, thereby worsening the problems it was supposed to 
have counteracted. 54 
But these arguments notwi thstanding, there would nonetheless appear 
to be a clear theoretical case for using alcohol taxation as an 
instrument of health policy. This is not to deny the value of the 
medical and informat ion campaigns that 0' Hagan advocates, but there 
is no reason to reject taxation as he and others have done. The 
justification relies on the widely-used economic concept of market 
failure. This holds that although in general a market system of 
resource allocation will maximise the welfare of a society, there are 
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instances in which a market does not function properly. There is a 
divergence between private and external costs, and the outcome is 
imperfect, in the sense that a different possible outcome would make 
at least some people better off, and make nobody worse off. 
Government intervention in the market might then be able to increase 
social welfare. 55 
A survey of the classification of various types of externality is 
provided in Baumol & Oates (1988)56, but in essence, the two major 
categories include those which define an externality by the reason 
for its existence and consequences, and the second, as in the case of 
alcohol, by its effects. In response to the non-optimality of the 
market equilibrium in the presence of externalities, a natural 
policy to adopt is the imposition of taxes to correct for 
distortions. Such taxes are often termed Pigouvian, following the 
work of A C Pigou (1920).57 
Market failure in the alcohol market is primarily the product of 
information deficiencies and the existence of negative 
externalities of consumption. It may be argued that the addictive 
nature of alcohol, or lack of information about the potential effects 
of alcohol consumption, prevents consumers from making well-
informed rational decisions. 58 How significant this lack of risk 
awareness is as a determinant of alcohol-related damage is not clear. 
However, a case can be made that the market does not provide 
sufficient information about the risks involved in heavy drinking: 
prices are distorted because of externalities, and explicit 
information as a commodity is not produced in sufficient quantity 
because of its public good character. 59 
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One interpretation of alcoholism is that chronic alcoholism 
interferes with the basic rationality postulate of consumer theory, 
in that an alcoholic is not free to choose whether or how much he will 
drink. As D Taylor (1983) has argued: 
Clinicians and others confronted with the appalling damage caused by the misuse 
of alcohol, not just in terms of accidents and physical ill-health, but with 
regard also to personality destruction and social decay, may feel strongly that 
most people have neither the experience nor the insight to judge its full 
costs. 
It is also argued that economists ignore the process by which 
J(references are formed. Preferences and behaviour, Taylor has 
argued, reflect a wide range of cultural and historical influences, 
and are "not simply the result of a constantly updated Benthamite 
calculus, carried out by the individual in isolation." so 
A varied range of policy measures are possible to redress the 
information deficiency problem; in addition to taxation, the 
government may wish to restrict the sale of alcohol by legislative 
I 
means. In particular, it may prevent certain sections of the 
population (typically the young) from buying alcohol at all. Other 
options include better health education, through which information 
about the likely costs and benefits of alcohol consumption may be 
made publicly known, and restrictions on alcohol advertising. s1 
Consumption of any alcoholic drink is likely to exceed the optimum 
level when negative externalities are taken into account, as 
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happened in the 18th century gin epidemic. Thus whilst the price 
mechanism can safely be left to reflect the cost of production, the 
tax system is needed to better reflect the social costs of 
consumption. 62 It has been estimated that at least three-quarters of 
a million people in the United Kingdom have drink related problems, 
and the most concerning aspect of this is the increase in problem 
drinking amongst women and younger people. 63 
The medical problems associated with excessive alcohol consumption 
include alcohol poisoning, cirrhosis of the liver, stomach ulcers, 
heart problems, and also alcohol-related illnesses. Social problems 
involve the (often related) affects of alcohol consumption upon 
other aspects of individual behaviour or on other people, and arise 
from drink-driving, hooliganism, assault, family breakdown and 
absenteeism from work. 64 
Heavy alcohol users as a group are thought commonly to have higher 
heal th care costs, creating external costs for moderate drinkers and 
abstainers. In effect, these raise the social cost of alcohol 
consumption above the private cost, thus justifying the imposition 
of a special tax on alcohol consumption which better equates private 
and social costs. 
Of especial pertinence to this thesis is the notion that alcohol 
consumed in certain forms is more likely to create external costs 
than alcohol in other forms, in particular that alcohol in less 
dilute forms, such as spirits, may be more quickly consumed than more 
dilute alcohol and dangerous levels of consumption thus more quickly 
reached. Moreover, casual observation suggests that many heavier 
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drinkers prefer spirits to other drinks, presumably owing to the more 
rapid consumption of alcohol possible with less dilute forms of 
alcohol. 
However, it cannot be concluded that extra consumption of a drink 
typically consumed by those who face the greatest alcohol problems 
imposes more costs on the rest of society than addi tional consumption 
of a different alcoholic drink: the social costs approach is 
concerned with the marginal effect of the extra consumption of 
alcoholic drinks. If the dilution of alcohol is considered to be 
important in imposing social costs, then the tax system should tax 
spiri ts more heavily, wine less so and impose the lowest duty level on 
beer.65 
As discussed in Section 5.3, the current structure of alcohol taxes 
in the United Kingdom to some extent taxes alcoholic drinks according 
to the quantity of pure alcohol that they contain. However, this 
principle of taxin.g according to alcoholic strength is applied only 
wi thin and not across different types of alcoholic drinks. On this 
basis, the current system of alcohol taxation discriminates heavily 
against spirits, to the considerable chagrin of The Scotch Whisky 
Association: 
Measure for standard measure, Scotch whisky contains equivalent amounts of 
alcohol to a glass of wine or a half pint of beer. There is no evidence to suggest 
that, when too much is taken, Scotch (or any spirit drink) is more harmful to 
health than any other alcoholic drink. It is the amount of alcohol consumed that 
matters, not the form in which it is taken, a point which the Government's 1995 
Report, "Sensible Drinking", has underlined. 66 
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No a priori rejection of the view that the social costs of 
concentrated alcohol are.greater than those of more dilute forms is 
possible; instead, empirical work is needed to assess the validi ty of 
this claim. Available medical evidence indicates that the 
consumption of alcohol in spirits is no more damaging to health than 
alcohol taken in any other alcoholic drink. It is the excessive 
intake of alcohol, whatever its form, which endangers health. A 
report in The Lancet in August 1991 found that liThe associations 
between alcohol from beer, wine or spirits with risk of coronary 
artery disease did not differ significantly. 1167 The French 
government has recognized: liThe harmful effects of alcohol are due 
to the amount consumed and not to the type of drink containing this 
alcohol or to its alcoholic strength." 6a . 
The Central Policy Review Staff reached a similar conclusion: 
No one drink is much more dangerous than another as to justify punitive taxation 
being imposed upon it, leaving other drinks relatively untouched. Those 
countries which have tried differential taxation of this kind have found that in 
the long run total consumption adjusts so that broadly similar amounts of alcohol 
will be consumed in other ways." 6 9 
The House of Commons Select Committee on Agricul ture concluded in its 
Fourth Report 1992/93: 
... that it would be sensible if alcoholic drinks were taxed according to their 
alcohol content rather than according to the product category in which they 
fall. 
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The Royal College of Physicians declared: "For all alcoholic drinks, 
it is the alcohol content that matters ... ", the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies are: " ... not aware of any evidence of a higher incidence of 
alcohol-related harm being caused by spirits than by any other form 
of alcohol ... " 70 
And The Royal College of Psychiatrists stated in a study entitled 
"Alcohol: Our Favourite Drug": 
It is alcohol content which matters, rather than the unique qualities of a 
particular drink ... the widespread belief. .. that only spirit drinkers become 
alcoholics ... is quite without foundation. 71 
As far as the evidence on drinking and driving is concerned, Wagenaar 
(1984), Berger & Snortum (1985) and Crooks (1989) conclude that there 
is no disproportionate effect from spirits drinking. Once again it 
would appear to be alcohol content which is the key factor. To the 
extent that there is a problem wi th any specific drink, the Minister 
for Roads & Traffic stated in 1989: "90% of road accidents are caused 
by people drinking beer,"72 possibly because a high proportion of 
beer is consumed through the on trade (in pubs), whereas most spirit 
consumption is through the off trade (at home). 
A study by the Department of Health and Social Security and the 
Scottish Home and Health Department, "Adolescent Drinking" (1988), 
claimed that the overwhelming majority of teenage drinkers are beer 
drinkers and that only a minori ty consume any wine or spirits. 78% of 
17 year old boys in England and Wales reported that when they drink 
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they consumed beer, cider or shandy "most of the time ", compared wi th 
only 1% for wine and 10% for spirits. 73 
On a calorific score, a pub measure (one unit) of Scotch contains 
about 55 cal, whilst a glass of wine contains from 80 to 115 cal, and a 
pint of bitter 180 cal. 74 Indeed, F A Whitlock, in his econometric 
study of male liver cirrhosis death rates and alcohol consumption in 
38 countries concluded that: 
If wine is drunk' as 'the principal alcoholic beverage, the hazard, in terms of 
cirrhosis, is greater than if beer or spirits are consumed. When the six 
countries having the highest per capita wine, beer and spirits consumption are 
compared, there is no significant difference in cirrhosis death rates between the 
beer and spirits drinking countries, whereas both are significantly lower than 
those rates in the wine-drinking countries. 75 
Given that it is the excessive consumption of alcohol, whatever the 
form, which creates the externality, there still remains the 
difficul ty of quantifying the role of alcohol consumption in causing 
particular health problems, such as liver disease, stomach ulcers, 
and heart disease. The estimates of alcohol related deaths in the 
United Kingdom vary from 4,000 per annum, in a study by the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists (1986) to 40,000 per annum in a study by the 
Royal College of General Practitioners (1986). 
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Ledermann's research in the 1950s suggested that there is a 
statistical relationship, across countries and across time, between 
per capita alcohol consumption and alcohol related illnesses. In 
more recent years, however, Ledermann's work has attracted severe 
methodological criticism. Jackson found, in his empirical work, 
that "very little of the variation in mortality rates between 
(European) countries can be explained in terms of variations in per 
capita alcohol consumption. None of his (Ledermann's) relationships 
were statistically significant." And as stated earlier, the 
Ledermann theory is regarded by the government's working group on 
alcoholism as unreliable. 
This is not to say that excessive consumption of alcohol over a long 
period does not result in medical problems like cirrhosis of the 
liver, and social problems such as absenteeism. Rather, that it is 
hard to establish a clear cut relationship between the amount of 
alcohol consumed and these problems. Still more, to establish the 
extent to which changes in taxes will impact on health related 
problems through reducing the consumption of persons with a high 
alcohol intake. 76 
There are also problems of valuation, as evidenced by the the wide 
variation in results reported by studies in the United Kingdom of the 
social costs of alcohol related harm. One of the best know of these 
is McDonnell & Maynard's (1985) estimate for 1983 77 • They calculated 
the cost of funding the health service, the cost to industry in terms 
of loss of output through absenteeism and other such variables, and 
estimated what proportion of these costs were alcohol related. They 
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estimated that in 1983 alcohol related costs were between £440m and 
£1.6 billion per annum, with a median estimate of £1.16 billion. The 
range itself indicates the degree of uncertainty involved. 
Accepting that there are medical and social costs associated with 
alcohol consumption, and if the rationale behind alcohol taxation 
is, as economic theory suggests, to account for the social costs 
which would not otherwise be reflected in the price of alcohol, then 
the appropriate level of taxation should correspond to the size of 
these costs for each drinker on each occasion. 
It would nevertheless be impossible to apply such a tax system, since 
this approach implies that different levels of tax should be applied 
to different persons, or for different situations~ The marginal 
social cost of consuming the fifth unit of alcohol may be different 
from consuming the first; the social cost of a teenager having one 
more extra pint of beer before going to a football match is unlikely 
to be equal to that of a middle-aged man having two glasses of wine 
with his dinner (the alcohol content being equivalent). Similarly, 
if it is true that women have a lower alcohol tolerance than men, a 
higher tax rate should be applied to female consumption than to that 
of males. 78 
Given that it is impossible to calculate all these variations in 
social cost, each unit of alcohol could be taxed according to the 
expected average social costs associated with its consumption. This 
could take the form of an 'insurance tax,' analogous to compulsory 
third party motor insurance: alcohol consumers as a group should meet 
all the costs of alcohol consumption. Insurance in this context is 
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being used in the sense that the tax on the drink can be regarded as a 
premium, which both increases as the individual's consumption 
increases and varies by type of alcohol consumed. 
Expected average social costs could be approximated by estimating 
total social costs for a previous year and dividing by that year's 
total alcohol consumption. In this manner, the total social costs of 
alcohol consumption are paid for by drinkers, with each drinker's 
contribution related in a very crude (although probably no cruder 
than in the case of motor insurance) way to costs imposed. 79 
Taxes should therefore be based upon the characteristic of the good 
that is related to the marginal harm caused. In the case of alcoholic 
drinks, this is usually taken as the quantity of alcohol they 
contain. If this is a correct indicator of likely harm, then alcohol 
duties should be related to the alcohol content and should not differ 
across different forms of consuming that alcohol. 8o If the present 
tax on beer and wine correctly reflects the social costs of consuming 
alcohol, then spirits are overtaxed. If these costs are correctly 
reflected by the tax on spirits, then beer and wine are too lightly 
taxed. 8 1 
Taking a high estimate of the total social cost of alcohol 
consumption, such as McDonnell & Maynard's £1.6 billion for 1983, 
and dividing by total alcohol consumption in the United Kingdom for 
the same year, results in a duty of £4 per litre of pure alcohol. This 
is significantly lower than the tax on all alcoholic drinks in 1983, 
which yielded some £3.9 billion, implying that the present level of 
alcohol duties greatly exceeds the rate necessary to account for an 
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estimate c·f the total social costs of alcohol consumption. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
This Chapter has examined the history of excise taxes on alcohol in 
the United Kingdom, and noted the influence of past prejudices 
against spirits upon the present duty structure, which taxes 
spirits, on a degree of alcohol basis, significantly more severely 
than either wine or beer. This anomaly, together with the rationale 
for special taxes on alcohol in general, was critically analysed in 
Sections 5.4 & 5.5, in the context of the various arguments that. have 
been advanced for alcohol excises. 
Close scrutiny in .Section 5.4 revealed most of these propositions to 
be wanting. Alcohol, including spirits, is no more a sumptuary good 
than many other products that are regarded as non-essential to life. 
Chapter 7.5 reveals that the own-price elasticity of demand for 
alcohol, especially spirits, is significantly more elastic than 
generally assumed, so there is no convincing argument in terms of 
efficiency for alcohol taxation. Nor of equity, as high excises 
impact disproportionately upon poorer households, who are also more 
likely to consume beer & spirits than wine. The special pleading for 
discrimination in favour of fermented beverages and peripheral wine 
producing regions was dismissed as thinly disguised 
protectionism. 
The health and welfare issues associated with alcohol consumption 
were examined in some depth in Section 5.5, utilizing the familiar 
tool of externalities to determine the cost to society of alcohol 
abuse. No convincing justification for higher taxes on spirits was 
discovered, as the externalities were related to the volume of 
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alcohol consumed, regardless of the form. This suggests that an 
ideal system of excise duties would seek to determine the total 
social cost of alcohol consumption, and then charge the average cost 
on each degree of pure alcohol consumed in a given year. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in any analysis of this 
kind, even a generous figure for the estimated total social cost of 
alcohol consumption would not justify the current level of excise 
duties in the United Kingdom. To this extent, the raison d'etre for 
alcohol excises in the United Kingdom would appear to be 
overwhelmingly to raise revenue for the government, an observation 
supported by this assertion of former Chancellor Nigel Lawson: 
I cannot subscribe to the view that health and social implications are the most 
important factors in determining the duties on alcoholic drinks ... the primary 
purpose of the duties is to raise revenue for the Government. 
This Chapter has attempted to marshal arguments which suggest this 
view is misplaced. The next two Chapters further contend that this 
attitude on the part of the United Kingdom government is no longer 
tenable in the context of the Single European· Market and the 
harmonisation of alcohol excises in the European Union. 
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CHAPTER 6: PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES III: HARMONISATION OF ALCOHOL 
EXCISES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
6.1 Introduction 
There are many things so many of us want to achieve ... sometimes there has to be a 
little bit of give-and-take. But once you get people together and have a nice 
stiff glass of whisky, you actually find you can come to an enormous degree of 
agreement about what is required. 
His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales 
This Chapter examines the European market for alcoholic beverages, . 
in the context of the most recent proposals of the European 
Conunission I s for the harmonisation of excise duties in Europe. 
Section 6.2 analyses the production and consumption of alcohol in the 
different European nations, whilst Section 6.3 examines the existing 
structure of alcohol excises in the EU. Section 6.4 seeks to 
determine whether there is price-sensitive competition between the 
different categories of beverage, as if there is then the widely 
varying structure and levels of excises across Europe will 
materially disrupt the free operating of the market for alcoholic 
products. 
Section 6.5 details the history of attempts to approximate indirect 
taxation in Europe, and the efforts of European institutions such as 
the Court of Justice to mitigate the more flagrant violations of the 
European treaties that have sought to establish a Single Market. The 
most recent proposals on the harmonisation of alcohol excises are 
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critically appraised in Section 6.6, and their example on nations 
outwith the EU considered. Alternative proposals to indirect tax 
harmonisation are considered in Section 6.7. 
concludes. 
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Section 6.8 
6.2 Production & Consumption of Alcohol in The European Union 
The northern nations are more addicted to the use of strong liquors than the 
southern, in order to supply by art the want of that genial warmth of blood the 
sun produces. 
James Boswell (1807) in The Journal of A Tour to the Hebrides 
Significant differences in patterns of both alcohol consumption & 
production exist within the European Union. This can be seen from 
Table 6.1, which details per capi ta consumption of the three 
principal categories of alcoholic beverage in eleven member states 
in 1989. 
Table 6.1: Per Capita Consumption of Alcohol for Eleven Member States 
1989 (Litres of pure alcohol) 
Nation Wines Beers Spirits Total 
France 8.88 2.04 2.40 13.32 
Luxembourg 7.37 3.58 1.57 12.52 
Spain 5.66 3.56 2.80 12.02 
Germany (FRG) 2.63 5.72 2.05 10.40 
Portugal 6.36 3.19 0.80 10.35 
Belgium 3.12 5.55 1.24 9.91 
Denmark 2.30 5.92 1.37 9.60 
Italy 7.67 1.08 0.75 9.50 
Netherlands 1. 78 4.55 1.92 8.25 
United Kingdom 1.40 4.08 1. 75 7.23 
Irish Republic 0.50 3.61 1.70 5.82 
Source: Pieda, Competition Between Alcoholic Drinks 
Most of the differences between countries observable in Table 6.1 may 
be explained by a high (but decreasing) propensity to enhance food 
with wine in southern member states, and the high propensity to 
prefer beer for all needs in northern member states. 1 
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Widely differing characteristics in the production of beer, wines 
and spiri ts across the European Union are also notable. In the Uni ted 
Kingdom, brewing & distilling are for the most part conducted in 
large scale plants, where sizeable economies of scale exist. Both 
industries are relatively highly concentrated, with sales dominated 
by a handful of powerful entrerprises. The brewing sector is also 
notable for a high degree of vertical integration, with a 
substantial proportion of licensed premises owned by the regional 
brewing concerns. 
Two distilling companies, Allied Domecq and Diageo, and a brewer, 
Bass, are among the 40 largest industrial companies in the United 
Kingdom. The two spirits producers are, alongside Canada I s Seagram, 
the largest sellers in world markets. The United Kingdom is the 
largest spirits producer in the EU, producing almost twice as much 
spiri t as France and three times as much as Germany. Moreover, the 
Uni ted Kingdom is the only Member State where spirits production is 
greater than beer and wine production in absolute alcohol terms. 
In contrast to brewing & distilling in the United Kingdom, the most 
conspicuous feature of continental European wine production is, in 
the words of a European Parliament Working Paper, that its methods 
"owe more to agriculture than to industry." This is not just because 
the main raw material input is a crop - this is also true of beer and 
spirit production - but because wine-making is characterized by 
small scale independent production in rural, often 'impoverished, 
areas. The EC I S Farm Accountancy Data Network, a survey of European 
Agriculture, shows that the average size of a wine growing farm was 
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just 9 hectares (22 acres) in 1986. By comparison, the average size 
of farms in the Uni ted Kingdom is 147 hectares. It is estimated that 
perhaps as many as 10 per cent of France's population is involved with 
the production and distribution of wine. 
In common with most other European agricul tural producer groups, the 
wine industry wields considerable political influence. Wine 
producers' incomes are supported by the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) through price maintenance intervention, and often also by 
domestic tax systems that favour wine-drinking. 2 By contrast, 
whisky, classified as an industrial as opposed to an agricultural 
product, has received no support from the CAP to resolve the problem 
of excess stocks known colloquially as the 'whisky loch;' the annual 
cost to the industry of financing such surplus stocks, based upon an 
interest rate of 8%, could well be as much as £200m. 3 
Arguably the most appropriate method of supporting low-income rural 
communities is by direct grants, not by subsidising them indirectly 
through excise taxation. This merely distorts the effective 
functioning of the market for alcoholic beverages, a subject 
discussed in more detail in Section 6.3. But the political power of 
the agricultural lobby makes reform unlikely. This political 
influence was made manifest in a European context in the negotiations 
for tax rate harmonisation in 1992, a matter that will be examined in 
Section 6.5. 
Scotch whisky therefore faces great difficulty competing in a wine 
dominated European Union, a difficulty which is compounded by a 
structure of alcohol excises in every European country that 
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discriminates against spirits in favour of wine and beer. National 
vinicultures are further protected by rate structure distinctions 
between wine from fresh grapes and fruits, ordinary and fortified 
wines, and still and sparkling wines. 4 
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6.3 The Existing Structure of Alcohol Excises in the European 
Union 
Table 6.2 quantifies the current level of alcohol excises in the 
European Union, European Economic Area, and Switzerland. 
Table 6.2: Alcohol Excises in the European Union, Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland as at April 1st 1996. Denoted in EeUs Per 
Hectolitre of Pure Alcohol 
Spirits Intermediate Wines Beer Additional 
Alcohol by Products Taxes 
Volume 40% 18% 11% 5% 
Austria 755 294 nil 362 Yes 
Belgium 1641 388 346 381 No 
Denmark 3980 750 817 883 Yes 
Finland 5327 4932 2744 3018 Yes 
France 1398 1200 31 193 Yes 
Germany 1355 295 nil 205 No 
Greece 801 260 nil 314 Yes 
Ireland 2688 2134 2408 1927 No 
Italy 522 252 nil 321 Yes 
Luxembourg 1085 388 nil 207 No 
Netherlands 1573 495 464 445 No 
Portugal 762 254 nil 280 Yes 
Spain 560 255 nil 168 No 
Sweden 5316 2710 2672 2609 No 
United Kingdom 2388 1225 1543 1306 No 
Iceland 6501 6027 5479 3789 Yes 
Norway 7452 7355 3865 4401 Yes 
Switzerland 3827 1056 nil 321 No 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Association 
It is readily apparent from Table 6.2 that widely differing patterns 
of excises exist across Europe, even within the supposedly 'Single 
Market', and that no country in Europe taxes all alcoholic beverages 
at a comparable rate per degree of alcohol, or indeed in a consistent 
manner. It is also noteworthy that the rate of excise duty levied on 
spirits in the United Kingdom is higher than for all other EU member 
states, excepting the Scandanavian countries and the Republic of 
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Ireland. But for every member state, the excise duty per degree of 
alcohol is greater for spirits than for wine and beer. The 
application of the same rate of VAT widens the absolute (but not the 
relative) indirect tax differentials in nine member states. 
However, in three member states (Luxembourg, Portugal and Italy) 
beer and spirits are subject to higher VAT rates than wine, widening 
the absolute and relative indirect tax differentials. s 
Also of note from Table 6.2 is that excise duty on wine is zero in five 
member states, and minimal in France. In fact, wine excises reach 30% 
of final price only in the Republic of Ireland. Excise duty on beer 
is less than 10% of final price in seven member states and exceeds 30% 
only in the Republic of Ireland. Excise duty on spirits is never less 
than 10% of final price and exceeds 30% in eight member states. 7 The 
implications of this for competition between alcoholic beverages is 
discussed further in Section 6.3, but the much higher level of tax 
applied to spirits also markedly reduces the incentive for 
competition within the spirits industry, a phenomenon examined in 
Chapter 2.3. 
France has an excise duty on beer depending on alcohol content and 
container size; a Vignette tax which applies a special levy on 
alcoholic beverages over 25% volume, and, lastly, a I droi t de 
circulation I on wine, which applies different rates to natural sweet 
wine and champagne, fortified wines and all other wines. In terms of 
excise duty alone French duty on spirits is 42.5 times that of the 
duty on wine on a per degree of alcohol basis, 8 an inequity worsened 
by a 17% rise in the French spirits excise in January 1997. 9 
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Germany discriminates heavily against spirits in favour of beer (the 
excise duty ratio is 8.5 for spirits to beer) as a consequence of it 
being a major beer consuming/producing country. In addition, while 
excise duty is set by the Federal Government, the revenue obtained 
accrues to the provinces where beer is produced, this being the only 
commodity with such special treatment. There has been a standstill 
on beer taxation in Germany over three decades. 10 
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6.4 Competition between Alcoholic Beverages 
I should never have switched from Scotch to Martinis 
Humphrey Bogart 
If it can be shown that in any or all or the markets of the European 
Union, different alcoholic beverages are in competition with each 
other for market share, then the systematic discrimination against 
spirits enshrined in national excise regimes will occasion price-
induced substitution between beverage categories, distorting the 
effective functioning of competitive markets. The resulting 
reduction in consumer welfare is demonstrated more formally in 
Chapter 5.4 utilising indifference curve analysis. 
The usual economic tool employed in measuring the degree of 
competition between products is cross-price elasticity of demand 
analysis. Values for cross-price elasticities of demand illustrate 
how the demand for one beverage will respond to a change in the price 
of other beverage categories. The critical issue, given that 
European Union excise duty regimes systematically discriminate 
against spirits, is the cross-price elasticities between spirits and 
other beverage categories - wine and beer. 11 
In respect of the value of these cross-price elasticities, there are 
three possible outcomes, depending on whether the different 
categories of beverage are 'complementary', 'substitute' or 
'independent' goods. If beverage categories are complementary 
goods, then an increase in the price of spiri ts will reduce the demand 
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for spirits and the demand for wine and beer, implying a cross-price 
elastici ty which is negative and significantly different from 
zero. 
If categories are substitute goods then an increase in the price of 
spirits will reduce the demand for spirits but this will be 
accompanied by an increase in the demand for beer and wine, implying 
a cross-price elasticity which is positive and significantly 
different from zero. If the categories represent independent goods, 
then an increase in the price of spirits will have no effect on the 
demand for wine and beer. Where no significant effect can be shown, 
the categories may be independent or the degree of substi tutabili ty 
or complementarity is too small or inconsistent to be measured with 
statistical confidence from the data available. 12 
There are two conceptually separate effects which can take place when 
the price of any particular beverage increases: first, the 
substi tution effect on the sales of both that beverage itself and of 
other beverage categories, resul tin,g purely from the change in 
price; second, the income or expenditure effect on sales, resulting 
from a squeeze on consumers' total expenditure on beverages because 
of the rise in price of the beverage in question. In aggregate, these 
two effects form the 'total' effect of price changes. 
Disaggregating the substitution effect from the overall total effect 
facilitates computation of the degree of complementarity or 
substitutability between categories within the overall market for 
alcoholic beverages. 13 
If there is evidence that, in any market within the European Union, 
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wine and/or beer are substitutes for spirits, then the higher excise 
duties levied on spirits will shift market share in favour of the 
other drinks categories. That is, there will be price-sensitive 
competition between the various categories of drinks. 14 The 
available data on cross-price elasticities across a number of 
studies suggests that price sensitive competition between different 
categories of drinks is a common occurrence. 15 The results of a 
survey by The Henley Centre 16 on the principal European'nations are 
detailed in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: Estimated Cross-Price Elasticities: 1991 
Nation Spirits/Wines Spirits/Beers Beers/Wines 
United Kingdom Significant Not Significant Significant 
France Significant Significant Not Significant 
Germany Not Significant Significant Significant 
Spain Not Significant Significant Not Significant 
Italy Not Significant Significant Not significant 
Significant = Positive and statistically significant 
Not significant = Not significantly different from zero 
Source: Pieda, Competition Between Alcoholic Drinks 
Table 6.3 indicates that price-induced substitution is most common 
between spirits and one of the other two beverage categories; six of 
the eight positive cross-price elasticities detailed above involve 
spirits. In fact, the Henley Study discovered that in everyone of 
the EU member states examined there was price sensitive competition 
between spirits and one of the two other categories (in the case of 
France, between spirits and wine, and spirits and beer.)17 
In Italy, Germany, France, Belgium and The Netherlands, there are 
also clearly observable examples of significant changes in 
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consumption coinciding with large differential changes in taxation: 
in general, the category which increases in price relative to the 
other categories suffers a fall in consumption and the other 
categories experience an increase in consumption. The fact that such 
changes can be observed on different occasions and in different 
member states reduces the possibility that they are mere 
coincidences. 1 8 
The fact that these analyses find a large number of consistently 
positive cross-price effects is technically impressive given the 
nature of the data and the complexity of the markets. Where posi ti ve 
and significant cross-price elasticities are reported, they are 
mostly around 0.40, indicating that a 10% increase in the price of one 
beverage category is associated wi th a 4% increase in the consumption 
of the other beverage category. None of the cross-price elasticities 
calculated was negative and/or statistically significant, 
indicating an absence of complementarity. 19 
A comprehensive model of the market for alcoholic beverages in the 
Uni ted States was compiled in 1984. The model quantified four 
primary needs which are satisfied by alcoholic beverages, viz 
quenching thirst, enhancing food, personal relaxation or reward and 
socialising. More than one of these needs were found to be satisfied 
at the same time, such as when socialising and enhancing food at a 
dinner party. Whilst each of the beverages were deemed to be more 
appropriate to some of the needs than to others, the analysis clearly 
indicated several instances where different beverages acted as 
substitutes for each other. 
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In order of the degree of substitutability, beer, wines and spirits 
were strong substitutes for the purposes of socialising, beers and 
wine for food enhancement, beers and spirits for personal relaxation 
or reward, and beers and spirits (cocktails and mixed drinks) for 
quenching thirst. 
All three principal beverage categories were therefore found, to 
varying degrees, to be potential substitutes for each other in 
respect of their appropriateness to satisfy each and all primary 
needs. In particular, for the largest primary need (socialising, 
accounting for over 30% of consumption), there was the greatest and 
most direct substitution. In addition, it should be noted that in 
three of the four instances where the possibilities of substitution 
appeared particularly strong, one of the beverage categories was 
spirits. 2o 
It is of course the case that others factors in addition to changing 
prices, such as changes in real personal disposable incomes, tastes 
and preferences, can obscure the effects of changes in prices. 
Demand curves are shifting through time, making it difficult to 
detect movements along a demand curve due to price changes. In order 
to address this problem, The Henley Centre commissioned a survey of 
drinking habits in the United Kingdom, analysing the effect of 
relative prices on consumption choices. The respondents were asked 
about drinking in a pub and how they would respond if the price of 
their preferred category increased by 30p (equivalent to a price rise 
of approximately 25%).21 The results are shown in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4: Response of Pub Drinkers to 30p Increase in Price of 
Preferred Category: 1991 
Sample 878 Spirits Wines Beers 
~ Drinking Most Often in a Pub 9 4 82 
Response to 30p increase: 
% No Change 42 36 63 
% Another Category Occasionally 16 21 9 
% Another Category Normally 16 3 6 
% Stop Drinking in Pubs 23 39 21 
% Any Change of Category 32 24 15 
% Of Which Change to 
* 
Spirits - 6 7 
* 
Wines 10 - 4 
* 
Beer 19 6 -
* 
Other 3 12 4 
Source: Pieda, Competition Between Alcoholic Drinks 
It can be observed from Table 6.4 that consumers switch to other 
categories of beverage when their preferred beverage is not 
available, a proportion of consumers who prefer any particular 
category would switch beverages, given a significant price rise for 
their preferred category, and in the United Kingdom at least, spirits 
appear more vulnerable to price-induced substitution than either 
wine or beers. 
Balasubramanyan & Salisu (1993) have also ascertained that beer and 
wine and wine and spirits are pairwise substitutes, but that the 
degree of substitutability is stronger between wine and beer than 
that between wine and spirits. They also discovered an asymmetry in 
the sense that the cross price elasticities are not numerically 
equal; the demand for spirits is less sensitive to changes in the 
price of wine, but wine consumption appears to be highly sensi ti ve to 
changes in the price of spirits. 
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In other words, as spirits become more expensive spirits drinkers 
swi tch to wine but wine drinkers do not switch to spirits as the price 
of wine increases. Asymmetry was also noted between wine and beer. 
While wine drinkers do not switch to beer, traditional beer drinkers 
appear to switch to wine as the beer price is increased. However, no 
discernible relationship between beer and spirits was 
discovered. 22 
Other studies on the United Kingdom market have reached widely 
differing conclusions. Jones (1989) found that wine, cider and beer 
are all substitutes for each other, but that spirits are 
complemements to all the goods. This is consistent with Walsh (1982) 
who finds spirits and wine to be complements, but contradicts Walsh 
(1982) and McGuinness (1983) who show spirits and beer as 
substitutes. 
It can be nonetheless be concluded that there most likely is a degree 
of price sensitive substitution between the three principal 
categories of alcoholic beverage which varies from country to 
country, and that differential taxation can cause substitution 
between the categories and thereby distort competition. 
This is a view held by both the European Parliament & the Commission. 
As part of the Directive establishing minimum rates of alcohol 
excises across Europe, in November 1993 the Commission engaged the 
consultants Bossard Associates of Paris to undertake a detailed 
'Competition Study' to examine the nature of competition between 
categories of alcoholic drinks, the findings of which were published 
in 1994 in a report entitled "Concurrence entre les Differentes 
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Categories des Boissons Alcoolisees," (Bossard, Paris 1994).24 
The terms of reference for the study stated that its objective 
was to: 
Produce a comprehensive and impartial investigation into competition in the 
alcoholic beverages sector and the effects of taxation upon it. Inrer alia, the 
study will examine on a Community-wide and state by state basis, the general 
effects of the minimum rates laid down in the Directive - and of the rates 
actually applied in the Member States - on the consumption of competing alcoholic 
drinks, and the particular effects of the rates actually applied in Member States 
with regard to competition between the different categories of drink. 
The findings of Bossard I s report confirmed the findings of the Henley 
Study and the stated views of the Commission that: " ... all alcoholic 
beverages are to a greater or lesser extent in competition with each 
other ... , " 25 that:" ... taxation affects competition between types of 
drink (eg between beer and spirits) and wi thin each type ... " , 26 and 
therefore " ... the application of taxes affecting the consumption of 
alcoholic drinks should not distort competition between these 
products ... "27 
The conclusions above point to the desirability of reducing excise 
duty differentials both between Member States and between different 
beverage categories; failing this there will be significant tax 
induced distortion of competition in the market for alcoholic 
drinks. 
288 
6.5 Indirect Tax Harmonisation in Europe 
Article 2 of The Treaty of Rome states: 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common Market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated 
rising standard of living, and closer relations between the States belonging to 
it. 28 
In respect of this, the European Court of Justice has been vigorous in 
applying Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome to remove technical 
barriers, which often have the effect of protecting the domestic 
market from goods produced elsewhere in the EU. In a landmark case, 
Cassis de Dijon, in 1978 the Court established the important 
principle that any good lawfully produced and marketed in one member 
state should be legal in any other: national laws that directly or 
indirectly excluded such goods can be justified only on highly 
restrictive terms. 
This interpretation paved the way for the so-called I new approach I to 
harmonisation, which is based on mutual acceptance of the measures 
taken by each Member State to ensure that the essential standards of 
health and safety are met by all goods produced on its territory. 
There is now, therefore, considerable pressure against national laws 
that restrict the import of goods lawfully produced and marketed 
elsewhere in the Community. 29 
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Nevertheless, in the field of indirect tax harmonisation, progress 
has remained slow, despite Article 99 of the Treaty of Rome requiring 
that: 
The Council of Ministers shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission after consulting the European Parliament, adopt provisions for the 
harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other 
forms of indirect taxation to the extent that such harmonisation is necessary to 
ensure the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 30 
A working party was established as early as 1960, and the Neumark 
Report (1963) emphasized that excises should be harmonized in step 
with sales taxes, but it was not until 1972 that the EC Commission 
issued a framework directive outlining the features of a possible 
harmonisation policy. Common definitions for bases of assessment, 
followed by rate unification, would be applied to the traditional 
excises on tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, and petrol. 
Nothing came of the framework directive, and member states continued 
to consume the products of which they were the major producers, 
leading the Commission (1980)to comment: 
The symbiotiC relationship between national industries and national excises has 
resulted in excise tax structures that discriminate against products of other 
member states .•. real or feigned concern with national social and health policies 
generally result in preferential treatment of domestic production. 
Until quite recently, for instance, France & Italy imposed 
substantially higher excises on spirits derived from cereals, such 
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as gin, whisky, and vodka, than on spirits distilled from wine, such 
as cognac, armagnac and calvados. Since the cereal distillates were 
all imported, in effect the excise structures of these countries 
favoured domestic products, although there was no open 
discrimination on the basis of origin. Similarly, Denmark had a 
separate rate for akqavit, which was taxed at only two-thirds the 
rate imposed on brandy, gin, rum and whisky, which were mostly 
imported. 3 1 
In 1980, the European Court of Justice (Cases 168-171/78) ruled that 
all these products stood in a competitive relationship to each other, 
according to the non-discrimination principle of Article 95 of The 
Treaty of Rome: 
No Member State should impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other 
Member States, any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed 
directly or indirectly on similar or competing domestic products. 32 
Case 170/78 was the famous I beer ruling I in which the Court ruled that 
the system of alcohol taxation in the United Kingdom discriminated 
against wine by taxing beer at a lower rate. The European Commission 
had set a limit for English wine production of 2.5 million litres, 
0.3% of United Kingdom wine consumption, and thus in the Court ruling 
the United Kingdom was regarded "as if" she were not a wine producer. 
It was decided that the ratio of the two excises should not exceed 
that of the alcoholic strength of an average table wine and the most 
~opular beer. This pOinted to a ratio of 3:1, since table wine is 
typically 11% alcohol by volume and beer about 3.5%.33 The ECJ 
measured discrimination by reference to the rate of duty per degree 
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of alcohol content, accepting that different categories of drinks 
compete for market share. 
In the subsequent budget, (March 1984), excise duty on wine in the 
lowest tax band was therefore reduced substantially. The rates set 
implied that exactly the same amount of duty was levied upon one 
centilitre of pure alcohol in wine of 9% abv and in beer strength 3% 
abv. It is ironic that the European Commission's recent proposals 
for approximating rates of excise duty would require the United 
Kingdom, in the long term, to alter the ratio in favour of wine. 
Most member states have some domestic production of either wine, beer 
or spirits. However, in all member states, save the United Kingdom 
and the Republic of Ireland, the domestic spirits industry is of 
Ii ttle economic or social significance. As a result, member states 
can comply with the letter, but flout the spirit, of the various 
judgements of the European Court of Justice. 
As detailed in the previous Section, the major wine producing 
countries tax wine lightly, if at all. The major beer producing 
countries tax beer lightly, and all d~scriminate against spirits. 34 
But because, for instance, 90% of France's beer consumption and 70% 
of its spirit consumption are home-produced, the Court can argue that 
if the French government chooses to impose higher taxes on beer and 
spirits, it is discriminating against domestic producers as much as 
foreign ones. The Court should nevertheless consider the potential 
market for imported spirits, not the existing one. 35 In addition, a 
member state can still disadvantage an alcoholic drink it does 
produce, such as, in the case of the United Kingdom, spirits. 36 
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As part of the programme to create the Single European Market, in 1985 
the Commission published a White Paper, Completing the Internal 
Market, which argued that a single market required not only 
administrative changes but also changes in both the rates and the 
structure of indirect taxes in member countries. 37 In addition, it 
was felt that in the absence of harmonisation there would be a 
tendency for tax rates to fall towards the minimum of those applied in 
the EU. 38 
Subsequently, in August 1987 the Commission published a series of 
documents on the 'approximation' of indirect tax rates. According to 
the Commission, its proposals were the "minimum changes which must be 
made ... in order to achieve a significant degree of fiscal 
harmonisation." These were not, in the end, adopted because the 
resul ting budgetary changes would have been unacceptable to a number 
of countries. 39 
A second set of proposals were agreed by the European Finance 
Ministers (ECOFIN) on July 27th 1992. The subsequent EC Directive 
92/84, which took effect from January 1st 1993, required member 
states to apply the following minimum rates of excise duty to 
alcoholic beverages: 
Wine 
Beer 
Spirits 
Zero 
187 ecu per hectolitre pure alcohol (hlpa) 
A two-tier threshold of 550 ecu or 1000 ecu per hlpa 
determined by the actual rate on January 1st 1993. 40 
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The Directive also required that all alcoholic beverages should be 
taxed at the same VAT rate in each member state wi thin a 14%-20% band. 
The legal minimum rates have had little impact on actual rates, 
because the minimum rates established are at about the lowest 
prevailing level for each category of drink.41 
As part of the 1992 agreement, it was agreed that a review of rates 
would take place in 1994. However, this was deferred and was followed 
-
in November 1995 by a low key meeting in Lisbon, comprising 
government and industry representatives, simply to air views. This 
meeting achieved nothing tangible, but the European Commission was 
due to have another review of rates by the end of 1996, which, inter 
alia, would take into account the question of competition between 
different alcoholic products. The Commission was required to 
~resent this review to the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers, but thus far has continued to procrastinate and little 
further progress has been achieved. 42 
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6.6 Problems with European Proposals for Excise Harmonisation 
In a report for the Adam Smith Institute entitled "A Disorderly 
House", Dr Barry Bracewell-Milnes stated that the 1992 ECOFIN 
Agreement was "the outcome of a power struggle, in which the 
principal vested interests were appeased or at least not seriously 
affronted. It was not informed by any economic principle."43 The 
various principles advocated for the special taxation of alcohol are 
reviewed extensively in Chapter 5. But certainly from the" 
perspective of Scotch whisky producers, indeed the wider spirits 
distilling industry in the United Kingdom, the agreement was highly 
disagreeable. Prior to the Council of Ministers meeting, the Scotch 
whisky industry had made known to the Chancellor its objectives with 
regard to excise tax harmonisation, which included: 
1) Obtaining the lowest minimum rate for excise duty 
2) Introduction of a capping mechanism aimed at ensuring that 
discrimination against Scotch whisky does not increase 
3) Imposition of a positive rate of duty on wine 
4) Granting of no advantages to special interests 
5) Achievement in the long term of equality of taxation based upon 
alcoholic strength 
Item One was the only one to have been achieved. A capping mechanism 
would have meant that any increase in spirits duty in EU member 
countries would have had to be accompanied by a similar increase on 
all other alcoholic products, preventing a widening of 
discrimination against both Scotch whisky and spirits generally. 
The absence of such a mechanism means there is no EU legal restraint 
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upon extending discrimination against spirits. 44 Since 1992, duty 
discrimination against spirits has increased significantly; ten EU 
countries have widened discrimination against spirits as compared to 
wine, and eight as compared to beer. 
The zero rate for wine was a triumph for the wine producing countries 
whose governments once again successfully defended their local 
industries. As for the 187 ecu minimum rate for beer this was also 
unsatisfactory; not only is the rate much lower than that applied to 
spirits, but it also embodied discrimination against beer compared 
with wine. In addition, therefore, to the negative affect upon 
distillers, companies in the United Kingdom with brewing interests 
are also adversely affected. Guinness, for example, has a large 
Spanish brewing subsidiary, Cruzcampo, which is clearly in 
competition with Spain's zero rated wine industry.45 
There is a further practical issue which arises from the positive 
minimum rates determined for spirits and beer and the zero minimum 
for wines. The spirits and beer minimum rates are denominated in ecu. 
Thus, if the domestic currency depreciates against the ecu, to the 
extent that the rate applied (expressed in ecu) falls below the 
Jj>rescribed minimum, then the duty (expressed in the domestic 
currency) must rise. As a result, in Greece, Spain and Italy, 
increases of 4% to 7% in excise rates for spirits were required to 
offset the effect of the depreciation in the value of their domestic 
currencies over 1992-93. Since wine is zero rated, no corresponding 
change in the rate for wine was required. Further, 'since the rates 
are minimum and not maximum rates, there is no automatic downward 
adjustment of excise rates on spirits and beer when a domestic 
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currency appreciates against the ecu. The result is to create a 
'ratchet' effect which operates to increase the duty differentials 
against spirits and beer.46 
The one saving grace is that strong pressure from the Scotch whisky 
industry thwarted Norman Lamont in June 1991 from acquiescing to 
:rroposals setting a minimum rate of excise duty on spirits of 1118.5 
ecu. This would have triggered major duty increases in the fast 
$rowing Southern European markets of Greece, Spain and Portugal and 
in the already large market of Italy. Price increases could have been 
between £2 and £2.50 a bottle. 
Nevertheless, establishing an additional threshold rate of 1000 ecu 
~er hlpa will both prevent member states with duties above this level 
from reducing their rate below 1000 ecu, and also prevent those 
countries whose rates are between 550 ecu and 1000 ecu from reducing 
their spirits rates at all. This anomaly appears to have been brought 
in to curb cross-border trading between low-tax Luxembourg and 
Belgium & France. 
The July 1992 ECOFIN agreement provided widespread concessions for 
small distilleries and special deals for certain spirits producers, 
conceding reduced rates of excise duty of "not more than 50% below the 
current national rate." 'Small distilleries' are defined as those 
producing no more than 10 hlpa per annum, or in the case of existing 
establishments, no more than 20 hlpa. 47 
No Scotch whisky distillery would qualify on this basis as a 'small 
distillery', and the concessions are also detrimental to companies 
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in the United Kingdom with overseas spirits interests; Grand 
Metropol i tan is Metaxa brandy, for example, is at a disadvantage vis-
a-vis products from small Greek producers whilst Guinnessis Asbach 
brandy suffers competition from small German producers. 
Special concessions were also agreed for Greece in respect of ouzo 
and spiri ts consumed in the Greek islands, certain drinks in Madeira, 
and for the products of the Italian regions of Gorizia & the Aosta 
valley. 47 In addition, rum from French overseas departments attracts 
an excise of FF 5215, compared to the FF 9060 rate applied to other 
spirits. 48 
Finally, in December 1996 the EU Council also agreed to extend the 
duty-paid derogations, in the case of Sweden until 30 June 2000, 
subject to prior review, and for Denmark and Finland until the end of 
2003. 49 This effectively means that Scandanavians will be limited as 
to the quantities of duty-paid alcohol they may legally import into 
these countries, presumably to protect lucrative government 
monopolies and to avoid compromising their Lutheranesque alcohol 
control policies. Whatever the reasoning, such concessions 
undermine the whole concept of a Single Market, and deny Finns and 
Swedes in particular one of the few tangible benefits that were 
supposed to result from their acceding to the European Union. 
It is not acceptable for the Commission to plead that its proposals 
are not intended to lay down an iideal i tax system for the EU but 
only to facilitate the removal of fiscal frontiers. The EC directive 
establishes the principle of de jure discrimination against spirits 
because it reflects the implicit assumption that it is appropriate to 
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apply different levels of taxation to different beverage 
categories. 5o The Directive thus provides a legal underpinning to 
the existing de facto structures of excise duties which are mainly 
noticeable for discriminating against spirits. Extension of this 
approach will entrench such discrimination. 
It was argued in Chapter 5 that there is no convincing rationale in 
economic theory for the discriminatory treatment of one type of 
beverage category and in favour of another. Moreover, the widespread 
existence of such discrimination in tax rates across Europe reduces 
consumers' welfare by inducing substitution between beverages, as 
well as producers' welfare by disrupting attempts to market their 
product throughout the Single Market. 
This being so, harmonisation should be applied to all competing 
products on the same basis, rather than on a quite artificial 
distinction between different beverage categories, based on 
protectionism of vested interests, and which pays no attention to the 
distortionary effects on the market. 51 
In this respect, the Commission claimed to have: 
Examined the feasibility of fixing the rates of taxation for all alcoholic drinks 
by reference to a single criterion, for example, alcoholic strength, volume or 
value. It found that while the simple logic of a consistent system is attractive, 
the rates which result are invariably extremely disruptive both as regards the 
revenue of individual member states and the distribution of the Community-wide 
tax burden on the categories of drinks concerned. . .. . In the Commission's view, 
when set against the complexity and di versi ty of Member States' current treatment 
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of alcohol products, the minimum rates present a reasonable and even-handed 
solution. 52 
There is no expression of concern for proposing a system of tax rates 
which Scotch whisky producers would see as "extremely disruptive" of 
their industry's ability to compete. 
Interestingly, the European Parliament has adopted a different 
stance on the issue of excise harmonisation. As early as 1983, the 
Economic & Monetary Affairs Committee wrote: 
If, therefore, we were considering a system of excise structures de novo ... the 
most obvious system to propose would be a single rate of excise duty per degree of 
alcohol for all alcoholic beverages. Such a system would avoid both distortion 
of competition and problems of definition. 53 
The European Parliament has also stated that it: 
•.. considers the continuing fiscal discrimination between different alcoholic 
drinks in Member States constitutes a barrier to inter-state trade, denies the 
consumer the benefits of increased choice and competition which are amongst the 
most important objectives of the EC Treaty, and is an obstacle to the achievement 
of the common market •.. 54 
Nevertheless, the European Parliament claims to be fully aware of the 
"resistance deeply rooted in national traditions and interests" in 
evolving a fair excise duty on alcoholic drinks, and in view of this 
considered: 
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Whether the desired harmonisation of taxes on alcohol might not be attained more 
easily and more rapidly by a change of strategy directed towards the gradual and 
complete abolition, over a period, of, say, twenty years, of taxes on alcohol, 
since they are a relic of an undemocratic mentality. 55 
The language in this resolution is somewhat inappropriate, as it is 
not clear that excise taxation should be considered against 
constitutional principles. The abolition of special taxes on 
alcohol would doubtless also increase consumption above the socially 
desirable optimum, a matter which was explored in Section 5.5. 
The latest resolution of the European Monetary Affairs Committee in 
September 1996 was more helpful, calling for the differences between 
excise rates on wine, beer and spirits not to be increased, and 
rejecting a zero rate on wine. The SWA commended the resolution, 
claiming: "Delivery of Parliament 1 s opinion represents a 
significant development in the fight to remove discrimination from 
EU alcoholic drinks tax structures.,,56 
The political difficulties involved in creating across Europe a 
system of excise taxation based upon alcohol content were recently 
stated succinctly by Leonard Harris, Director of International Taxes 
for HM Customs & Excise, who told the ParI iamentary Select Committee 
on the Treasury and Civil Service: 
You could organise a drink structure de novo which bore a close relationship to 
alcoholic strength, so that spirits taxes would come down and beer would go up and 
so on. Whether or not that is going to cut any ice with the twelve member states 
when it comes to protecting national interests, is quite another matter. 57 
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As an indication of further difficulties ahead for the United 
Kingdom, Peter Wilmott, the Director-General of Customs & Indirect 
Taxation at the European Commission, is on record as saying he 
believes that only if tax changes are decided by qualified majority 
voting (and not, as at present, by unanimous vote) will agreement 
ultimately be possible. 58 
Such a move would not only have significant implications for alcohol 
control policy in the United Kingdom, but, given the likelihood that 
subsequent agreements reached under such a system would entrench 
discrimination against spirits, seriously jeopardize the interests 
of the Scotch whisky industry as well as other spirit distillers in 
the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom goverriment should consider 
very seriously vetoing any attempt by other European Union members to 
move to qualified majority voting on fiscal policy. 
Not surprisingly, the issue of tax harmonisation across Europe has 
been of great concern to the drinks industry in the United Kingdom. 
Western Europe is the world's largest and most important drinks 
market, representing approximately 25% of total world drinks 
consumption, worth at retail prices around £44 billion in 1989. At 
this level, which is equivalent to almost 2% of total Community GNP, 
the economic benefits of the drinks industry to Europe is evident. 
Anthony Greener, Diageo Chairman, has written: 
The industry is important to Europe precisely because it is overwhelmingly 
European. If we look at the high-value end of the market - the profit earning 
dominance of British companies is especially clear. The three most profitable 
companies in the world are from the UK. I am unaware of such a strong European -
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and particularly British - position in any other international business. 
Mr Greener goes on to state: 
The difficulties which could beset the European drinks industry as a result of 
the Single Market are quite profound. They could, at worse, severely handicap 
the potentially strong competitiveness of British producers. There is a hazard 
for my industry which even the British government has not yet fully recognized: 
It can be summarized in two words: tax harmonisation. 
The prize for the drinks industry if these tax difficulties can be 
resolved is considerable, especially for companies in the United 
Kingdom - a truly single market, without trading barriers, in which 
consumer trends towards higher quality consumption of more 
international brands become increasingly similar in all countries. 
The long-range business implications for such an opportunity ar.e 
considerable, in many functional areas - for example, physical 
distribution, marketing and sales organisations. Moreover, success 
and increased competitiveness in Europe will strengthen the 
industry's resources and abilities to be more competitive in other 
international markets, particularly in the United States and the Far 
East. 
Conversely, if the European drinks industry is adversely affected by 
a failure to resolve the difficulties of tax harmonisation, this can 
only weaken the ability of that industry to compete effectively 
outside Europe. This would be to the advantage of non-European 
competitors and to the ultimate disadvantage of the wider European 
economy. 59 
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In this respect, the principle of de jure tax discrimination against 
spiri ts implicit in the latest European excise duty structure will be 
noted outwi th Europe and add to the difficulties the whisky industry 
faces in lobbying for fairer tax treatment. 
The Scotch whisky industry faces as many as 400 cases of 
discrimination in over 200 export markets worldwide. Some countries 
prohibi t the sale of all alcoholic drinks on religious grounds. Such 
prohibi tions must, of course, be respected. Other countries 
restrict the sale and/or advertising of alcoholic drinks on heal th or 
social grounds. Where such restrictions are applied without 
discrimination to all alcoholic drinks, the right of those countries 
to do so should be tolerated. In some countries, however, 
restrictions which purport to be based upon health or social grounds 
are applied indiscriminately against some types of alcoholic drinks 
but not against others. 
There are many markets where imports of Scotch whisky are either 
prevented or very substantially reduced by tariff or non-tariff 
barriers. These fall into two categories: 
i) Countries which restrict the import of Scotch whisky and/or tax it 
significantly more heavily than competing locally-produced 
alcoholic drinks for the express purpose of protecting local 
industry. 
ii) Countries which, because of balance of trade difficulties, have 
been forced either to impose restrictions on all imports or on 
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imports of luxury goods; or to erect high tariff barriers. The 
industry may have to accept that it is unrealistic to expect the early 
removal of many such barriers, particularly in Latin America. 
A sustained and determined effort should be made, both by the 
Government and the industry, at securing fairer trading conditions 
worldwide. 50 In this respect, each year the Scotch Whisky 
Association (SWA) meets with the Department of Trade & Industry and 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food to examine trade 
barriers market by market, to priori tise markets to be targeted, and 
to determine appropriate strategies. This collaboration has paid 
dividends over the years, and has ensured that both the Government 
and overseas legations are fully aware of what is required to enhance 
the export success of Scotch whisky. 51 
In 1996, for example, the EU Commission, the Uni ted States & Canadian 
governments, the Scotch Whisky Association & other European spirits 
producers, and the World Trade Organization, successfully persuaded 
Japan to implement the 1987 GATT ruling which called for Japan to 
equalise spirits taxes. 52 In most other developed countries of the 
world, the imported spirits share of the spirits market is in excess 
of 30%. But in Japan, due to discriminatory taxation, it is only 7%, 
compared with nearly 74% for the local spirit Shochu. 
In less than two years time duty on Scotch will be reduced by 58% 
whilst tax on Shochu will rise. Accordingly, by October 1st 1998, the 
differential will have largely been removed although it will not be 
finally eliminated until 2001. 53 
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As Hugh Morison, Director General of the Scotch Whisky Association 
commented in the Association's 1996 Annual Review: 
The wider impact of the Japanese ruling should not be underestimated. The WTO has 
made it clear that tax discrimination against imported spirits breaches world 
trade rules, and its ruling will provide a benchmark for tackling discrimination 
in other markets. 
The SWA believe Chile had been awaiting the outcome of the Japanese 
case before deciding how to comply with Europe's requirement that 
she, too, should cease discrimination. In October 1997, the European 
Commission asked the WTO to ban Chile's discriminatory taxation, 
which taxes Scotch whisky at nearly three times the level of locally-
produced spirits. The Chilean government imposes duties of 70% on 
whisky imports, in order to help promote sales of the local spirit 
pisco, taxed at only 25%.64 
India has long been regarded by the industry as a potentially 
lucrative market, but progress is impeded by import restrictions and 
high tariffs. 65 The importance of a co-ordinated effort by the 
industry and government cannot be overemphasized because, until a 
substantial reduction in trade barriers takes place, no significant 
growth in Scotch whisky exports can be expected, a point made by Ivan 
Straker of the SWA in August 1989: 
Volume sales and foreign exchange will not increase substantially until these 
barriers to our exports have been removed •.• Scotch whisky will not achieve its 
true potential until it has free and unfettered access to all world markets. 
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The SWA anticipate that the GATT market access agreement, which deal t 
primarily with tariff barriers, will increase general economic 
prosperity, boost sales and encourage governments to take further 
action in tackling equally damaging non-tariff barriers which have 
greatly increased in recent years. 
In particular, it was envisaged that the "zero for zero" agreement, 
ini tiated in Tokyo in July 1993, would remove import duties in all the 
EU markets plus seven others, namely the USA, Canada, Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore. Based on exchange 
rates then prevailing, it was calculated that there could be a 
reduction in the United States of £1.45 per bottle, £1 a bottle in 
Japan and 50p in New Zealand. In addition, it was expected that the 
agreement would result in a 30% import duty reduction in all other 
countries which were signatories to the GATT. 66 
The current European proposals for excise harmonisation will 
seriously impede these efforts at securing fairer trading condi tions 
for Scotch whisky worldwide. 
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6.7 Alternatives to European Excise Harmonisation 
We know no spectacle so ridiculous as the British public in one of its periodical 
outbursts of morality. 
Lord Macaulay Essays 
A number of economists have rejected the arguments put forward by the 
Commission in favour of indirect tax harmonisation across Europe, 
and have instead come up with alternate proposals, most of which, 
were they to be implemented, would run directly counter to the wider 
objectives of the various treaties attempting to establish a Single 
European Market. 
Moreover, these proposals primarily reflect 
deleterious effects of excise harmonisation 
'sovereignties', particularly in respect of 
concern 
upon 
alcohol 
at the 
national 
control 
policies and exchequer revenue. Few if any have taken issue with the 
current minimum rates for the harm they will inflict upon important 
industries in the United Kingdom. 
Sijbren Cnossen (1983) has argued 67 that origin-based rate-uniform 
excises are not a sine qua non for proceeding with the removal of 
border controls, contending that border controls could be eliminated 
by shifting border tax adjustments for excises to factory gates and 
retail outlets. Instead of being applied nationally, the 
destination principle would be implemented across the Union in 
conjunction with an EU clearing mechanism and a uniform system of in 
bond transportation for excisable goods. Whilst this would 
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eliminate the need for fiscal checks at frontiers, the proposal would 
do nothing to create a competitive market for alcoholic beverages 
across Europe or reduce the incidence of cross-border shopping. 
In a report published by the Institute For Fiscal Studies entitled 
"Fiscal Harmonisation: An Analysis of the European Commission's 
Proposals,"(1988)68, Lee, Pearson & Smith argued that duty 
differentials between member states could be retained by introducing 
a system of tax stamps. Such a system would involve the EU market 
being spl it into two, or three, duty areas, wi thin which duty would be 
uniform, but between which duty differences would remain and cross-
border shopping restrained by restricting the movement of duty-paid 
goods. The authors believe the flexibility this would allow member 
states is important given that with national monetary policies 
eventually being phased out, the weight on fiscal instruments for 
short-term stabilisation and long-term structural adjustments will 
increase. 
The problem with this proposal is that it takes no account of the 
widely diverging excises even within the three duty jurisdictions 
outlined, making harmonisation extremely difficult. Moreover, 
legal restrictions on the free movement of duty paid goods between 
nations runs directly counter to the whole concept of a Single 
European market. 
In response to the 1989 Commission proposals on indirect tax 
harmonisation, The Institute For Alcohol Studies 69 commissioned an 
analysis of the effects upon public health policy in the United 
Kingdom, concluding: 
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There is no convincing reason for the approximation of alcohol excises at all ..• 
Letting each Member State decide its own rate is the only way of showing a genuine 
respect for alcohol taxation as a public health tool .... There is sufficient 
evidence for concern over what the EC proposals imply for health and other 
alcohol-related problems in the United Kingdom that the United Kingdom should 
argue for national sovereignty, on health grounds, in choosing rates of alcohol 
excise duty. The Commission's explicit and public acceptance of the connection 
between alcohol taxes and health is an open invitation for Member States to 
present such an argument. 70 
This Nigel Lawson did in a 1988 Treasury paper to fellow EC Finance 
Ministers: 
Alcohol and tobacco must be treated as special cases because of the serious 
health risks associated with such products ... Any harmonisation should not force 
individual Member States to adopt significantly lower tax rates than they would 
ideally wish to impose for health reasons. 71 
Such unilateral action on the part of European governments is 
arguably undesirable from the viewpoint of the disruption it 
occasions for European drinks producers. Nor is it really an option 
any longer, given that domestic tax bases are being steadily eroded 
by the substantial quanti ties of duty-paid goods legally and 
illicitly finding their way from high to low-tax countries. 
The Institute for Alcohol Studies et al would no doubt retort that 
disruption to the marketing & distribution of alcoholic products 
within Europe and the problems of cross-border shopping are 
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justifiable trade offs, given the freedom national sovereignty on 
indirect taxation allows member states to pursue alcohol control 
policies. 
The issue of indirect taxation in Europe is therefore in this respect 
at least analagous to the continuing controversy as to the merits and 
costs of a single European currency. Any potential gains in 
'efficiency', which theoretically can be measured, are offset by a 
reduction in national 'sovereignty', a much less quantifiable 
phenomenon. Both issues also involve questions as to the extent to 
which there is an overarching 'European' interest that encompasses 
all member states, and is of sufficient magnitude to justify 
subsuming national preferences. 
The inherent suspicion of governments in the United Kingdom to 
'European' initiatives, together with the faith of Conservative 
administrations in the efficacy of the free market, has hitherto 
resulted in the United Kingdom adopting the stance that 
'harmonisation' of indirect taxes should be an issue allotted to the 
market to decide. This would presumably result in cross-border 
shopping occasioning a gradual spiraling down of excises to the 
lowest common denominator. This sentiment was also expressed by 
Keith Boyfield of the Adam Smith Institute in a tract published in 
1995 entitled "Letter To Lisbon:"72 
There is no benefit to be derived from adopting a maximalist approach which 
substantially raises the average rate of excise duty within the EU. It would be 
far preferable to maintain a minimalist approach which, although it may not 
deliver harmonised taxation rates in the short term, at least provides consumers 
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with the opportunity to purchase goods in Member States with lower tax regimes. 
Such a policy puts downward pressure on those EU countries which levy excessively 
high excise duties, bringing the 'hidden hand' into the fight for 
harmonisation. 
Such a position has some merit in view of the current objectionable 
minimum alcohol excises applied across the EU, but the eroding of 
exchequer revenues brought about by the relaxing of personal imports 
of duty-paid goods from the Continent may occasion a shift in the 
Uni ted ~ingdom government's attitude toward 'variable geometry' and 
'subsidiarity' in the near future. 
Moreover, if there is not a sufficient 'European' interest to justify 
even the harmonisation of alcohol excises, then arguably the vision 
of such pan-European thinkers as Goethe, Beethoven, Monet and 
Schumann is little more than a house of cards. If alle menschen am 
den briide . .. nicht when it comes to supping a pint together, then it 
certainly bodes ill for any monetary union. 
But such questions of 'high politics' are outwith the scope of this 
thesis. On a practical basis at least, it is contended that there are 
very sound reasons for a certain degree of harmonisation of alcohol 
excises in Europe. There is no reason to doubt the concerns within 
the drinks industry as to the opportunity cost of a fragmented drinks 
market, and the transport costs of cross-border shopping still 
represent an inefficient use of resources, even though they are borne 
by the consumer. 
Moreover, modifications are needed to Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' 
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if it is recgnized that a given market is imperfect. Chapter 5.5 
attempted to prove that the case for the special taxation of alcohol 
to mitigate the externalities associated wi th excessive consumption 
is on the whole well-founded, as is the proposition that all 
beverages should bear an equal tax according to alcohol content. The 
Commission should therefore direct its efforts in this area to 
attempting to quantify a value of the negative social costs to the 
European economy associated with alcohol consumption. 
Some would retort that such an exercise is fatuous as well as being 
potentially Herculean, given the wide, and with expansion in EU 
membership, ever wider divergencies between countries, especially 
as to levels of alcohol tolerance. But arguably similar arguments 
could be advanced toward every other aspect of European integration, 
such as the Common Agricultural & Fisheries Policies, the Schengen 
Agreement on border controls, a single immigration policy, 
harmonised standards, and, a fortiori, economic & monetary union. 
McDonnell & Maynard's (1985) conclusions for the United Kingdom, 
examined in Chapter 5, were that a high estimate of the total social 
• costs of alcohol consumption would amount to approximately half the 
yield from alcohol duties in the United Kingdom in 1983. But at this 
level duties in the United Kingdom would still be much higher than 
many other countries in the EU. So even attributing a low value to 
the negative externalities associated with excessive alcohol 
consumption in Europe would facilitate the setting of a de minimis 
'floor' for alcohol excises across Europe that would likely be 
significantly higher than the current minimum rates. 
313 
To the extent that member states, such as the United Kingdom, opted to 
apply rates in excess of the minimum this would reflect a national 
preference for alcohol taxation as a 'convenient' means of garnering 
revenue. This is the position taken by Smith (1988): 
Whilst the Community does need to set minimum duty rates, to prevent 
"undercutting" and a downward spiral in all rates, Member States wishing to set 
higher duty rates than the minimum bear the cost of dOing so themselves; there are 
no grounds for Community control over their decision. 73 
But high-tax sovereigns must expect that if juxtapositioned 
geographically with lower-tax jurisdictions, they will experience 
some eroding of their revenue base. Transport costs alone will 
ensure that sizeable disparities in alcohol excises could continue 
between Scandanavia and Southern Europe, but inevitably in the long-
run some approximation of rates amongst the core countries of Western 
and Central Europe (the United Kingdom included) is likely. 
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6.8 Conclusions 
This Chapter has studied the European market for alcoholic 
beverages, and considered the bearing this has had upon the various 
proposals of the European Commission for the harmonisation of 
alcohol excises. A recurring theme throughout is that such proposals 
have taken as their terms of reference points of departure rather 
than considering the whole subject de novo. 
Section 6.2 showed that per capita consumption of alcohol varies 
markedly across European nations, as does the relative share of each 
category of beverage in overall consumption. To some extent this is a 
reflection of the comparative advantage each nation enjoys in 
producing the differing drinks; the United Kingdom is Europe I s 
largest manufacturer of distilled spirits, but has virtually no 
vinicul ture. By contrast, the high propensity to imbibe wine in the 
Latin cultures of Europe is undoubtedly attributable in part to the 
salience of wine production in the culture and economies of these 
nations. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, wine producers are a formidable lobby 
in these countries, to a much greater degree than sJ>iri ts distillers 
have influence in the United Kingdom. Section 6.3 on the existing 
structure of alcohol excises in Europe detailed how this power is 
manifested, in the form of duty structures which in every European 
nation (including, perversely, the United Kingdom), discriminate 
heavily, on a per degree of alcohol basis, against spirits in favour 
of wine, and to a lesser extent, beer. In fact, five countries were 
shown to have no excise on wine whatsoever. Moreover, classified as 
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an 'agricultural' as opposed to an 'industrial' product, wine has 
been eligible in the past for considerable support from the Common 
Agricultural Policy. None has ever been forthcoming for the whisky 
industry. 
Section 6.4 presented several carefully constructed academic 
reports, including one written for the European Commission itself, 
which all concluded that the different categories of alcoholic 
beverage are in competition with each other to fulfill consumer 
needs, and hence price-distorting excises will have an appreciable 
impact upon consumption. 
Section 6.5 looked at the history of attempts to harmonise indirect 
taxation in Europe, as part of the goal of achieving a truly 
integrated Single European Market. The various institutions of the 
EU were shown to have been fairly proactive in seeking to outlaw 
practices in member states that have discriminated against the 
products of other states. Whilst this has largely prevented nations 
from overtly protecting indigenously produced categories of 
alcoholic beverage against comparable products from other 
countries, these rulings have done nothing to discourage the 
application of taxes that have had the effect of indirectly 
protecting domestic producers. 
Hence countries such as Italy with a substantial wine industry and 
minimal, but nonetheless some, production of spirits, are abiding by 
the letter of these rulings when they levy no tax on wine, but tax 
Scotch whisky and home-produced spirits equally. Nonethemore for 
this, despite the fact that the United Kingdom's wine industry has 
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exhibited significant increments in quality in recent years and is 
now producing some well-rated vintages, the European Court of 
Justice ruled in 1980 that the United Kingdom "is not!! a wine 
producer, so by taxing beer at a lower rate, was discriminating 
against imported products. 
The most recent proposals of the European Commission's on the 
harmonisation of alcohol excises were scrutinized in Section 6.6, 
and shown to be highly nefarious to the United Kingdom in every 
respect. The proposals are grounded on no logical economic 
principles and are riddled with inconsistencies, which is perhaps 
not surprising as they emerged from a typical political !!horse-
trading" session of the Council of Ministers, intended to enshrine 
protectionism of vested interests, none of which are to the benefit 
of the United Kingdom. 
Section 6.6 concluded by examining some of the many barriers to trade 
Scotch whisky faces around the world, the combating of which will 
only be made the more difficult by the example of the de jure 
discrimination against spirits inherent in the Commission's latest 
proposals. Section 6.6 also conveyed the opinion of industry leaders 
that the fragmenting of the supposedly Single European Market 
occasioned by 15 different excise regimes is highly disruptive from 
the point of view of production, distribution and marketing. 
Section 6.7 gave vent to some of the indignation expressed by 
economists concerned with the impact upon alcohol control policies 
and the distributional effects of the Commission's proposals for the 
Uni ted Kingdom. iviost of these economists advocate 'al ternati ves' to 
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the Commission's proposals that run directly counter to the whole 
concept of a Single European Market, not to mention the very raison 
d'etre of the European Union. None reflect upon the justification 
for the special taxation of alcohol, or consider the deleterious 
effects of the Commission's proposals upon the United Kingdom's 
indigenous spirits industry, of such importance to certain 
peripheral regions in Scotland. 
Section 6.7 concluded that wide variations in excises have been 
productive of a sizeable degree of legal and illicit cross-border 
trading in duty-paid goods, which has had the effect of eroding 
receipts from indirect taxation in high-tax regimes, such as the 
United Kingdom. This subject is explored further in the next 
Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES IV: SOME ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 
Is there, that bears the name 0' Scot, 
But feels his heart's bluid rising hot, 
To see his poor auld mither's pot 
Thus dung in staves, 
And plunder'd 0' her hindmost groat 
By gallows knaves? 
Robert Burns The Author I s Earnest Cry & Prayer "To the right honourable and 
honourable Scotch [sic] representatives in the House of Commons." 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5.3 it was revealed that the present structure of excise 
duties in the United Kingdom is illogical, compounded by numerous 
irrational anomalies, and discriminates heavily against spirits. 
When expressed on a degree of alcohol basis, the tax on spirits is 
almost twice that on wine and beer. In examining the rationale for 
alcohol taxation in Chapter 5.4 & 5.5, it was shown that no compelling 
arguments have been advanced for penal rates of taxation on spirits, 
and that a coherent system would tax all alcoholic drinks according 
to their alcoholic content. 
In Chapter 6.4, evidence was marshalled to show that alcoholic drinks 
compete with each other for market share, and that, ipso facto, the 
higher rates of duty applied to spirits will adversely affect sales 
of that product. This is of especial importance given that alcohol 
consumption in the mature markets of Northern Europe is largely 
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static. Chapter 6.3 revealed that the discrimination against 
spiri ts in the Uni ted Kingdom is mirrored in other European markets, 
and is most noticeably reflected in the current minimum level of 
excises applied across Europe since January 1993. 
Section 7.2 of this Chapter examines other problems associated with 
, 
the present structure of alcohol excises in the United Kingdom, 
whilst Section 7.3 analyses several reforms proposed by economists. 
Section 7.4 presents preferred options, and, utilizing estimates of 
own-price elasticities in Section 7.5, Section 7.6 discusses the 
effects of the proposed reforms upon the Scotch whisky industry. The 
impact upon the regional Scottish economy is considered in Section 
7.7, and finally, in Section 7.8, the effect of the proposed reforms 
upon government revenues is perused. Section 7.9 concludes. 
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7.2 Problems with the Present Structure of Duties in the United 
Kingdom 
Tell them wha hae the chief direction, 
Scotland an' me's in great affliction, 
E'er sin' they laid that curst restriction 
On aqua-vitae; 
An' rouse them up to strong conviction, 
An' move their pity 
Robert Burns The Author IS Earnest Cry & Prayer "To the right honourable and 
honourable Scotch [sic] representatives in the House of Commons." 
High taxes, by sometimes diminishing the consumption of the taxed commodities, 
and sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently afford a smaller revenue to 
the government than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes. 
Adam Smith The Weal th of Nations 
The discriminatory treatment of spirits for excise purposes in the 
Uni ted Kingdom has the effect of depressing domestic consumption of a 
(mainly) domestically produced product, in favour of alcoholic 
beverages such as wine, which are almost entirely imported, and beer, 
which is increasingly imported from overseas. Even if foreign 
companies brew under licence in the United Kingdom, profits from 
sales are repatriated overseas. The Scotch Whisky Association has 
calculated that if wines were taxed on the same basis as spirits, 
then, according to HM Customs & Excise demand equations, this would 
reduce wine imports, increase sales of spirits & beer and improve the 
325 
trade balance by £200 million. 1 
Moreover, the task of the Government in lobbying for whisky and other 
spiri ts to be taxed fairly alongside wine and beer in overseas 
markets, and in particular resisting any widening of discrimination 
in Europe, is made more difficult by the existence of high and 
discriminatory rates of duty on spirits in the United Kingdom. The 
European Union accounts for 40% of exports of Scotch whisky, worth 
£827 million in 1996, and 50% of spirits drunk in Europe are produced 
in the United Kingdom, but Scotch whisky exports to Europe are under 
threat if the tax bias against spirits in the United Kingdom is 
consistently copied and perpetuated across continental Europe. 
This point was recognized by the last government, when Chancellor 
Kenneth Clarke announced in his 1995 Budget Speech: "High rates of 
duty at home have made it difficult for the Scotch whisky industry to 
press their excellent case for lower duty rates in other countries. " 2 
Tony Tucker of the Scotch Whisky Association has added: "So long as 
Britain continues to practice a high-tax policy, we see duty in our 
markets in Europe drifting upwards. "3 
As was enunciated in Chapter 6.5, the current minimum rates of 
alcohol excises applied across the European Union establish a 
minimum rate of duty for spirits that is four times the rate applied 
to beer, when expressed in terms of equal quanti ties of pure alcohol. 
There is no compulsion to tax wine at all. But the credibili ty of the 
United Kingdom government in arguing for reform of this prejudiced 
structure is compromised to a considerable degree by the 
discrimination against spirits in the United Kingdom's excise duty 
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structure. 
High rates of duty on spirits have had the effect of contributing to 
lower employment in the industry. Since 1979, an estimated 12,000 
full time jobs have been lost in the Scotch whisky industry, and an 
additional 10,000 jobs have been lost as a consequence of falling 
beer sales. 4 Assuming a Type II employment multiplier of 4.63 for 
spirits and 4.09 for brewing, (see Chapter 3), this implies that as 
many as 94,460 jobs have been lost overall in the United Kingdom 
economy as a result of reduced output of spirits and lower domestic 
production of beer. 
Alcoholic drinks companies face particular uncertainties about 
future pricing since a major element - taxation - is outwith their 
control. This uncertainty is particularly great in the case of 
spiri ts, since taxation currently forms such a high proportion of the 
final price, and of Scotch whisky, where production decisions have to 
be be taken at least three years in advance of the product reaching 
the market. 5 This contrasts with those low tax regimes in Southern 
Europe, where attractive pricing is possible, allowing Scotch whisky 
brand owners to expand their markets and more easily capture the 
enthusiasm of new drinkers. 
A further problem with the United Kingdom's high rates of duty on 
alcohol in general and spirits in particular, compared with other 
countries in the European Union, is the encouragement this gives to 
both legal and illicit cross-border trading. As was expounded upon 
in Chapter 6.3, the United Kingdom levies higher taxes on alcohol 
than any other nation in the EU excepting the Republic of Ireland & 
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the Scandanavian countries. 
A standard bottle of Scotch whisky may retail in Southern Europe for 
less than half the price obtaining in the United Kingdom. So even 
Britons dwelling in the glens where whisky is distilled are obliged 
to pay more than double the price charged in others parts of a 
supposedly 'Single Market.' Figure 7.1 presents a graphic 
illustration of the effect of different taxes upon final prices of a 
typical bottle of Scotch whisky in five key European markets. 
Figure 7.1: Total Tax on a Typical Bottle of Scotch Whisky in Five 
European Markets 
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In the past, with restrictions on the free movement of goods within 
the European Union, such disparities were sustainable, but the 
creation of the Single European Market on January 1st 1993 meant that 
in theory citizens of the United Kingdom are free to import as many 
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duty paid goods into the country for personal consumption as they 
wish. Whilst it is an offence in the United Kingdom for merchants or 
indeed individuals to re-sell duty paid goods unless they pay the 
normal United Kingdom rate of duty to Her Majesty's Customs & Excise, 
this has not presented a substantial increase in illegal smuggling. 6 
The problem was recognized by Kenneth Clarke in his original 1994 
budget: 
One of the most widely publicised other effects of the Single Market has been the 
increase in legitimate cross-border shopping in alcohol and tobacco, and in 
smuggling. Both of these have inevitably meant some loss of duty to the 
Exchequer, pressure on the British drinks industry and some damage to British 
business. No Chancellor can remain unmoved in the face of this.7 
Cross-border trading imposes several costs. The resource costs of 
journeys across frontiers are borne by the individual, but cross-
border shopping may result in an inefficient allocation of resources 
to the extent that consumers' purchasing decisions are driven by tax 
differentials rather than by underlying differences in producer 
prices. 8 High rates of excise duty on spirits suggests that cross-
border shopping will therefore be more disruptive to the spirits 
industry than to the beer and wine trade. 9 
The extra resources allocated to policing illicit trading also 
involves a cost to the taxpayer. In July 1993, HM Customs & Excise 
were obliged to create a new corps of 150 excise 'verification 
officers' in expectation of a surge in illici t activity following the 
removal of border controls. 10 In May 1997, The Scotsman carried a 
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report on the defraudulent export and re-export of whisky in bond, 
criminal activity made lucrative by the very high duties levied on 
spiri ts in the United Kingdom. HM Customs & Excise estimated their 
loss associated wi th this particular enterprise to be of the order of 
£160 million. 11 
HM Customs & Excise have suggested that in 1995, £210 million was lost 
from legitimate cross-border shopping (£110 million wine, £60 
million spirits and £40 million beer). In addition, a recent HM 
Customs & Excise press release reported the results of a survey on 
excise evasion through smuggling. The survey showed that total 
revenue (excise duty and VAT) evaded on liquor and tobacco products 
from other EU countries could amount to some £770 million a year, of 
which £210 million is attributable to liquor products (£110 million 
to beer, £50 million each to wine and spirits). 12 
The Wine and Spirit Association conducted its own surveys at ports to 
collect information on the level of cross-border trade in wine and 
spiri ts. On the basis of these it made a preliminary estimate of the 
annual loss to the United Kingdom exchequer in excise duty and VAT of 
£573 million on wine and spirits alone in 1996. 13 The Brewers & 
Licensed Retailers Association (BLRA) estimates that United Kingdom 
beer sales lost to cross-Channel shopping total some £430 million per 
annum. This implies a VAT loss of £64 million and a duty loss of £83 
million. 1 4 
Differences between the official and trade estimates are partly a 
resul t of differing underlying assumptions about the volume of 
cross-border trade considered 'additional' to that which would have 
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been purchased in the United Kingdom. HM Customs & Excise assumes 
that half the alcohol imported from Europe represents additional 
consumption, and therefore has no implications for domestic excise 
revenue. 
The availability of cheaper alcohol will lead to some extra 
consumption since people's real incomes will increase as a result, 
but HM Customs & Excise stresses that its estimate of the extent of 
this is subject to a large margin of error. 15 In addition, it should 
be noted that a recent study by Oxford Economic Forecasting showed 
that for all reasonable price elasticities, at least 80% of personal 
beer imports were substituting for sales in the United Kingdom. 16 
According to Sutherlands, overall, and not including the Channel 
Tunnel, the quanti ties of duty-paid wines and spirits landed in the 
United Kingdom from Dover-based vessels are now three and a half 
times greater than they were in the first survey of 1993. In 1995 HM 
Treasury and the trade agreed that the overall legal element had a 
retail value in the United Kingdom of between £877m and £1322m. 17 
The cross-border trade in beer is having a particularly adverse 
impact upon brewers, publicans and licensed retailers in the South of 
England. Prior to the relaxation of frontier controls in January 
1993, approximately 440,000 pints of duty-paid beer were landed each 
day from France. The Brewers & Licensed Retailers Association now 
estimate that imports have almost tripled to 1.3 million pints a day. 
This is equivalent to 4% of the beer market in the United Kingdom, 
16.5% of the take-home trade, or the combined total of beer sales in 
all the taverns in Kent & Sussex. The Henley Centre has calculated 
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that lost beer sales in the United Kingdom may have been responsible 
for the loss of as many as 10,000 full time equivalent jobS. 18 
Ironically, in March 1998 the Prime Minister's partner, Ms Cherie 
Booth QC, won a legal battle on behalf of a major brewer, arguing that 
the United Kingdom's obligations under EU law require the 
harmonization of indirect taxes. 
In the light of these problems, a review of duty on alcohol and 
tobacco to develop a policy aimed at combating smuggling from low-tax 
countries was announced by Gordon Brown in his first budget. Dawn 
Primarolo, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, said the review 
would be held because smuggling of alcohol and tobacco from lower 
taxed areas on the Continent was damaging the government's 
revenues: 
It cheats the taxpayer and damages legitimate businesses. We want to forge a 
partnership with the industry with a view to finding new ways of tackling these 
problems. There will be no let-up in Customs' fight against this criminal 
activity. I have asked Customs to consult interested parties and report to me by 
the end of the year. 
Responding to the announcement of a review, Brian Stewart, Chief 
Executive of Scottish & Newcastle, said that the review should 
recognize the beer and pub industry's ability to create large numbers 
of new jobs if there was a duty cut. Mr Stewart, along with other 
representatives of the drinks trade, made the sensible point that 
raising alcohol duties in the budget prejudged the outcome of the 
review: 
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Given that we are confident that the review of duty on alcoholic drinks will 
reveal a compelling case for their reduction, we are disappointed and surprised 
that the Chancellor has opted to make an increase in January 1998. 19 
The proposed review is especially timely, because in addition to the 
undermining of the revenue base of alcohol duties by .cross-border 
shopping, recent evidence suggests that alcohol excises in the 
Uni ted Kingdom in general, but those levied upon spirits in 
particular, may have reached their revenue-maximising pOint. 
Whenever a tax is levied; be it upon labour, capital, or goods and 
services, the tax base tends to disappear as companies, households 
and individuals seek to minimise the incidence of the tax. This non-
linear relationship between the tax rate and tax revenue is 
determined by the rate at which changes in the tax rate cause changes 
in the tax base (domestic demand) and hence lead to changes in tax 
revenues. The relationship was hinted at by Adam Smith (1776), and 
was stated succinctly by Dupuit (1844): 
If a tax is gradually increased from zero up to a point where it becomes 
prohibitive, its yield is at first nil, then increases by small stages until it 
reaches a maximum, after which it gradually declines until it becomes zero 
again. 1 7 
Figure 7.2 illustrc3,tes this supply-side argument, viz that tax 
revenues fall if taxes are raised above a certain pOint. It is most 
often cited in respect of income tax, but it applies just as much to 
other taxes such as excise duties. If the actual rate is anywhere 
above the high point on the curve, then the yield would be increased 
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by a cut in the rate. 20 
Figure 7.2: The Dupuit/Laffer Curve 
1 Maximum revenue point 
Yield 
0% t Tax rate 
Revenue Maximising Rate 
Source: Keith Bayfield, Too Much To Swallow 
In any case, revenue maximisation is not an appropriate aim of fiscal 
policy on general social or economic grounds: as the tax rate 
approaches the maximum-revenue rate, the increase in tax revenue is 
negligible but the reduction in consumers' and producers' surplus is 
substantial. 21 This is discussed more formally in Chapter 5.4. 
In recent years, empirical evidence on yields from excise duties 
suggests that in respect of spirits at least, the high point on the 
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Laffer Curve may have been surpassed. Following an increase in duty 
of 4.4% in March 1992, excise revenue from spirits fell by £79 million 
in the year to March 1993. Revenues rose by almost £46 million in the 
year to March 1994 after a period of unchanged duty. In the year to 
March 1995, revenue increased by £69 million. But in the mini-budget 
of December 1994, occasioned by the backbench Tory revolt over 
applying VAT at the full rate to domestic fuel, alcohol duties were 
increased by 4%.22 The result was that revenues from the spirits 
industry fell by £123m during 1995, despite spirits producers 
suffering a cut in profit margins in an attempt to maintain 
sales. 23 
In the aftermath of the 4% spiri ts tax cut in November 1995, the first 
in 100 years, the market revived and stabilised in 1996, and home 
sales began to climb. 24 In December 1995-January 1996, excise 
receipts from spirits were up £17 million. 25 A second 4% cut followed 
in November 1996, but in the new Labour government's first budget on 
July 3rd 1997, Gordon Brown announced a 3% increase in excise duties, 
effective of January 1998. 
Whisky industry leaders attacked the move, saying it was 
inconsistent in the face of the Chancellor's decision, also 
announced in the budget, to undertake a thorough review of the whole 
alcohol tax system. The Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) said it was 
"immensely disappointed" that the Chancellor had chosen a flat 
percentage increase of alcohol duties which it said would increase 
the duty on Scotch by more than that on other drinks. Campbell Evans, 
Press & Media Spokesman for the SWA said: 
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We are surprised that he should have made any changes, since it would seem to pre-
empt the outcome of his review. By raising duties ahead of the review, the 
Chancellor has failed his own test of fairness. The last two rises in spirits 
duty generated less money for the Treasury so if the Chancellor expects to raise 
more revenue by this move he is likely to be disappointed. 26 
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7.3 Possible Reforms of the Duty Structure in the United Kingdom 
The temptation to smuggle can be diminished only by lowering the tax rate 
Adam Smith The Weal th of Nations 
Section 7.2 determined that the present system of duties in the 
United Kingdom is contrary to the national interest. This Section 
looks at the effects of some alternative proposals, all of which take 
as given the need to first reform the system such that all alcoholic 
beverages are taxed on an equal basis according to alcoholic content. 
It is sometimes contended that taxes on alcohol should reflect 
distributional considerations, although it has been argued 
elsewhere in this thesis that such matters are more candidly attended 
to through the tax & benefit system. Suffice to reiterate, that the 
current system of excise duties on alcohol in the United Kingdom is 
not progressive, an outcome which could only be achieved by 
discriminating against wine and in favour of beer and spirits. Such a 
regime would be contrary to the rulings of the European Court of 
Justice. Equalising duty per degree of alcohol would not make the 
system more inequitable, as none of the reforms proposed would result 
in a si tuation where any income decile paid significantly more of its 
income in alcohol tax. 27 
The Institute For Fiscal Studies has conducted several studies on 
raising or lowering the level of alcohol duties in the United 
Kingdom, and the attendant consequences upon consumption, 
government revenues, and distributional effects. All models share 
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the common feature of favouring a system that taxes beverages 
according to alcoholic content, but offer alternative proposals on 
how to achieve this. The results of two of the more recent, "Alcohol 
Consumption & Taxation" written by Edmund Crooks in 1989, and "The 
Structure of Alcohol Taxes: A Hangover from the Past?" by Paul Baker & 
Stephen McKay in 1990, are examined here. 
Both models use the IFS Simulation Program for Indirect Taxation 
(SPIT), based upon a demand system model of household expenditures 
estimated over 17 years of Family Expendi ture Survey (FES) data from 
1970-1986. The results obtained from the model are incorporated 
wi thin a micro-computer programme which simulates the effect of tax 
changes over a sample of some 7045 households from the 1986 FES. 
Baker & McKay believe their model to be more accurate than Crook's, as 
it divides the sample into four groups, according to whether the 
household owns a car, or whether they smoke. 28 
Crooks determined that 'levelling down' the tax rate on wine and 
spirits to the rate which applied to beer would result in spirits 
consumption doubling, but in this model, although beer is no more 
expensive, beer consumption falls as people move over to spirits. 
This conclusion is at odds with most other studies which show no 
significant cross-price elasticity between beer and spirits. In 
total, alcohol consumption, measured in terms of litres of pure 
alcohol consumed per annum, increases by 16.5%, government revenue 
increases by 1.5%. By contrast, Baker & McKay's model suggests that 
'levelling down' would result in an increase in alcohol consumption 
of 12.2%, but would lower government revenue by 7%.29 
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Conversely, Crooks calculated that in the case of 'levelling up' 
duties on wine and beer to that which pertains for spirits, beer and 
wine consumption both fall, and there is some switching to spirits. 
Overall consumption of alcohol falls by 11%, government revenue 
increases by 4%. In Baker & McKay's model, 'levelling up' would lower 
alcohol consumption by 18.7%, and increases government tax revenue 
by 14%.30 
One important assumption made in these simulations is that there is 
no response from the producers; the only change in prices is caused by 
the change in taxation. This implies that the incidence of the taxes 
is entirely on the consumer, and the whole burden is passed forward by 
the drinks companies. Arguably this is a fair assumption; in most 
circumstances companies will maximise profits by passing on any tax 
increases or cuts, although to the extent that they have monopoly 
power in the market some of the tax increase or cut will be absorbed 
in lower of higher margins. In this instance, the effects on 
consumption & revenue will be greater or less than the simulations 
suggest. 
A feature of the two simulations in Crook's model is that both 
levelling 'up and levelling down lead to increases in total indirect 
tax receipts. This apparently paradoxical result is caused by the 
fact that spirits are much more price elastic than beer. So if taxes 
are levelled down, the increase in spirits consumption is large 
enough to boost revenue even though the tax rate is reduced, whereas 
if taxes are levelled up, the decrease in beer consumption is not 
great enough to offset the revenue-increasing effect of the higher 
tax rate. 3 1 
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Baker & McKay concluded that revenue and consumption 'neutral' 
reforms could be effected by comparable rates of tax per unit of 
alcohol. This suggests that it would be possible for the Chancellor 
to implement a set of alcohol duties, based upon alcohol content, 
which would leave government revenue and total alcohol consumption 
largely unchanged, but which would reflect the social costs of 
alcohol consumption in a more consistent manner. The consumption 
neutral reform implies an increase in duties on beer and wine, and a 
decrease in the duty on spirits which offsets these increases. The 
resul t of this would be a slight increase in tax revenue of 
1.5%.32 
But Crooks believes that there is a major problem wi th this plan from 
a public health point of view: in the long-term there would be a 
substantial increase in real incomes, and hence in alcohol 
consumption. The proposed increase in beer and wine duties would 
moderate that growth, but the fall in the real value of spirits duties 
would accelerate it. The increase in demand in response to increases 
in real income will of course depend upon income elasticity; some of 
the more recent estimates are given in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1: Income Elasticities of Demand 
Beer Wine Spirits 
Walsh & Walsh (1970) 0.50-0.79 - 1. 48-2.06 
(Republic of Ireland) 
Her Majesty's Treasury (1980) 0.7 2.2 2.5 
Duffy (1983) 0.80-1.10 2.5 1.6 
Salvanathan (1988 ) 0.41 1. 74 2.18 
Crooks (IFS 1989) 0.92 2.56 2.09 
Comparison of the income elastities of wine & spirits in particular 
wi th their smaller own-price elasticities (see Section 7.5) suggests 
that even larger price increases may therefore be necessary to 
restrain consumption if real incomes are increasing. Studies across 
countries have discovered that the income elasticities tend to be 
lower the more important the drink is in terms of its share of total 
consumption. Thus in beer drinking countries, beer has a low income 
elastici ty, in wine drinking countries (except for Italy), wine has a 
low value. In Finland, Sweden and probably Russia, vodka has a low 
income elasticity. 34 
The reported income elasticities of demand can largely account for 
both the rapid growth in consumption of spirits and wine in the 
relatively prosperous 1960s & early 1970s, and the marked fall in the 
expansion of per capi t:a consumption levels during the recession and 
stagnation after the 1973/4 oil price crisis, & during the 1979-81 
recession. 
Duffy's (1983)35 estimates suggests that the per capit:a demand for 
wines and spirits is likely to grow at rates approximately 50-150% 
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faster than the consumer's real disposable incomes, cet:eris paribus. 
Beer demand may increase at a rate 20% below the rate of growth of 
income. Duffy concludes: 
Even if these estimates seem rather high, they do at least signal that the future 
rate of increase in consumption of alcoholic drinks may be very large indeed; the 
implication would seem to be that in the long-run any alcohol control policies 
are likely to be confronted with an uphill struggle against the affluent 
society's increasing propensity to consume drink. 36 
On the basis of his estimates of income elasticity, Crook's predicts 
that an increase in national income of 2 per cent in real terms would 
increase the consumption of beer by just under 2 per cent, the 
consumption of spirits by 4 per cent, and the consumption of wine by 
as much as 5 per 'cent, arguing: 
The volume of consumption could well double every 20 years. It has already been 
accepted that the Treasury should uprate the nominal value of duties each year in 
order to maintain their real value. Should we also adopt a different convention 
for uprating alcohol taxes, in order to curb the growth caused by rising 
incomes?37 
Evidene accrued by Brendan Walsh on the Republic of Ireland 38 casts 
doubt on the wisdom of Crook's suggestion. The excise tax on all 
alcoholic beverages, but on beer in particular, is extremely high, 
exceeded only in the Scandanavian countries, which suggests that 
alcohol is more expensive in relation to income in the Irish Republic 
than anywhere else in the Western world (Sulkunen, 1978). 
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But these rigorous fiscal policies notwithstanding, there has been a 
steady increase in per capita alcohol consumption during the 1960s 
and 70s, with an attendant rise in at least some of the indicies of 
alcohol-related problems. Perhaps if alcohol tax policy had been 
more lenient, there would have been a greater increase in problems, 
but the econometric evidence suggests the effect would not have been 
dramatic. One consequence of this policy of high alcohol taxes has 
been a marked rise in the proportion of income devoted to purchasing 
alcoholic beverages, to the point where the Republic of Ireland is 
ahead of all other countries on this statistic. 
There is an understandable temptation for those concerned with 
public health to seek a solution to the problems fo alcohol abuse in a 
tougher fiscal policy. Undoubtedly many countries have neglected 
this possibility, but the evidence from the Republic of Ireland 
suggests that only limited inroads on the problems associated with 
excessive drinking can be expected from a policy of high alcohol 
taxes. 39 
Moreover, recent evidence suggests that alcohol consumption in the 
Uni ted Kingdom has plateaued, and that fears rising real incomes will 
occasion ever higher levels of alcohol consumption may be 
exaggerated. Figure 7.3 illustrates that after rising through most 
of the 1980s, per capita alcohol consumption in the United Kingdom 
was actually less in 1992 than in 1979. 
343 
Figure 7.3: Per Capita Alcohol Consumption in the United Kingdom 
1979-92 (litres of pure alcohol per annum) 
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Source: Pieda PIc, Alcoholic Drinks: Competition in the 
European Union 
As a proportion of their total income, people are choosing to spend 
less on alcohol, a fact revealed in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2: Average Weekly Household Expenditure on Alcoholic Drink 
(%): Scotland and the United Kingdom, 1977-1996 
Year Alcoholic Drink as % of Total Expenditure 
Scotland United Kingdom 
1977-78 5.7 4.9 
1979-80 5.4 4.8 
1981-82 5.0 4.7 
1982-83 4.7 4.7 
1983-84 5.3 4.8 
1984-85 5.6 4.8 
1985-86 5.6 4.7 
1986-87 5.3 4.6 
1987-88 5.2 4.6 
1988-89 4.9 4.3 
1989-90 4.8 4.1 
1990-91 4.5 4.1 
1991-92 4.5 4.1 
1993 4.6 4.3 
1994-95 4.3 4.3 
1995-96 4.0 
Sources: The Scottish Economic Bulletin, 1994-1996 
The Scottish Abstract of Statistics, 1997 
The Scottish Office based their estimates in Table 7.2 upon the 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES),published annually by HMSO. It 
should be noted that estimates for alcohol purchases reported in the 
FES are below those which might be expected by comparison with other 
sources. This caveat notwithstanding, the general thrust of falling 
alcohol expenditure as a percentage of total income holds good; 
evidence from The Drinks Pocket Handbook 1995 also reveals a fall 
from 7.21% in 1970 to 6.28% in 1993,40 whilst Sutherlands also report 
a fall from 7.20% in 1984 to 6.02% in 1994.41 
Real absolute expenditure on alcohol in the United Kingdom has also 
fallen in recent years; in 1988, at the peak of the Lawson boom, total 
consumers I expenditure on alcoholic beverages summed to £21,789 
million. By 1993, this figure had fallen to £20,513 million 
(expressed at constant 1990 prices). 
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This fall in expenditure masks significant shifts in the pattern of 
alcohol consumption. Consumption of both beer and spirits has 
fallen: beer production in the United Kingdom fell from 41.2 million 
barrels in 1979 to 34.85 million barrels in 1993, whilst production 
of Scotch whisky declined from 4,158,700 hectolitres in 1980, to 
3,562,500 hectolitres in 1993. As a result, since 1979, the share of 
spirits in total expenditure on alcohol has fallen from nearly a 
quarter to barely a fifth, representing a reduction in sales of 
30%.42 
But whereas brewers have been able to maintain profits on reduced 
sales because of a 45% increase in the real duty paid price since 
1979, the real duty paid price of Scotch has fallen by 3%. By 
contrast, since 1979, sales of wine have soared by 60%, increasing 
the proportion of alcohol expenditure accounted for by wines from 16% 
to 25%.43 The existing duty structure in the Uni ted Kingdom therefore 
levies the highest excise duties on that segment of the drinks market 
which has been diminishing - spirits - while subjecting wine, whose 
consumption has been increasing, to much lower excise duties. 44 
These changes are illustrated graphically in Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4: Consumption of Alcohol in the United Kingdom 
(hectolitres of pure alcohol) 1988-1992 (1988=100) 
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Source: Pieda PIc, Alcoholic Drinks: Competition in the European 
Union 
Finally, as depicted in Figure 7.5, comparison of per capi ta levels 
of alcohol consumption reveals that the United Kingdom ranks below 
most other European countries; 21st to be precise, in a league table 
of international per capita alcohol consumption. 45 
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Figure 7.5: Per Capita Alcohol Consumption by Country 
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In sum, therefore, empirical evidence indicates a fall in per capi ta 
alcohol consumption in the United Kingdom since 1979, especially of 
beer and spirits, a long-term contraction in alcohol expenditure as a 
percentage of consumers' incomes, and a recent reduction in the 
absolute level of expenditure on alcoholic drinks. Moreover, in 
other countries of the European Union, where in general alcohol 
excises are much less than in the Uni ted Kingdom, there has only been 
a slight increase in per capita alcohol consumption since 1961, as 
depicted in Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.6: Average Per Capita Alcohol Consumption (LPA), EU 
Member States, 1961-1991 
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Source: Pieda PIc, Alcoholic Drinks: Competition in the European 
Union 
This evidence, together wi th the findings of Brendan Walsh in respect 
of the Republic of Ireland referred to earlier, seriously qualifies 
the Apocalyptic scenarios envisaged by Duffy, Crooks et ai, and hence 
markedly diminishes the validity of their arguments for frequent 
revalorisation of alcohol excises in the United Kingdom to take 
account of rising real incomes. 
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7.4 Preferred Options 
The various reforms of the structure of alcohol excises in the Uni ted 
Kingdom advocated by economists, such as those attached to the 
Insti tute for Fiscal Studies, were considered in the previous 
Section. Arguments in favour of regularly uprating alcohol duties to 
take account of high values of income elasticity of demand 
(particulary for spirits & wines) were also examined, but these were 
discovered to be at variance with empirical evidence of static 
alcohol consumption. 
It is contended in this Section that none of the proposed reforms 
outlined in the previous Section are really viable in the present 
context. Any substantial increase in alcohol duties would result in 
higher retail prices, politically unpopular, and the price changes 
would also feed through to the Retail Price Index. Moreover, none of 
the proposed reforms took into account the impact of significant 
reductions in alcohol consumption upon industries in the United 
Kingdom engaged in brewing and distilling. Such an omission also 
prevents an analysis of the effects of linkage reductions upon the 
wider economy resulting from a contraction in output in the drinks 
industry. 
Of greatest concern, however, is the encouragement unilateraly 
raising duties in the United Kingdom would give to the already 
substantial levels of cross-border shopping, the scale and 
opportuni ty cost of which was discussed in Section 7.2. The level of 
duties in the United Kingdom have already reached such a meridian 
that the government is being forced to persuade other EU member 
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states to raise their excise duties on alcohol in order to defend the 
revenue base in the United Kingdom from the effects of cross-border 
shopping. The previous Paymaster-General, David Heathcoat-Amory, 
told a recent conference organized by the Wine & Spirit 
Association: 
Ideally, we would like to see other member states, especially the low taxing 
ones, increase their duties on wine and beer to bring them more in line with 
ours ... that will not be easy to achieve. 46 
Such appeals are unlikely to win much support, but even if they were, 
one of the first to suffer would be the United Kingdom's domestic 
drinks industry. Prosperous markets in Southern Europe would 
contract sharply if there was any mandatory increase in minimum 
excise duty rates. 
In Chapter 6.7 it was argued that the harmonisation of alcohol 
excises is a sine qua non for successfully completing the internal 
market. Given that the average level of duties in most member states 
of the European Union are appreciably lower than in the United 
Kingdom, any harmonisation will most likely result in rates that are 
below those pertaining at present in the United Kingdom. In seeking 
to ensure that any final settlement does not discriminate against 
spiri ts, the government will need to recognize that the duty 
structure first has to be reformed in the United Kingdom. 
Reconstituting alcohol excises in the United Kingdom will therefore 
'involve not only altering the relative duty structure such that all 
alcoholic beverages are taxed at an equal rate according to alcohol 
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content, but inevitably means a reduction in the absolute level of 
alcohol excises. This can be achieved most simply through not 
revalorising all alcohol duties in line with inflation, and cutting 
the tax on spirits in absolute terms. 
The logic of these proposals was recognized by the previous 
Chancellor, who in his last two budgets, froze alcohol duties on wine 
and beer and actually reduced the spirits excise in two consecutive 
4% cuts. But even with annual cuts of 4%, it would take 14 years for 
spiri ts to reach pari ty wi th other alcoholic drinks, and in any case, 
in his post-election budget the present Chancellor widened the 
absolute differentials between the taxation of alcoholic beverages 
by announcing an increase in alcohol duties of 3% from January 1998. 
The Chancellor did, however, freeze spirits duty in his March 1998 
budget. 
Table 7.3 outlines how the proposed reforms could be effected. The 
excise on spirits is almost halved, and the tax applied to other 
categories of alcohol adjusted downwards slightly such that all 
alcoholic beverages are taxed at a flat rate of £10.00 per litre of 
pure alcohol. 
Table 7.3: Duty Charged (£) Per Li tre of Pure Alcohol: Current Levels 
(1997) and Proposed Change 
Product ABV Present Duty Proposed Duty 9" 0 Cut 
Fortified Wine 17.50% 10.70 10.00 6.5 
Beer 4.93% 10.82 10.00 7.6 
Table Wine 11. 20% 12.54 10.00 20.0 
Spirits 40.00% 18.99 10.00 47.0 
Creating such a structure of alcohol duties in the United Kingdom 
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would substantially increase sales of spirits such as Scotch whisky, 
increasing output and employment across Scotland. This is discussed 
in more detail in Section 7.6. Moreover, reforming alcohol excises 
along the lines proposed would enable the government to lobby 
credibly for comparable structures in other nations, and for the 
principle of equivalency to be applied when setting minimum rates of 
alcohol duties across the European Union. 
Nevetheless, in addition to reforming the domestic structure of 
alcohol excises, the United Kingdom government may need to adopt a 
more aggressive stance within the European Union if it is to oblige 
other member states to recognize its point of view. The government 
may wish to use its veto in the Council of Ministers to thwart any 
attempts at harmonising alcohol excises in the EU which does not 
apply the principle of taxation according to alcohol content. In 
addi tion, the government should fight tenaciously for the removal of 
the several 'concessions' allowed as part of the October 1992 
agreement on minimum rates. 
A tete-a.-tete in the Council of Ministers may not be sufficient. The 
government should consider very seriously applying Imperial 
Preference in the form of abolishing duties & VAT on wine imported 
from the British Dominions of Australia & New Zealand. This would 
have the salutary affect of focusing the attention of wine enamoured 
European governments on the United Kingdom's viewpoint. 
Such policies could be implemented by the United Kingdom sans peur et 
sans reproche, as they would be no different to the 'preference' 
France has secured for the spirits produced in its Caribbean 
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colonies, which places Scotch whisky at a competitive disadvantage 
in its most important market. Reducing the tax on spirits in the 
Uni ted Kingdom below that which obtains for wine would not be nearly 
so effective, because as well as undermining the case for equivalency 
in excise taxation, such a move would also benefit French producers 
of Cognac, Armagnac, and Calvados. New World wines currently 
represent formidable competition to European viniculture, not only 
in respect of quali ty, but in terms of value too. Abolishing taxes on 
Antipodean wines would therefore be highly efficacious. 
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7.5 Estimates of Own-Price Elasticities 
A reformed system of alcohol excises in the United Kingdom was 
advocated in the previous Section, involving a reduction in duties in 
general, but on spirits in particular. The effect of these 
reductions on sales will clearly depend upon the responsiveness of 
demand to any fall in price. The precise value for own-price 
elasticity depends upon the shape of the 'Demand Function' for the 
alcoholic beverage concerned - how the demand for it responds to 
changes in price. If the measured elasticity is less than minus I, a 
good is defined as displaying elastic demand; if the elasticity is 
equal to minus I, the good is said to be of unit elasticity (ie if the 
elasticity of demand is precisely minus 1.0, a ten per cent fall in 
price would cause sales to increase by 10 per cent); and if the 
elasticity of demand is greater than minus 1 (eg -0.8) the good is 
deemed to display inelastic demand - a price change will have minimal 
impact on the quantity sold. Elastici ty figures are usually 
expressed as minus figures, since if the price of a good increases, 
demand falls. Thus, an inverse relationship normally obtains 
between the price charged and the quantity demanded. 
In a recent report for the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 
entitled Alcohol Taxes & The Single Market (1995), Ian Crawford & 
Sarah Tanner 47 analysed household expenditure on beer, wines and 
spiri ts, arriving at some estimates of own price demand elasticities 
for the year 1993. These are set out in Table 7.4, together with 
other estimates of own-price elasticities for alcoholic beverages, 
which will be referred to later in this Section. 
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Table 7.4: Own-Price Elasticities 
Beer Wine Spirits 
Her Majesty's Treasury (1980) -0.2 -1.1 -1.6 
Salvanathan (1988) -0.20 -0.49 -0.79 
Crooks (IFS 1989) -1.0 -0.91 -2.42 
Constant Real Expenditure -1.4 -0.4 -2.41 
True Budget Shares -1.29 -0.83 -1.64 
The Henley Centre (1991) -0.30 -0.30 -0.49 
Balasubramanyan & Salisu (1993) -0.34 -0.97 -1.06 
Her Majesty's Customs & Excise (1993 ) -0.5 -1.3 -1.3 
Bossard (1994) -1.4 -0.45 -2.10 
Her Majesty's Customs & Excise (1995) -0.96 -1.05 -1.07 
Crawford & Tanner (IFS 1995) -0.67 -1.40 -1.18 
Blake & Nied (1995) Av of time series -0.19 -0.54 -0.57 
Av of cross section -1.15 -0.13 -2.94 
Range -0.19/ -0.13/ -0.57/ 
-1.29 -1.40 -2.94 
Mean -0.74 -0.76 -1.51 
Standard Deviation 0.480 0.401 0.766 
Significantly, the official economic evidence collected by HM 
Customs & Excise also indicates that the demand for alcoholic drinks, 
especially spiri ts, is sensi ti ve to price. As can be seen from Table 
7.4, the demand equations employed by HM Customs & Excise in 1995 
differ from those calculated by Crawford & Tanner. For example, 
Customs & Excise deem the demand for wine to be marginally more 
inelastic than the demand for spirits, whereas Crawford & Tanner 
concluded that the demand for wine is significantly more elastic than 
that which obtains for spirits. 
In a recent report entitled Too Much To Swallow (1995)48, the Adam 
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Smith Institute asked Her Majesty's Customs & Excise to explain the 
different estimates. It transpired that HM Customs & Excise demand 
elasticities were based upon some econometric studies undertaken by 
the IFS for Customs & Excise in 1990. It would appear that the 
different estimates of elasticity of demand are explained by the fact 
that the IFS regularly updates its model for alcoholic beverages in 
the I ight of changing personal incomes, tax rates and other 
variables. Crawford & Tanner believe that the differences between 
the two sets of estimates are not significant, if allowance is made 
for the standard errors involved in such calculations. 
In a recent enquiry, the Treasury Select Committee questioned Henry 
Neuberger, the Head of the Economics & Statistics Division of HM 
Customs & Excise, about the official estimates of demand elasticity 
with regard to alcoholic drinks. Mr Neuberger pointed out that 
II Alcohol, by contrast with tobacco, has a demand which is very 
sensi ti ve to price. II Mr Neuberger confirmed that liOn the whole, 
professional estimates put the elasticity of demand at about unity, 
which means that a one per cent increase in price will lead to about a 
one per cent fall in consumption. 1149 
The estimates of Crooks (1989) on own-price elasticity require some 
comment. It is possible that the own-price elasticities of -1.0 for 
beer, -0.91 for wine and -2.42 for spirits, are biased for alcoholic 
drink in particular, because of the under reporting of alcohol in the 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES). Consider the constant real 
expenditure own-price elasticities as -1.4 for beer, -0.4 for wine 
and -2.41 for spirits, on mean budget shares of 4.1, 0.75 and 1.1 per 
cent respectively. If, however, the true budget shares, discovered 
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from the National Accounts, are used instead of the FES shares, the 
elasticities become -1.29 for beer, -0.83 for wine, and -1.64 for 
spirits, much closer to the estimates of HM Treasury (1980).50 
If spirits have the same (or greater) own-price elasticity as wine 
and beer, then spirits' share of consumer expendi ture must be reduced 
relative to other drinks categories. This follows from the fact that 
excise duties form a higher proportion of the final price of spirits 
product s . 5 1 
Most other studies have at least concurred on the inelasticity of 
demand for beer, but disagree as to the position in respect of wine 
and spirits. Duffy (1980) believed the price elasticity of demand 
for beer in the United Kingdom to be low,52 whilst Walsh & Walsh 
(1970)53 in their study of alcohol consumption in Ireland, came to 
the conclusion that a "rising relative price of beer has little or no 
effect on the quantity of beer consumed, but does lead to a 
proportional increase in expenditure on beer." 
Duffy (1980) found that spirits and wine are significantly 
responsive to movements in prices, but Walsh & Walsh (1970) 
considered their best estimate for Ireland was 0.57. Salvanathan 
used the differential approach to analyse the demand for beer, wine 
and spirits in the UK, 1955-85, and he too found demand for all 
alcoholic beverages to be inelastic. 54 
Balasubramanyan & Salisu's estimates are based upon a model 
combining the traditional approach and the systems wide method, 
believing this is likely to yield demand elasticities that are 
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consistent with stylised facts. They express per capi ta real 
expenditure on each of the three categories of alcoholic drink as a 
function of total real expenditures on alcoholic drinks, real prices 
of the three drinks, and the amount of expenditure incurred by 
vacationers from the United Kingdom abroad (particularly in 
Europe.)55 
In a 1994 paper utilising cointegration and error correction 
techniques, Balasubramanyan & Salisu also found the own price 
elastici ty of demand for spirits to be higher than that for wine and 
beer. But whilst the short run own price elasticity of demand for 
wine was found to be higher than its long-run price elasticity, the 
opposite was found to be true in the case of spirits. They found 
Ii ttle difference between the estimated short-run and long-run price 
elasticities of demand for beer. 
The error correction term in the error correction mechanism was found 
to be statistically different from zero, leading Balasubramanyan & 
Salisu to conclude that: "This suggests that the extant studies on 
demand for alcoholic drinks in the United Kingdom have relied on 
equations which are misspecified, as they do not include the error 
correction term." For these reasons, Balasubramanyan & Salisu have 
argued that the price elasticities of demand for the three categories 
of drinks estimated on the basis of the cOintegration and ECM models 
may be much more accurate that those grounded in conventional 
econometric models. 56 
In an in-depth econometric analysis of demand for alcoholic drinks in 
ten European Union countries, especially prepared for the European 
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Commission, Bossard (1994) found only three examples out of 40 
alcoholic drinks sectors across Europe where a price rise did not 
result in reduced consumption. The three sectors discovered where 
price was not a significant influence were beer consumption outside 
of the home in France, consumption of still wine in Germany, and wine 
consumption in Spain. Bossard concluded: 
On the whole, consumption of alcoholic beverages is highly sensitive to 
price ... ln most countries, the sensitivity to the specific price is greatest for 
spirits and least marked for the dominant alcoholic beverage. 57 
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that precise estimates of the 
own-price elasticity of demand for different alcoholic drinks will 
remain elusive; Table 7.4 shows that there are quot homines, tot 
sententiae on this subject, and the standard deviations are 
particularly revealing. For this reason, average values have also 
been computed, and faux de mieux, for the purposes of this study the 
mean estimates calculated will be utilised. It should also be noted 
that the lowest level of disaggregated elasticity estimates 
available refer to 'spirits' in general; there are no officially 
recorded figures specifically for whisky, much less any distinction 
made between demand for the cheaper blended whiskies or the higher 
quality malts. 
But recent empirical evidence suggests that attributing a value of 
approximately -1.5 to the price elasticity of demand for whisky wi th 
respect to own price may be appropriate. An article in The Scotsman 
newspaper on March 6 1997 reported that sales of Scotch whisky had 
increased by 3% in the aftermath of the 4% cut in duty in November 
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1996. 58 As duty accounts for approximately 50% of the final price, 
this represents a 2% fall in the final price; a 3% increase in sales 
therefore suggests a price elasticity of -1.5. 
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7.6 Implications for Whisky Industry of Reform 
Section 7.4 advocated reforming the structure of alcohol excises in 
the United Kingdom such that all alcoholic beverages were taxed at a 
flat rate of £10.00 per litre of pure alcohol. This would necessi tate 
minor reductions in the tax on beer, cider and fortified wines, a 20% 
reduction in the wine excise, (100% for wines imported from Australia 
& New Zealand), and almost halving duties on spirits. 
At present, an average 70cl bottle of spirits at 40% abv attracts a 
specific duty of £5.32. Including Value Added Tax of 17.5%, this sums 
to £6.25. Reducing the tax on spirits from £18.99 to £10.00 per litre 
of pure alcohol implies a cut of just over 47%, which would lower the 
specific duty pn an average strength bottle of spirits to £2.80, 
£3.29 including VAT. Assuming an average retail price for a typical 
bottle of blended Scotch whisky of £10.50, this 47% reduction in tax 
of £2.96 represents a fall in the final price of 28%. 
The effect on sales of whisky from this cut will clearly depend upon 
the responsiveness of demand to this reduction in price. In Section 
7.5, an average value for the own-price elasticity of spirits was 
determined to be -1.51. So a 28% reduction in the price of whisky 
would, ceteris paribus, result in a 42% increase in demand. 
This assumes of course that the cut in duty is passed on fully to the 
consumer, not added to producer or retailer margins. Current 
pressure on the selling prices realised by producers suggests that 
some may attempt to garner some of the duty saving for themselves. A 
certain distributor in the Far East intimated that he believed the 
362 
Scotch whisky industry was being "optimistic" in assuming that the 
savings from lowering Japanese duties on imported spirits will be 
passed on to the consumer. 
But presuming that demand for spirits does increase by the estimated 
42%, what will be the effect upon employment in the whisky industry? 
In 1996, 32.07 million litres of pure alcohol (lpa) of Scotch whisky 
were consumed in the United Kingdom. A 42% increase in demand would 
therefore increase this figure by 13.47 million lpa to 45.54 million 
lpa. This 13.47 million lpa increase in output destined for the 
domestic market represents a rise of 4.7% in total Scotch whisky 
output, based upon 1996 world sales figures of 288.87 million lpa. As 
discussed previously, at end of 1996, some 13,345 people were 
directly employed by the whisky industry, so a rise in total Scotch 
whisky output of 4.7% should increase employment by 627. 
This analysis assumes near enough 100% capacity utilisation in mal t & 
grain distilleries, which in reality is seldom the case; in 1995, the 
figure was of the order of 70%, so it is quite likely that a 
substantial increase in output could be realised without hiring many 
more men. In addition, it is assumed that whisky distillers will wish 
to maintain current stocks in bond, estimated at 7.4 years supply at 
current (1997) sales projection. But since whisky is consumed at an 
average age of six years, a stocks/consumption ratio of 7.0 is held 
within the industry to be appropriate. 59 Moreover, even if the 
estimates of direct employment increases may be inflated, the extra 
whisky production will require additional inputs from suppliers who 
may well be operating at higher levels of capacity utilisation. 
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7.7 Effects on Regional Scottish Economy 
In the previous Section it was calculated that up to 627 jobs could be 
created wi thin the whisky industry by the proposed reduction in the 
spirits excise. This Section attempts to determine the impact 
increased output of whisky has upon the regional Scottish 
economy. 
Multipler estimates presented in Chapter 3 vary as between the 1989 
and 1994 Input-Output Tables. Two estimates of indirect and induced 
employment created by the increase in final demand for whisky are 
therefore given in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5: Employment Created Across Scottish Economy Resul ting 
From Increase in Final Demand For Whisky: 
1989 & 1994 Employment Multiplier Estimates 
Employment Created 1989 Multipliers 1994 Multipliers 
Direct 627 627 
Indirect 1668 922 
Induced 608 395 
TOTAL 2903 1944 
1989 Type I Employment Multiplier = 3.66 
1989 Type II Employment Multiplier = 4.63 
1994 Type I Employment Multiplier = 2.47 
1994 Type II Employment Multiplier = 3.10 
These calculations assume that the income arising from direct and 
indirect employment created by the whisky industry is additional; 
there is no offset from reduced unemployment and supplementary 
benefit. This assumption is consistent either with the jobs being 
filled by in migration or by people entering the labour force, rather 
than leaving the unemployment register. 
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But conceivably, all those entering employment could come off the 
unemployment count. In an article for the Scottish Economic Bulletin 
enti tIed" Income & Employment Mul tipliers: Some Further Resul ts, " D 
S Henderson & G Storie 61 calculated that taking this into account 
diminishes the Type II employment multiplier associated with the 
whisky industry by a factor of approximately 0.3. In this instance, 
the Type II employment multiplier, estimated by J M Alexander & T R 
Whyte on the basis of the 1989 Scottish Input-Output Tables, is 
therefore reduced from 4.63 to 4.33. 62 
In Henderson & Storie's calculations, the income of the unemployed 
was assumed to be 20% of the income received in employment. This 
estimate had been derived by estimating the average receipts of 
unemployment and supplementary benefit per head of unemployed in 
Scotland, and taking this as a percentage of average income per 
person in employment, including the self-employed. They also 
assumed that the average tax rate is relevant to the change in income, 
but in reali ty this assumption is likely to understate the tax paid on 
additional income, and therefore to overstate the relevant 
multiplier, because of the effects of the income tax rate and of 
factors such as the loss of rent and rate rebate, eligibility for 
payment of National Insurance contributions etc. 
In practice, it is unlikely that net increases in employment will 
resul t in either all persons coming off the count or none. 
Interpolation according to the expected outcome would yield more 
relevant estimates,63 but for the present purposes the Type II 
employment multipliers associated with the 1989 and 1994 Input-
Output Tables will be utilised. 
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Evidence presented on cross-price elasticities in Chapter 6.4 
suggested that whilst there is no statistically significant cross-
price substitution between beer and spirits when the relative price 
of one varies vis-a-vis the other, wine and spirits are close 
pairwise substitutes. The minor reductions in beer duties proposed 
will not therefore compromise the calculated employment gains above. 
The 20% reduction in the wine excise, 100% for wines from the 
Dominions, will however impact upon demand for spirits, but probably 
not to any significant degr~e. 
It will be noted too that the projected increase in employment across 
Scotland occasioned by the reduction in excise duties (1944-2903) 
offsets the contraction in employment calculated in Chapter 4 in the 
event of losing intra-EU duty free sales of Scotch whisky in 1999 
(463-1232). Even assuming that 80% of intra-EU duty free sales of 
Scotch whisky are lost in the aftermath of abolition, and employment 
gains from lowering the spirits excise were less than the minimum 
1944 projected, in a likelihood there would still be a net creation of 
jobs. 
By reducin~ duties on spirits along the lines proposed, the 
government of the Uni ted Kingdom would ensure that increased 
domestic demand for Scotch whisky compensates for the loss of the 
intra-EU duty free market, and will therefore at least sustain, if 
not augment slightly, current levels of employment across Scotland 
dependent upon the whisky industry. 
At present, the majority of spirits destined for duty free outlets 
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are filled in 1 litre bottles. So an addi tional innovation that would 
assist European spirits producers in coming to terms with the 
aboli tion of intra-EU duty free in 1999 would be the substitution of 
the present 70cl bottle wi th a standard 1 litre bottle for all spirits 
sold in the European Union. Such a move would lower production costs 
and hence be popular within the whisky industry, especially if it 
were to provide the basis for further standardization in other 
markets. Litre bottles would also render a reconsti tuted duty system 
that taxed on the basis of 'Ii tres of pure alcohol' transparent and 
readily understood. 
Such a reform would be especially beneficial to the Scotch whisky 
industry. The proposed reduction in spirits duties in the United 
Kingdom would have the effect of cutting the tax on a typical 1 litre 
bottle of Scotch whisky at 40% abv by £4.23. Assuming a current 
retail price of £15.00 per litre, this would reduce the selling price 
to £10.77 - roughly equivalent to the 'duty free' price currently 
charged aboard a P&O ferry for a litre of typical blended Scotch 
whisky. 
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7.8 Impact of Proposed Reforms on Government Revenue 
In this Section, the possible impact upon exchequer receipts in the 
Uni ted Kingdom of the proposed amendments to the structure of alcohol 
duties is considered. ReduCing excise duties on spirits in 
particular would shrink tax receipts on each bottle sold, but the 
increase in sales would have the effect of enlarging the tax base, 
mitigating the final loss in tax. 
According to Scotch Whisky Association Databank figures, in 1996 
duty paid Scotch whisky retained for home use was 32,065,300 Ipa, 
duty was £19.78 per litre of pure alcohol, 55 so tax receipts realised 
in 1996 were approximately £634 million. This is in line with 
Sutherlands' 1996 estimate of HM Customs & Excise duties from Scotch 
whisky of £653 million. 54 
It was advanced in the previous Section that a reduction in the 
spirits excise to £10.00 per litre of pure alcohol would increase 
total whisky output by 13.47 million to 45.54 million lpa. Total 
excise receipts from whisky would therefore be of the order of £455 
million. The increase in employment associated wi th higher output of 
whisky would reduce social security and raise income tax payments, 
but it was contended in the previous Section that this salutary 
benefit will most likely be offset by reduced employment resulting 
from lower exports of Scotch whisky in the aftermath of the abolition 
of intra-EU duty free in 1999. A similar qualification applies in 
respect of altered corporation tax receipts. 
Nevertheless, the reductions in duty rates will act to curtail the 
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incidence of cross-border shopping. Estimates by HM Customs & Excise 
presented in Section 7.2 suggested that the duty and VAT loss on 
spirits in 1996 from legitimate cross-border shopping and illicit 
smuggling was at least £100m. The significant cut in duties on 
spiri ts proposed would render much of this activity unprofitable, so 
it is quite possible HM Customs & Excise would realise most of this 
revenue. In addition, lower duties on beer and the proposed 20% cut 
in wine duties (100% on wines from Australia & New Zealand), would 
also substantially stem the flow of cross-border shopping, and hence 
help to restore the domestic excise tax base. 
The calculations above suggest therefore that lost revenues to the 
exchequer associated with the proposed reductions in alcohol duties 
are likely to be minimal, a finding supported by empirical evidence 
of the revenue effects of recent changes in duties. Data presented in 
Section 7.2 revealed that revenues accruing to HM Customs & Excise 
from alcohol duties fell in the financial year following a duty 
increase, but increased when duties were frozen or reduced. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the dependence of HM Treasury in the United 
Kingdom upon alcohol & commodity taxes reflects past administrative 
and political convenience rather than a calculated use of the tax 
system to influence consumption patterns. The growth of revenue from 
new and buoyant taxes during the 20th century has greatly reduced the 
pre-eminence of the old excise duties as a source of revenue. 57 
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom continues to raise a higher 
proportion of total government revenue from taxes on alcohol than any 
other European Union member state, excepting the Republic of 
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Ireland and the Scandanavian countries. s8 The total revenue from 
alcohol duties in 1995-96 summed to over £5.6 billion (disaggregated 
in Table 7.6) , equivalent to 2. 5p on the basic rate of income tax, or 
2.3% on VAT. 
Table 7.6: HM Customs & Excise Revenue from Alcoholic Drinks: 
Year to 31st March 1996 Em 
Product Total Revenue 9,,-0 of Total 
Scotch Whisky 652.6 11.6 
Other Spirits 1000.8 17.8 
Beer 2642.3 47.0 
Wine 1187.3 21.1 
Cider & Perry 134.2 2.4 
Total Drinks 5617.2 100.0 
Source: The Scotch Whisky Industry Review 1996 
It is evident, therefore, that governments in the United Kingdom have 
been attempting to raise too great a proportion of revenues from 
alcohol excises, and substi tution into other forms of taxation may be 
timely. 
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7.9 Conclusions 
Section 7.2 of this Chapter discussed the many problems with the 
present structure of alcohol excises in the United Kingdom. This 
system depresses consumption of spirits, chiefly produced in the 
United Kingdom, and encourages the imbibing of wine, almost 
exclusively imported. The discriminatory treatment of spirits in 
the domestic market seriously compromises the efforts of the whisky 
industry to eliminate inequitable tax treatment overseas, most 
notably evident in the recent proposals of the European Commission 
for minimum alcohol excises across Europe. 
Moreover, high rates of duty in the United Kingdom have been 
productive of lower employment in the drinks industry, a phenomenon 
worsened by the prevalence of cross-border shopping, which has been 
directly responsible for the loss of many jobs in the on-trade in 
Southern England. In addition, on the basis of HM Customs & Excise 
own estimates, the loss to the United Kingdom Treasury from reduced 
domestic sales of alcohol is substantial. 
Empirical evidence taken from the effects of recent alterations in 
the excise rates suggests that government revenues from spirits 
duties fell in the aftermath of an increase in tax, but rallied when 
duties were frozen or reduced. This implies that excise duties in 
general, but on spirits in particular, may have surpassed their 
revenue maximising rate. 
Section 7.3 analysed the various alterations to the Uni ted Kingdom IS 
structure of alcohol excises proposed by economists. The I levelling 
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up', 'levelling down', and 'revenue & consumption neutral' reforms 
advocated by those attached to the IFS were examined, as was the 
notion that high values of income elasticity of demand for alcohol 
(wine & spirits in particular) justifies regularly revalorising 
alcohol duties to take account of rising real incomes. 
All these economists' arguments were found to be wanting. None took 
into account the effects of their proposals upon important 
industries in the United Kingdom, like the Scotch whisky industry, 
nor did they consider the bearing of cross-border shopping upon 
levying indirect taxation in the United Kingdom. The Republic of 
Ireland was shown to have utilized extensively indirect taxation in 
an attempt to curb alcohol consumption, but the results have been 
mixed. Moreover, other evidence presented revealed that total per 
capita alcohol consumption in the United Kingdom (especially of 
spirits & beer), has actually fallen since 1979, and risen only 
slightly in the wider European Union, where alcohol control policies 
have generally been much more relaxed. 
In the light of this evidence, it was suggested in Section 7.4 that 
alcohol duties in the Uni ted Kingdom should be frozen, and the rate on 
spirits approximately halved in real terms, such that all alcoholic 
drinks would be taxed at the flat rate of £10.00 per litre of pure 
alcohol. On the basis of McDonnell & Maynards' estimates referred to 
in Section 5.5, this figure would still be more than adequate to take 
account of the negative externalities associated with alcohol 
consumption. Such a reform would also enable the government and 
drinks industry leaders in the United Kingdom to lobby credibly for 
'equivalency' in alcohol taxation in other countries. 
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It was also contended that abolishing taxes on wines imported from 
the British Dominions of Australia & New Zealand would not only 
augment consanguinity with these Commonwealth nations, but have the 
effect of forcing those European countries for whom wine is an 
important industry to take account of the United Kingdom's viewpoint 
when discussing the harmonisation of alcohol excises across 
Europe. 
Section 7.5 considered the widely varying estimates for values of own 
price elasticity of demand for alcoholic beverages in the United 
Kingdom, evidence if any were needed of the severe limitations on 
Economics as an 'exact' social science. Nevertheless, for spiri ts at 
least, the mean estimate calculated conformed quite closely with 
empirical evidence of the effect of recent reductions in the spirits 
excise upon sales of Scotch whisky. 
Utilizing this elasticity estimate in Sections 7.6 & 7.7 facilitated 
a computation of the potential effects of a reduction in duties upon 
demand for whisky, and hence employment, in the whisky industry and 
wider Scottish economy. The estimated gain in employment was 
calculated to be sufficient to offset any negative linkage 
adjustments associated with a reduction in whisky exports in the 
aftermath of the abolition of intra-EU duty free in 1999. 
Finally, in Section 7.8 the impact of the proposed reductions in 
duties upon government revenue was contemplated. It was suggested 
that the enlarging of the tax base associated with increased sales, 
together with a reduction in cross-border trading, would ensure that 
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any loss to the exchequer would be minimal. In addition, it was 
contended that governments in the United Kingdom have been relying 
too heavily upon alcohol excises as a source of revenue, and that 
alternative forms of taxation should be considered. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
In the introductory Section of Chapter 2, it was stated that no a 
priori conclusion as to the exigency of government intervention in 
those areas most directly impacting upon the whisky industry was 
possible without an examination of those factors which were intra 
vires the industry to affect. Such an appraisal was consummated in 
Chapter 2. 
It was revealed that the precedent for government intervention in the 
industry was set as far back as 1823, and since that time, the public 
authori ties have periodically acted to assist the development of the 
industry. A consideration of the production of whisky revealed that 
in such a traditional industry, major improvements in productivity 
are rare, and where this has been attempted, there has often been a 
trade-off in quality. 
The issues surrounding mergers & acquisitions within the whisky 
industry and indeed the wider Scottish economy were examined, and the 
reservations of those concerned with high levels of 'non-Scottish' 
control of indigenous industries noted. It was nevertheless argued 
that in the whisky industry at least, such consolidation facilitates 
economies in marketing & distribution, and may be necessary given 
contracting sales of whisky in highly competitive mature markets, 
and the uncertainty of continuing success in those newly 
emerging. 
Chapter 2 concluded that whilst there is some scope for performance 
improvement in the arenas of marketing & distribution, the ability of 
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the whisky industry to achieve a sustained increase in demand for 
whisky is sharply constrained, considering that taxation forms such 
a significant element of the final price of the product. 
Chapter 3 examined the linkages between the whisky industry and the 
regional Scottish economy, calculating that the whisky industry may 
support over 40,000 jobs across Scotland, directly, indirectly 
through suppliers, and by the process of multiplier induced 
employment. In particular, the Scottish Input-Output Tables 
revealed that the Scottish agricultural, glass and paper & board 
sectors are especially dependent upon the patronage of the whisky 
industry. 
Whilst it was suggested in Chapter 4 that abolition of the intra-EU 
duty free concession in 1999 is timely, it was revealed that the 
intra-EU duty free market was worth approximately £185m to the whisky 
industry in 1995, representing almost 2.3% of total whisky output by 
volume in that year. Determining precise estimates as to the likely 
impact of abolition of intra-EU duty free upon the whisky industry 
was difficult, given the possibility that there may be an increase in 
duty-paid sales overseas in the aftermath of abolition. But it was 
concluded that there will likely be significant negative linkage 
adjustments with suppliers to the whisky industry post 1999. 
Chapter 5 examined the history of the special taxation of alcohol in 
the United Kingdom, and noted the influence of past prejudices 
against spirits upon the present duty structure, which taxes 
spirits, on a degree of alcohol basis, significantly more severely 
than either wine or beer. It was concluded that there are no 
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economic, health or social justifications for such discrimination, 
and that an ideal system of excise duties would seek to determine the 
total social cost of alcohol consumption, and then charge the average 
cost on each degree of pure alcohol sold. On this basis, even 
attributing a high value to the estimated total social cost of 
duties in the United Kingdom. 
'\ 
J 
alcohol consumption would not justify the current level of excise 
/ 
Chapter 6 studied the European market for alcoholic beverages, the 
form of which is in part determined by duty structures in every 
European nation which discriminate heavily against spirits in favour 
of wine, and to a lesser extent, beer. Several academic reports were 
presented in Chapter 6 which concluded that the different categories 
of alcoholic beverage are in competition with each other to fulfill 
consumer needs, and that this being the case, excise duty structures 
that discriminate against spirits will have an appreciable impact 
upon consumption. 
The most recent proposals of the European Commission on the 
harmonisation of alcohol excises were shown to be based upon nothing 
more than blatant protectionism of European vinicultures, highly 
nefarious in every respect to spirits distilling industries in the 
Uni ted Kingdom. But the al ternati ves to excise harmonisation 
advanced by most economists ran directly counter to the concept of a 
Single European Market. 
Chapter 7 discussed the many problems with the present structure of 
alcohol excises in the United Kingdom, which has the effect of 
depressing consumption of spirits, a largely indigenously produced 
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product, and encouraging the purchase of wine, almost entirely 
imported. In addition, it was revealed that high duties on alcohol in 
general have encouraged a surge in cross-border trading in duty-paid 
products, which as well as being to the detriment of employment and 
exchequer revenues in the United Kingdom, has been productive of 
criminal activity. 
The various alternatives proposed by economists to the United 
Kingdom's structure of duties were considered, but all were found to 
be wanting. Most advocated reforms that would equalise the tax 
applied to all alcoholic beverages, but believed 'levelling up' 
duties on wine & beer to that which pertains for spirits was the most 
effective way of achieving this. None took into account the effects 
of such proposals upon important industries in the United Kingdom, 
such as whisky, nor did they consider the bearing of cross-border 
shopping upon levying indirect taxation in the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, empirical evidence presented in Chapter 7 suggested that 
alcohol duties in the Uni ted Kingdom, particularly those applied to 
spirits, have likely exceeded their revenue maximising rate. 
In the light of this evidence, it was contended that the structure of 
alcohol duties in the United Kingdom should be reformed such that all 
alcoholic beverages are taxed at an equal rate on the basis of 
alcoholic content. This reform could be most effectively 
implemented by harmonizing alcohol excises at a level of £10.00 per 
"--Ii tre of pure alcohol, and thereafter freezing duties with a view to 
reducing their real value. This implies a slight reduction in duties 
on beer, a cut in the wine excise of 20%, and almost halving the tax 
applied to spirits. 
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It has been argued throughout that such innovations in the United 
Kingdom are a sine qua non for the whisky industry & government to 
lobby with integrity for comparable reforms overseas and in any 
revised set of proposals on European excise harmonisation. 
In addition, to incline other nations in Europe to the United 
Kingdom's viewpoint on these issues, it was suggested that the excise 
and Value Added Tax should be abolished on wines imported from the 
British Dominions of Australia & New Zealand. 
Estimates of the own-price elasticity of spirits presented in 
Chapter 7 implied that reducing the excise applied to spirits would 
most likely increase sales of whisky to such an extent that the 
resulting fillip to employment across Scotland would be sufficient 
to offset any negative linkage adjustments associated with a 
reduction in whisky exports in the aftermath of the abolition of 
intra-EU duty free in 1999. 
Chater 7 concluded that the effects of the proposed reforms upon 
exchequer revenues would be slight, and that in any case, governments 
in the United Kingdom have been attempting to raise too great a 
proportion of revenues from alcohol excises. 
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o Whisky! Soul 0 plays and pranks! 
Accept a bardie's grateful thanks! 
When wanting thee, what tuneless cranks 
Are my poor verses. 
Robert Burns 
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